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Representational and Calculational Accounts of Reasoning about Conjunctions and 
Disjunctions of Events
Representational accounts for errors in reasoning about conjunctions and 
disjunctions of events were contrasted with accounts based on the algebraic 
combination of simple event likelihoods. In a series of two experiments, patterns in 
judgments about complex events were explored when the differing strategies were 
likely to be used. Evidence was gathered to determine when representations of 
complex events are likely to be constructed, and how judgments about complex 
events are derived when a representation is available. A particular representational 
account of judgment and decision making, explanation-based decision making, is 
explored as an account for errors in reasoning about conjunctions and disjunctions of 
events. As predicted, likelihood judgments for conjunctions of explanations 
consistently were above the estimated likelihoods of at least one of the component 
explanations, and likelihood judgments for disjunctions of explanations consistently 
fell below likelihoods of the more likely component explanations for common 
scenario problems. Furthermore, conjunction judgments were found to depend on the 
relationship between component explanations, a finding predicted by explanation- 
based decision making and consistent only with representational accounts of 
reasoning. However, disjunction judgments were not sensitive to the relationship 
between component explanations, suggesting that subjects may invoke a calculational 
strategy when assessing some types of disjunctive events. The findings of this 
research provide support for both representational and calculational accounts, and 
suggest that the representation of events plays in important role in the selection of 
strategies that are used to solve judgment problems.
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Representational and Calculational Accounts for Reasoning about 
Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Events
INTRODUCTION
People are often called upon to make probability judgments about complex 
events. For example, a juror may need to decide how likely it is that a defendant is 
innocent because he or she acted in self defense. A military strategist may assess the 
likelihood of troop deployment on either of two fronts or both. A radar specialist 
may need to quickly decide if a radar image is military and attacking. In each case, 
data is available to the decision maker and the decision maker must assess the 
likelihood of certain interpretations of those data. These interpretations often take the 
form of complex combinations of events.
Probability theory has been used to prescribe how optimal judgments 
regarding the likelihood of events should be made. However, probability theory has 
been unable to provide an acceptable account for how people actually make 
judgments (see e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Pennington & Hastie,
1992; Robinson & Hastie, 1985; Schum & Martin, 1982; Wyer, 1976)). Statistical 
heuristics, judgment tools that are rough equivalents of statistical principles, are 
primarily used in situations in which statistical reasoning is normative, when the 
sample space and processes are clear, and when the role of chance in producing 
events is clear (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). However, in everyday 
judgments, these conditions are rarely met.
One major goal of our research is to extend the empirical work on judgments 
of event likelihoods, especially the research on reasoning about conjunctions of 
events, to situations in which disjunctions of events are under consideration.
Through this empirical extension, we propose to investigate the theoretical 
explanations that have been offered for common errors in reasoning about
conjunctions and disjunctions. A framework is presented for classifying the 
theoretical accounts of the judgment phenomena. This framework classifies the 
accounts according to whether the judgment phenomena are explained in terms of (a) 
the algebraic combination of simple event likelihoods or (b) the semantic 
representation of complex events.
Reasoning about Conjunctions of Events
People show a consistent pattern of reasoning about probabilities of a 
conjunction of events and much of this reasoning violates probability theory. A 
complex event is called a conjunction when it can be broken into at least two 
component events (e.g., A, B) that both occurred (e.g., A & B). Probability theory 
states that the probability of events A&B cannot exceed either the probability of event 
A or the probability of event B. When subjects are asked to make likelihood 
estimates of single and conjunctive events, subjects frequently rank the likelihood of 
A&B as more probable than A and less probable than B. According to probability 
theory, these subjects are making a very basic error in reasoning, because the 
probability of the conjunction cannot be greater than either component. Tversky and 
Kahneman have termed these responses "conjunction errors", because they violate the 
prescriptions of probability theory.
These conjunction errors have been most widely demonstrated with 
categorical materials, in which the judgment involves assessing the likelihood that a 
person is a member of a particular category given a description (Agnoli & Krantz, 
1989; Fiedler, 1988; Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991; Locksley & Stangor,
1984; Morier & Borgida, 1984; Shafir, Smith, & Osherson, 1990; Smith & Osherson, 
1984; Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988; Wells, 1985). In one of the best- 
known examples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983),
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subjects were presented with a paragraph about a person, “Linda,” who was described 
in terms of her social activism. Subjects were then asked to rank or estimate the 
probabilities of single and conjunctive events related to the description, for example 
that Linda was a bank teller (A), Linda was active in the feminist movement (B), and 
Linda was a bank teller who was active in the feminist movement (A&B). Eighty- 
five percent of their subjects ranked the likelihood of A&B as more probable than A 
and less probable than B, in violation of probability theory.
Similar errors have been found in causal reasoning (Abelson, Leddo, & Gross, 
1987; Ahn, Gordon, & Bailenson, 1994; Leddo, Abelson, & Gross, 1984; Manning & 
Schreier-Pandal, 1993; McClure, Lalljee, & Jaspars, 1991; McClure, Lalljee, Jaspars, 
& Abelson, 1989; Pennington, Messamer, & Nicolich, 1992; Tversky & Koehler, 
1993), reasoning about event scenarios (Dawes, 1988; Goldsmith, 1978; Yates & 
Carlson, 1986), and medical diagnosis (Biela, 1986). In one study (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983) subjects were presented with a description of a situation (e.g., 
about Mr. P.) and assertions about the situation. Subjects ranked the assertions by 
their probabilities of occurrence. Simple assertions, such as “Mr. P. killed one of his 
employees” were rated as less likely than complex conjunctive assertions containing 
the simple assertion, such as “Mr. P. killed one of his employees to prevent him from 
talking to the police”. The mean rank of the conjunction was 2.90, whereas the mean 
rank of the inclusive statement was 3.17. Therefore, the probability of the 
conjunction (Mr. P. killed an employee for reason X) was found to be greater than the 
probability of its component (Mr. P. killed an employee). Thus, these studies have 
found that complex explanations are sometimes preferred to, or assigned a likelihood 
greater than explanations containing only one component. As with categorical 
reasoning, the higher assessments of probability for conjunctive causal explanations 
constitute a violation of probability theory. A more detailed or complete account 
A&B&C must of necessity be less likely to be true than is each individual
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component, A, B, C.
4
Reasoning about Disjunctions of Events
Although not as exhaustively studied, there is evidence from a variety of 
domains that decision makers also reason about disjunctions of events in ways that 
are inconsistent with probability theory (Bar-Hillel, 1973). A complex event is called 
a disjunction when it can be broken into at least two component events (e.g., A, B), 
and at least one of the component events occurred (e.g., AorB). The probability 
theory combination rule states that the probability of events AorB is equal to the 
probability of event A plus the probability of event B minus the probability of the 
conjunction of events A&B. Consequently, the probability of a disjunction of events 
cannot be less than the probability of the more likely component event. People have 
been found to violate the probability theory combination rule when engaging in 
causal reasoning (Goldsmith, 1978; Manning & Schreier-Pandal, 1993), categorical 
reasoning (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1993; Hampton, 1988; Morier & Borgida, 1984; 
Wells, 1985), medical diagnosis (Biela, 1986), reasoning about event scenarios 
(Carlson & Yates, 1989; Dawes, 1988), and when choosing among risky alternatives 
(Shafir, 1994; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). The most common pattern found in these 
studies is that reasoners tend to underestimate disjunctions relative to the probability
theory combination rule.
For example, Carlson and Yates (1989) found evidence that people reason
about disjunctions composed of unrelated events in a manner that is inconsistent with 
probability theory. Specifically, they asked subjects to make likelihood judgments 
about either US automobile prices increasing by at least $25 or the Detroit Tigers 
ending their season with a better record than the Cleveland Indians, or both. They 
found that 70 percent of their subjects rated the disjunction as having lower
probability than the least likely component, in direct violation of the probability 
theory combination rule. In research involving categorical materials, Hampton 
(1988) found that people were sometimes more willing to allow an item in a category 
considered singly than when the category was disjoined with another class in which 
the item clearly did not belong. His subjects considered “eating ice-cream” to be a 
member of the singular category “hobby”, but did not consider it to be a member of 
the disjunctive (and necessarily more likely) category “hobby or game”. Bar- 
Hillel( 1973) found that subjects preferred to bet on a simple event over a more likely 
complex event composed of a disjunction of the simple events. In judging 
cumulative probabilities, Dawes (1988) found a tendency to underestimate the 
likelihood of disjunctions of events, for example, in estimating the probability of 
being seriously injured or killed in a car accident over many years.
Theoretical Accounts for Conjunction and Disjunction Errors
Although it has not been possible to identify a single rule or set of rules that 
subjects consistently apply to simple event probabilities to arrive at probabilities for 
complex events, several theoretical accounts have been offered. In order to arrive at 
likelihood judgments in the form of a rating or ranking, it is clear that all decision 
makers and experimental subjects must engage in some form of mental calculation, 
whether available to consciousness or not. One important feature that distinguishes 
among various theoretical accounts of how this computation occurs is whether the 
account assigns a maximal role to the computation process itself, or whether the 
account assigns a maximal role to the mental representations and interpretations of 
the complex events that might occur prior to the computation. The former type of 
theory we refer to as an “algebraic combination rule account” because these theories 
attempt to explain reasoning about the likelihood of conjunctions and disjunctions of
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events in terms of algebraic combination rules in which simple component event 
probabilities are added, subtracted, multiplied, averaged, or otherwise combined.
The mental representation of the events themselves is not addressed except to 
propose that probability values for the simple component events are stripped off prior 
to combination. The second type of theory we refer to as a “representational account” 
because in these theories likelihood judgments are based on assessments of the 
features of semantic representations, such as similarity or completeness, after the 
complex events are represented. In these accounts, simple component event 
probabilities are not explicitly combined, indeed, they may never be derived. In the 
next sections, we review these two types of theories, and discuss their predictions for 
reasoning about conjunctions and disjunctions of events.
Algebraic Combination Rule Accounts
Algebraic combination models (Abelson et al., 1987; Carlson & Yates, 1989, 
Einhom, 1985; Goldsmith, 1978; Shanteau, 1975; Troutman & Shanteau, 1977; 
Wyer, 1976; Yates & Carlson, 1986) provide a very simple account of how people 
reason about the likelihood of complex events. In these models, people perform 
some mathematical calculation on simple event probabilities to evaluate more 
complex events. These models assume that probability values are stripped from 
component events and then combined, without consideration for how the component 
events are related or how they can be integrated into a single representation. They 
claim that the primary cause of conjunction and disjunction errors is the application 
of incorrect combination rules to simple event likelihoods. These incorrect rules 
may include averaging, weighted averaging, multiplying, and computing the 
geometric mean of the component probabilities. For example, the earliest proposals 
for reasoning about conjunctions described subjects’ computations as following, or
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nearly following, an averaging rule (Goldsmith, 1978; Shanteau, 1975; Troutman & 
Shanteau, 1977; Wyer, 1976). Later proposals provided fits to subjects’ judgments 
about the likelihood of complex events with a weighted geometric mean of the 
component probabilities (Abelson et al„ 1987; Einhom, 1985; Leddo et al„ 1984).
The most complete proposal for algebraic combination rules that describe 
judgments about conjunctions and disjunctions of events, we will call the signed 
combination model (Carlson & Yates, 1989; Yates & Carlson, 1986). The signed 
combination model suggests two rules: the signed summation rule as an account for 
judgments about conjunctions of unrelated events, and the signed combination rule as 
an account for judgments about disjunctions of unrelated events. The first claim of 
this model is that people differentiate (qualitatively) between likely and unlikely 
events. The second is that people can compare the likelihoods of events to determine 
which of two or more events is more likely, or if they are equally likely. A likely 
event has a greater perceived chance of occurring than an unlikely event. Thus, in 
applying these rules to judgments of complex events, it is suggested that people 
assign a positive qualitative likelihood value (+) to likely events, and a negative 
qualitative likelihood value (-) to unlikely events. Events that have equal chances of 
occurring or not occurring receive a neutral value (0). The likelihood of a 
conjunction is determined by summing the likelihood indices of the components:
1(A & B) = 1(A) + 1(B), where 1(X) is the qualitative likelihood of event X. This is 
the signed summation rule. Using this formula, the model makes the predictions that 
when A and B are both likely, the judgment of the likelihood of A&B (++) will be 
greater than A (+) and greater than B (+), creating what has been called a double 
conjunction error. When A is likely and B is unlikely, the judgment of A&B <+-) will 
have a value between A (+) and B (-) resulting in a single conjunction error. Finally, 
when both A and B are unlikely, no conjunction errors are predicted to occur <~ is 
less than -, resulting in no error). Carlson and Yates (Carlson & Yates, 1989)
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developed a second rule to account for peoples’ estimates of disjunctions of events, 
the signed combination rule: A( AorB) = vv/A(A) + vi'2/M B), where w] and w2 have
values between zero and one, and together sum to one. This rule uses the same 
qualitative likelihood index described for the signed summation rule. For 
disjunctions of events, this model predicts that for events of equal qualitative 
likelihood, the disjunction will be equal in likelihood to the components. For events 
of differing qualitative likelihood, the model predicts that the disjunction should fall 
between the components.
Representational Accounts
Representational models (e.g., (Hampton, 1988; Leddo et al., 1984, McClure 
et al., 1989; Pennington & Hastie, 1986; Pennington & Hastie, 1988; Pennington & 
Hastie, 1991; Pennington & Hastie, 1993; Pennington et al., 1992; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) are rich models describing how 
events are represented, and how computations over the representation of the events 
can lead to predictable judgment errors. In representational models, the evaluation of 
the likelihood of complex events emerges as a property of the representation of 
knowledge. Judgments about a complex event are influenced by factors such as the 
relationships among component events, and whether the events can be combined into 
a single, plausible scenario. Representational models claim that these factors should 
influence the evaluation of a complex event beyond the mere derivation of 
component likelihoods. These models claim that it is not necessary for component 
event likelihoods to be derived in all situations. The likelihood of the complex event 
as a whole may or may not be determined through the derivation of simple event 
probabilities. 1 Instead, the representation of the complex event will determine how
i Of course, people must somehow translate their representation of the complex event into a 
quantitative likelihood. They may do so using some calculational method, and in some
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it is evaluated.
The best known representational account of conjunction errors contends that 
people use a representativeness heuristic to reason about uncertain events. According 
to the representativeness heuristic, the subjective probability of an event is 
determined by its similarity to a parent population or category, and by the degree to 
which it shares salient features with that population or category (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). An 
instance is representative of a category if it shares the essential features of that 
category. Representativeness of a category can be increased by increasing the 
number of features the instance shares with the category, and decreased by increasing 
the number of distinctive features the instance has that are not shared by other 
category members. Thus, in the well-known “Linda” example, people judge Linda to 
be most likely to be a feminist and least likely to be a bank teller because her 
description is most similar to our representations of feminists and least similar to our 
representations of bank tellers. Furthermore, the description of Linda shares more 
features with a feminist bank teller than with just a bank teller alone, making her 
more representative of feminist bank teller than of bank teller. In this manner, 
representativeness predicts that people will estimate the conjunction (feminist bank 
teller) as more likely than one component (bank teller), producing a conjunction 
error. Extending representativeness to disjunctions, Bar-Hillel (1993) suggests that 
disjunction errors will occur to the extent that an event is more similar to or more 
representative of a subordinate category than to its superordinate. Thus, a particular 
person might be deemed more likely to major in literature (A) than in humanities 
(AorBorC...) if the description of the person fit quite closely a stereotype of a person
situations, this method may involve algebraic combination. Thus, representational models 
do not make the claim that calculation is absent. Their claim is that the entire representation 
of the complex event is important, and this representation will determine the evaluation of a
complex event.
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interested in literature.
Although representativeness provides a plausible account of conjunction 
errors on many of the category-description problems, it is less clear how category 
representations and similarity matches can account for most categorical disjunction 
effects, categorical conjunction effects when materials do not give rise to sensible 
category representations, and conjunction and disjunction errors in causal reasoning 
about events. Other representational accounts have tried to fill in this gap, most 
notably accounts that stress the representations of events in terms of stories or 
explanations that provide an interpretation of the events (Leddo et al., 1984;
McClure et al., 1989; Pennington & Hastie, 1991; Pennington & Hastie, 1993;
Pennington et al., 1992).
According to one theory (Pennington & Hastie, 1986; Pennington & Hastie, 
1991; Pennington & Hastie, 1993), in the course of making assessments of 
uncertainty and making decisions based on those assessments, decision makers 
construct an explanation, in the form of a story, that ties evidence into a causal 
structure and thereby provides an interpretation of it. Assessments of uncertainty are 
determined by attributes of the explanation the decision maker constructs to account 
for decision-relevant evidence. These attributes include, among others, the 
completeness, plausibility, and uniqueness of the explanation. Similarly, Leddo and 
colleagues (Leddo et al., 1984), suggest that people use their content knowledge of a 
situation and their abstract knowledge of causal relations to construct an explanatory 
frame. The frame represents their ideas about the structure of a complete explanation
of a given event.
In both of these theories, which we will refer to as an explanation-based 
decision making account, a set of events is considered to be more likely when the 
representation is viewed as more plausible, i.e. matching knowledge we have about 
what happens in the world, but also when it is viewed as more complete.
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Completeness refers to the extent to which the story has its expected parts — initiating 
events, goals (motives), actions, and outcomes -  connected into a causal sequence.
A complete story, one with each important piece of evidence causally linked together 
to explain the final outcome, is more likely to be considered true than an incomplete 
story, i.e., a story with links missing in the causal chain of events (Pennington et al.,
1992).
In terms of probability theory, a complete story is less probable than a story 
with some elements left unspecified. In other words, the conjunction of the 
probabilities of all the elements in the story is necessarily less than the conjunction of 
the probabilities of only some of the elements of the story. Therefore, the more 
complete story of Mr. P. being accused of murder because of X, Y, and Z should be 
considered more likely to be true than the less complete story of Mr. P. being accused 
of murder for no specified reason. Thus, explanation-based decision making 
accounts for the conjunction errors for causal materials through increased
completeness of the explanation.
Explanation-based decision making and the completeness principle were 
developed using judgments involving causal reasoning. No specific account of 
conjunction errors with categorical materials has been developed. It has been argued 
that categorization can also involve causal reasoning (Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 
1989) when the categorical judgment is novel, that is, when deliberate reasoning 
about the proper categorization occurs. Indeed, Tversky & Kahneman (1980) claim 
that "the intentions and traits that are inferred from a personality sketch are naturally 
viewed as causes of such outcomes as professional choice or success in school (page 
59)” (see also Hastie, Schroeder, & Weber, 1990). To the extent that causal 
reasoning occurs, explanation-based decision making explains conjunction errors for 
categorical material in exactly the same way as for causal material -  on the basis of 
completeness and plausibility. Considering the Linda example, to the extent that
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causal reasoning occurs, a person would try to construct a plausible causal chain or 
story connecting the description of Linda with her obtaining a position as a bank 
teller. To the extent that such a scenario was implausible or incomplete, likelihood 
judgments of the bank teller category would be low. To the extent that activity in the 
feminist movement yields a plausible, complete causal scenario, probability estimates 
would be high. The conjunction estimate would be based on an explanation 
containing most of the elements of the complete, plausible feminist story, with minor 
alterations to explain Linda's work choice, thus retaining the story's completeness and 
losing some of its plausibility. Consistent with this view, research (Hastie et al„
1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980) has found evidence that subjects naturally 
developed causal accounts to explain why a described person chose a vocation 
inconsistent with their personality description.
In addition to predicting conjunction errors through the completeness 
principle, explanation-based decision making also predicts that disjunction errors will 
arise in some situations through a second principle called the uniqueness principle. 
Uniqueness of an explanation refers to the extent to which only one plausible 
alternative explanation exists for decision-relevant evidence. According to the 
uniqueness principle of explanation-based decision theory, stories that can uniquely 
explain events are rated as more likely to be true than are multiple stories that provide 
non-unique accounts of events. Similar "discounting" principles have been proposed 
in causal attribution research (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986) in which a likely cause is 
discounted when alternative causes are available. The uniqueness principle leads to 
the prediction that disjunctive explanations should be regarded as less likely than 
what is prescribed by the probability theory combination rule, unless the component 
explanations can somehow be merged into a single explanation (as in conjunctions). 
In some cases, this could yield the surprising effect of disjunctive explanations being 
regarded as less likely than the single explanations that comprise them.
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For example, in the domain of legal decision making, a defense containing 
multiple possible stories that could explain events may not be considered any more 
likely to be true by juries than a unique defense story (a story without competing 
alternatives), holding everything else constant. Indeed, the defense with multiple 
stories may even be considered as less likely to be true than a unique defense story. 
Thus, Mr. P. is guilty of murder either because he did X or Y may be considered less 
likely than the assertion that Mr. P. is guilty of murder because he did X, unless X 
and Y can be combined into a plausible story in which both X and Y occur. Similar 
predictions are made for categorical materials, to the extent that disjunctive 
categorizations require separate explanations that do not yield a single connecting 
causal chain.
Theoretical Support
There is mixed theoretical support for both algebraic combination and 
semantic representation accounts. The most convincing studies in favor of algebraic 
combination models have shown that the pattern of conjunction and disjunction 
errors remains the same across situations where the representation of events should 
be dramatically different. In one such study, Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991) 
found that similar errors occurred for complex events with completely unrelated 
components, with components related to a common description, and with 
components referring to materials where representativeness could not be playing a 
role (e.g. materials describing imaginary creatures). Thus, they claim the major 
determinant of conjunction errors must be the simple event probabilities, rather than 
the representations of the complex events. Similarly, Thuring and Jungerman(1990) 
found that a causal relationship between constituents had no effect on the incidence 
of conjunction errors. Instead, they found that the errors were primarily predicted by
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simple event probabilities.
Another convincing approach to distinguish among algebraic combination and 
semantic representation models involves showing that errors in reasoning about 
conjunctions and disjunctions of events occur in situations in which a common 
representation for the complex event is unlikely. Yates and Carlson (1986) and 
Carlson and Yates (1989) conducted a series of studies to find out if the incidence of 
conjunction and disjunction errors would be high even when it was unlikely that 
subjects would combine components of the complex events into a single 
representation. Their complex events were composed of two events generated by 
unrelated processes, such as the likelihood that "Congress will raise taxes in this 
election year" and that "Bo Derek will be nominated for an Academy Award for her 
performance in her latest film". They found a high incidence of conjunction and 
disjunction errors that seemed only to depend on the component event likelihoods of 
complex events. Carlson and Yates concluded that the errors must thus be primarily 
caused by the incorrect application of algebraic rules to component event 
probabilities.
Abelson, Leddo, and Gross (1987) tried to determine whether a rule provided 
a fit to subjects’ judgments about complex explanations for event scenario outcomes. 
In their study, subjects were asked the probability that an explanation or a 
conjunction of explanations was among the factors that influenced a person to take 
some action (e.g. Jerry buying a new car). They found that a weighted geometric 
mean of the component explanation probabilities (e.g. the probability of Jerry 
thinking the dealer was reputable, and the probability of Jerry wanting a car with a 
good performance record) provided the best fitting model for their data. The weight, 
also called the conjunction coefficient, represents the degree to which the component 
explanations fit together. Although this model is primarily an algebraic combination 
model, the fact that the weight improved the model’s fit of the data points to a
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representational account. Not only were component probabilities found to be 
important, the authors claimed that the relationship among the component 
explanations were used to adjust the final value of the complex explanation up or 
down, depending on whether the explanations could be fit together into a coherent 
story.
In general, research providing evidence for representational models typically 
involves demonstrating that the representation of events influences the incidence and 
magnitude of conjunction and disjunction errors, above and beyond that due to simple 
event probabilities. For example, the incidence of errors has been found to depend on 
the relevance of judged events to a described scenario (Manning & Schreier-Pandal, 
1993), on the type of event that was to be explained by the conjunction (e.g. rare or 
common events, (Locksley & Stangor, 1984), on whether the problem was described 
with story-based or covariation-based explanations (Ahn et al., 1994), and on the 
perceived compatibility of the conjunction’s components (Gavanski & Roskos- 
Ewoldsen, 1991). Using a different approach, Bar-Hillel and Neter (1993) found that 
disjunction errors occurred even when no component probabilities were available for 
the application of algebraic rules. They claim that the errors made by their subjects 
could not have been due to improper combination of simple event probabilities. 
Consistent with this idea, Shafir, Smith, and Osherson (1990) noted that subjects in 
their studies rarely decomposed the complex events they were judging.
Baltzer (1993) found varying degrees of support for both representational 
accounts and algebraic combination accounts. Baltzer studied peoples’ judgments 
about conjunctions and disjunctions of causal events, in which subjects were asked 
the likelihood that a defendant in a trial is innocent for particular reasons, and 
categorical events, in which a person (e.g. Linda) has particular traits or occupations. 
The components of the complex events were either both plausible (PP), both 
implausible (II), or mixed (PI). In all conditions, subjects consistently
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underestimated disjunctions of independent events relative to the prescriptions of 
probability theory, a result that is consistent with the primary claim of the uniqueness 
principle of explanation-based decision making, that single explanations of events are 
preferred over multiple, separate explanations for events. This result is also 
consistent with Carlson & Yates’ signed combination rules account, which predicts 
that subjects find disjunctions equal to or between their component probabilities. 
When making judgments about conjunctions of events, subjects consistently 
overestimated their likelihoods relative to the prescriptions of probability theory, 
regardless of component plausibility. This result is consistent with the completeness 
principle of explanation-based decision making, which claims that a conjunction of 
events should be a more complete explanation of events when merged into a single 
story, and thus judged to be more likely than single, less complete explanations. This 
result, however, was consistent less than one third of the time with the claims of the
signed summation rules.
In a third experiment, Baltzer (1993) found that an account based merely on
combination rules was not sufficient. In this study, the relationship of the 
component events was varied such that they were either complementary or 
contradictory in nature. The incidence and magnitude of conjunction and disjunction 
errors varied in the direction predicted by the explanation-based account.
Conjunction errors were larger when explanations could be merged into a single story 
(i.e. complementary components) than when the explanations competed with each 
other (i.e. contradictory components). Disjunction errors were larger when the 
component explanations were non-unique and competed with each other, than they 
were when they could be merged into a single representation. The influence of 
complementarity on these judgments can not be accounted for by simple algebraic
combination rules.
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A Theoretical Synthesis
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The most general conclusion that can be drawn from the host of studies cited 
above is that the representation of events is fully or partially responsible for errors in 
some situations, and improper calculational rules in others. For problems in which a 
semantic representation of events is not possible, such as when the components of a 
complex event are described by symbols (e.g. “attribute A&B ) (Beyth-Marom,
1981) rather than actual attributes (e.g. “feminist bank teller ), combination rules are 
responsible for the errors in reasoning. Similarly, it is likely that combination rules 
are also responsible for errors when components of complex events are generated by 
unrelated processes, as studied by Carlson and Yates (1989) and Gavanski and 
Roskos-Ewoldsen(1991). Combination rules are not able to account for differences 
in error rates caused by aspects of problems other than individual component 
likelihoods. In these cases, the representation of events must be playing a role in the 
evaluation of likelihoods and the incidence of judgmental error. For example, 
representational strategies must be used in the studies showing that errors are 
influenced by the complementarity of component events (Baltzer, 1993), the type of 
event being described (Locksley & Stangor, 1984), (McClure et al., 1989)), and the 
presence and direction of causal links (Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991). These 
studies have shown that differences in what constitutes a complete or plausible 
explanation or set of explanations for an event influence conjunction and disjunction 
error rates beyond simple component event likelihoods.
The research (Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991; Reeves & Lockhart,
1993) directly pitting representational strategies against calculational strategies 
compared judgments in which calculational strategies would likely be invoked, for 
example, unrelated scenario problems such as the likelihood Linda is X and Bill is Y, 
to judgments in which representational strategies would likely be invoked, for
example common scenario problems such as those involving a single person, such as 
the likelihood that Linda is X and Y. These researchers claimed that if the same 
pattern of results was found in both conditions, then subjects must be using 
combination rules in both. Differences were rarely found between the conditions. 
However, this result is at odds with the studies showing that representational 
strategies are used in some common scenario situations.
One possible explanation is that the materials used to invoke the 
representational strategies were sub-optimal for detecting differences between the 
two types of strategies. According to explanation-based decision making, when a 
single, plausible representation of the complex event exists or can be constructed (e.g. 
a plausible story in which the component events are a part), judgments will be 
derived from the representation. Subjects may attempt to construct such a 
representation, and find that it is implausible. In such a situation, separate 
representations may exist, one for each component event. This is likely to be the case 
for judgments about independent or contradictory events relating to a common 
scenario. When a single, plausible representation is not available, subjects may be 
more likely to derive component probabilities for the separate representations and 
combine them according to a rule. If this is true, one can expect to find minimal 
differences between uncommon scenario problems and common scenario problems 
containing independent component events. At this time is unclear whether two 
events generated by unrelated processes are evaluated in the same manner as 
independent events generated by a common process or involving a common scenario 
which are not naturally merged into a single, plausible story.
In summary, I claim that representational strategies will be used when a 
common representation of events occurs naturally, and calculation^ strategies will be 
used when such a representation is not easily formed. Judgment patterns should 
differ when different strategies are invoked. It is likely that the studies that have not
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found differences between representational and calculational strategies have either 1) 
not used materials that invoked different strategies, or 2) have not used materials that 
highlight the differences between the strategies. My research explores the 
circumstances under which representational and calculational strategies are used 
when making judgments about complex events, and the judgment patterns that result 
from the differing strategies. It is possible that the role the representation of the 
events plays can range from minimal to maximal depending on the puzzle to be 
solved and the fit of the strategy. This research attempts to determine when subjects’ 
judgments are derived from a computation over the representation itself, and when 
aspects of the problem or representation cue subjects to use computational rules for 
part or all of their final judgment.
Research Overview
In previous research, Baltzer (1993) obtained support for explanation-based 
decision making as an account for reasoning about conjunctions and disjunctions of 
events. Subjects made judgments about single, conjunctions, and disjunctions of 
explanations that were either complementary, and could easily be merged into a 
single, more complete explanation of the events, or contradictory, such that the 
component explanations could not both occur together. It was found that the 
complementarity of explanations influenced the magnitude of conjunction and 
disjunction errors obtained for judgments about complex events, in the direction 
predicted by the uniqueness and completeness principles of explanation-based 
decision making. Although judgments were found to be influenced by 
complementarity in the direction predicted by explanation-based decision making, 
data have not been provided to show that subjects were actually representing events 
as stories, and that they merged complementary explanations into single, more
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complete stories. The first study described below provides talk aloud data to test the 
claim that people are indeed constructing stories, and that these people are using a 
representational strategy that causes errors in judgments about complex events. This 
study will also provide data to determine whether people are using calculational 
strategies on materials in which it is possible for semantic representations to be 
playing a role.
A second study will be performed to explore the differences in judgments 
when differing strategies are invoked. In the representational strategy condition, 
stories constructed by subjects in the verbal protocol study will be used as stimuli. 
Judgments in this condition will be contrasted with judgments that are likely to be 
produced by calculational strategies, such as those in which the components are 
generated from unrelated processes (a la Yates & Carlson, 1986; and Carlson &
Yates, 1989), in which it is difficult for subjects to form a representation connecting 
the component events. It seems likely that subjects will attempt to use a 
representational strategy for common scenario problems and for problems providing a 
representation that merges component events. However if the component events are 
not merged into a single representation and if the component events are from 
uncommon scenarios, subjects may evaluate the components separately and combine
them according to a rule.
The goals of this research are as follows: 1) to obtain evidence that subjects 
are merging component events into a single representation using verbal protocol data; 
2) to show differences in judgments when differing strategies are invoked; 3) to 
determine when judgments will be derived from a computation over a representation, 
and when computational rules will be invoked; and 4) to provide an account for why 
previous research (Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991) did not find differences in 
errors between calculational and representational strategy conditions.
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EXPERIMENT 1: VERBAL PROTOCOL STUDY
In a series of studies, Baltzer (1993) found evidence for an explanation-based 
account of judgments about complex events. This evidence was based on a 
hypothesis that the complementarity of explanations that comprise complex events 
would influence judgments about those events. Specifically, it was predicted that 
complementary explanations that are merged into a single, more complete 
explanation would be considered a better explanation of evidence than multiple 
explanations that could not be merged into a single account of the evidence. In 
support of this prediction, the magnitude of conjunction errors was larger for 
complementary explanations that could be merged into a single explanation than for 
contradictory explanations that could not. A second prediction of explanation-based 
decision making also received support, that unique explanations would be judged to 
be better explanations than non-unique explanations, when the non-unique 
explanations could not be merged into a single, causal chain. Consistent with this 
prediction, disjunction errors were larger when the complex explanations were 
contradictory than when they were complementary. Although judgments were found 
to be influenced by complementarity in the predicted direction, more evidence is 
needed to substantiate the claims of explanation based decision making: that subjects 
are representing events as stories, and that they merge complementary explanations 
into single, more complete stories. The purpose of this study is to provide evidence 
through talk alouds that people do indeed construct stories when they make 
judgments about the events used in the study described above, and that people use a 
representational strategy that causes errors in judgments about those complex events. 
In addition, this verbal protocol study should shed some light on whether people use 
calculational strategies on materials in which it is possible for semantic
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representations to be playing a role.
22
Method
Subjects
Forty-four University of Colorado undergraduates participated in the 
experiment as fulfillment of a requirement for their psychology classes. All subjects 
spoke English as their native language. Data were unavailable for two subjects due to 
computer and tape recorder failure. Of the remaining 42 subjects, 26 were female 
and 16 male.
Materials
Although explanation-based decision making is a theory of causal reasoning, 
effects consistent with the predictions of explanation-based decision making were 
found for both causal and categorical judgment problems in Baltzer’s original studies 
(Baltzer, 1993). Both types of materials were used in this verbal protocol study. For 
the causal reasoning materials, three short civil and criminal legal cases were 
constructed. A description of charges against a defendant and a body of evidence 
were included in each of the cases. Subjects were asked questions regarding the 
likelihood that the defendant was innocent for particular reasons. For the categorical 
reasoning materials, three short descriptions of fictitious people were constructed. 
Subjects were asked questions regarding the likelihood that those people had certain 
traits (i.e., occupations, hobbies, or political affiliations). Tversky and Kahneman s 
(1983) well-known "Bill-the-accountant" description was used as one of the 
descriptions.
For each case and description, subjects were asked to provide likelihood 
estimates on a scale of 0 to 100 for six questions: a disjunction of explanations or 
characteristics A and B, a conjunction of the same explanations, the likelihood of 
explanation A, the likelihood of explanation B, and the likelihood of two filler 
explanations. The relationship between the explanations composing the disjunctions 
and conjunctions was varied such that half of the explanations were complementary 
in nature, and the other half contradictory. Both component explanations were 
considered plausible in pilot tests. For the causal material only, subjects were asked 
to reach a decision (guilty/not guilty) about the case, and to rate the confidence they 
had in their decision a scale of one to ten. Appendices A-D contain the causal and
categorical stimuli used in this experiment.
Complementary explanations were designed so that they could be merged into 
a causal relationship that helped to explain their parent case or person description.
For example, the explanations (A) Kristin is on a basketball team at school, and (B) 
Kristin would like being a coach for a girls team in the future, may enter into a causal 
relationship (e.g. Kristin is pursuing her dream of coaching a girls team by playing on 
the basketball team at school) that helps to connect her person description (e.g. 
athletic high school student) with these components.
Contradictory explanations were very unlikely to both occur together. For 
example, it is unlikely that Kristin would be both (A) on a basketball team at school, 
and (B) unable to participate in school sports because she holds a part-time job after 
school. These explanations are considered contradictory because it is unlikely that 
Kristin would be on a basketball team at school if she was unable to participate in 
school sports because of her part-time job after school. Each characteristic alone,
however, is plausible given the description of Kristin.
To measure how successful the relationship-type (i.e. complementary versus 
contradictory) manipulation was, we asked subjects to provide a subjective
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complementarity rating. Subjects were asked to rate how well the explanations went 
together, on a scale from -10 (don't go together) to 10 (completely go together), where 
0 indicated the explanations weren't related. Subjects were given an example of what 
was meant by the end points and the center point of the scale. For example, if 
subjects were given the pair of contradictory explanations described above, subjects 
would be told that a -10 indicates th a t" Kristin would never be on a basketball team 
at school if she was unable to participate in school sports because of her part-time job 
after s c h o o l t h a t  a 0 indicates that "Kristin being on a basketball team at school has 
nothing to do with her being unable to participate in school sports because of her 
part-time job after s c h o o l a n d  that a 10 indicates that 'Kristin being on a basketball 
team at school is definitely related to her being unable to participate in school sports 
because of her part-time job after school." Subjects could then mark any point along 
the -10 to 10 scale to indicate how well the explanations went together. Negative 
numbers indicate a negative or contradictory relationship, and positive numbers 
indicate a positive or complementary relationship.
Design
All subjects were presented with each of the case descriptions (causal) and 
person descriptions (categorical). Three within-subjects independent variables were 
material type with two levels, causal and categorical, case with two levels nested 
within material type, and relationship type, also with two levels, complementary and 
contradictory. The between-subjects variable was talk-aloud status. Eighteen 
subjects were asked to talk aloud as they performed reasoning tasks comprised the 
first group, and 24 subjects served as a control. The control subjects performed 
reasoning tasks identical to those in the talk aloud group, except they were not asked 
to talk aloud. The dependent variables were likelihood ratings, confidence ratings
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(causal material only), case rulings (causal material only), and subjective 
complementarity ratings.
The block of causal material was always presented together, as was the block 
of categorical material. The practice case was always presented as the first case in a 
block. Half of the subjects received the causal material first, and the other half 
received the categorical material first. Order of presentation of the remaining two 
cases within each material type block (causal and categorical) was counterbalanced. 
Order of presentation of relationship type (complementary and contradictory) was 
also counterbalanced within each block. For the 18 subjects in the talk aloud group, 
there were two replications of the full design requiring eight subjects (2X2X2) each, 
plus an additional two subjects. For the 24 subjects in the control (non-talk aloud) 
group, there were three replications of the full design, requiring eight subjects each.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted on Macintosh computers running HyperCard. 
Subjects were given some practice questions to get them familiar with using the 
keyboard and mouse. Subjects in the talk aloud group were then given instructions 
to think aloud as they read about the court cases and about the person descriptions. 
They were instructed to read out loud each piece of evidence presented on the 
computer screen, and after each screen, to say what they were thinking as they read 
that evidence item. Evidence was presented to subjects one sentence at a time. 
Before the evidence presentation began, two practice talk aloud tasks were
performed. The first talk aloud consisted of the following three sentences: (1) The
girl entered the room. (2) The room was empty and dark. (3) Suddenly the lights 
came on, balloons floated to the ceiling, and her friends started singing. Subjects 
usually inferred that it was the girls birthday, and her friends were hosting a surprise
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birthday party for her. Following the two practice talk alouds, evidence presentation 
began. From this point on, the stimuli presented to the talk aloud and control groups 
were identical.
Subjects were presented with three causal and three categorical cases (a 
practice and two targets). For each case, subjects were asked to make six judgments 
about the likelihood of the defendant being innocent or guilty for particular reasons, 
or about the described person having a certain job or hobby. The order the questions 
were seen was randomized for each case, with the constraint that the fillers always 
appeared in the second and fifth positions. In the causal material only, subjects weie 
asked to make a ruling on the case (guilty or not guilty) and to supply a confidence 
estimate in their decision on a scale of 1 (not confident) to 10 (confident), after they 
had supplied likelihood estimates for the six questions. Then for both the causal and 
categorical cases, subjects were asked to rate how well the two explanations that were 
used in the disjunction and conjunction questions went together (i.e. the subjective 
complementarity rating), on a scale o f -10 (don't go together) to 10 (completely go 
together).
After subjects had completed the six causal and categorical reasoning tasks, 
subjects in the control group were dismissed, and subjects in the talk aloud group 
were given a 10 minute break. During this time, a transcription of the subject’s talk 
aloud for one causal and one categorical reasoning case was printed. Subjects were 
asked to read a short description of six strategies that they may have used in 
answering the conjunction and disjunction questions during the session. These 
strategies include the following: (1) calculate from a rule, (2) adjust up or down,
(3) 5 0 / 5 0  “I don’t know”, (4) familiar experience, (5) story, and (6) similarity to a 
typical instance. Subjects were told that they may or may not have used any of the 
above named strategies, and that these were just a few of the strategies that people 
have used in the past. They were then asked to think about which strategies they used
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when answering questions about the King and Kristin cases. To refresh subjects’ 
memories, the experimenter read back to the subjects what they had said during the 
period when they answered the singular, conjunctive, and disjunctive questions.
They were then asked to describe what they were thinking when coming up with 
answers to those questions. Then they were asked for each question whether or not 
they used the strategies described above, and if so, what percent of their answer was
based on that strategy.
All subjects were run one-at-a-time in private rooms. In the talk aloud group, 
the experimenter was seated in the same room with the subject, facing a computer 
located in front of an adjacent wall. As the subject talked aloud, the experimentei 
transcribed the protocol in real time. The experimenter remained silent throughout 
most of the session, unless the subject had questions. In the control group, the 
experimenter and subjects were in separate rooms. The experimenter was available 
for questions at all times. The verbal protocol sessions took between one and two 
hours to complete. The control sessions took approximately 30 minutes to complete.
V erbal P ro toco l R esults
Forty-two subjects participated in the verbal protocol experiment. Eighteen of 
these were asked to talk aloud as they reasoned about cases , and twenty-four served 
as control subjects who were not asked to talk aloud. Data from two subjects in the 
talk aloud group of the McMillan complementary causal reasoning case were 
removed from the analysis because the subjects were confused about character
identities.
Manipulation Check
A central claim of explanation-based decision making, like all
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representational theories of judgment, is that the representation of complex events 
mediates judgments about those events. This study manipulated the representations 
that people construct about complex events by varying the degree to which 
component events could fit into a single, plausible scenario. It was expected that 
complementary events could easily be thought of together in a single scenario, while 
contradictory events could not. To test the success of this complementarity 
manipulation, subjects were asked to provide a subjective complementarity rating. 
They were asked to rate the extent to which the events went together on a scale of -10 
(if X occurred, Y could not also occur) to 10 (if X occurred, Y would definitely 
occur). As expected, events in the complementary condition received higher 
subjective complementarity ratings (M= 6.6) than events in the contradictory 
condition (M=-5.7), F(l,38)=324.1, MSE= 17.62, p<.00\. The ratings were slightly 
lower for causal materials {M=-0.6) than for categorical materials (M=1.4), 
F(l,38)=9.03, MSE  = 17.71, p<.01, but this difference did not interact with 
relationship type (i.e., complementary versus contradictory) or talk aloud condition 
(i.e., talk aloud versus control).
' ' - .■ -v -; ' - Causal Categorical Overall
Complementary
Contradictory
5.5 7.6 
-6.7 -4.8
6.6 
- 5.7
Overall -0.6 1-4
Complementarity Effect Replication: Conjunctions
Explanation-based decision making predicts that the magnitude of 
conjunction errors will be larger for complementary explanations that can be merged 
into a single explanation than for contradictory explanations that can not. To test this 
prediction, a mixed analysis of variance was performed on conjunction judgments in 
which relationship type (complementary versus contradictory) was the within- 
subjects variable, and protocol condition (talk aloud versus control) was the between- 
subjects variable. Replicating previous research, the magnitude of conjunction errors 
larger when subjects were given complementary materials (M=5.4) than whenwas
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they were given contradictory materials (M=-13.8), F(l,38) = 17.08, MSE = 773.16, 
PRE  = .30, pc.001. The means for these conditions are shown in Table 2.
Subjective complementarity, a measure of the extent to which subjects 
thought the component explanations could occur together, was also expected to 
influence conjunction error magnitude. To examine the effects of subjective 
complementarity on error magnitude, subjective complementarity was used as a 
covariate in the above mixed analysis of variance. When differences in subjective 
complementarity were held constant, the effect of relationship type was no longer 
reliable, and the subjective complementarity covariate became a significant predictor 
of conjunction error magnitude, F(l,38)=7.87, MSF=5154.72, PRE=.\1, pc.Ol. In 
particular, the magnitude of conjunction errors increased with subjective 
complementarity, as predicted. In sum, these analyses show that subjective 
complementarity and relationship type (complementary versus contradictory) are 
redundant predictors of conjunction error magnitude, as expected.
A second mixed analysis of variance was performed to examine the effects of 
material type on conjunction judgments. In this analysis, material type (causal versus 
categorical) was the within-subjects variable, and protocol condition (talk aloud 
versus control) was the between-subjects variable. No predictions were made 
regarding conjunction error magnitude differences between causal and categorical 
reasoning materials. However, categorical materials had smaller conjunction errors 
on average (M=-7.6), than causal materials (M=-0.8), F(l,38)=4.24, MSF=480.89, 
PRE — .10, p<.05. In addition, relationship type was found to have a stronger effect 
on the categorical materials than on the causal materials, as evidenced by a material 
type by relationship type interaction, F(l,38)=4.14, MSF=615.51, PRE -  .10, p<.05, 
as shown in Table 2. However, when controlling for the difference in subjective 
complementarity between causal and categorical materials, these effects were not 
reliable, suggesting that the causal / categorical differences may have been due to 
differences in the way subjects perceived the complementarity of the causal and
categorical materials.
Although subjects in the protocol condition took longer to perform the
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judgment tasks due to the time they spent verbalizing their thoughts, protocol 
condition did not significantly affect conjunction error magnitude, nor did it interact 
with any within-subjects variables in either of the analyses reported above. This 
suggests that the talk aloud condition did not substantially alter the way subjects 
performed the judgment tasks.
Table 2 ^  Conjunction Error Magnitude by Relationship and Material Tv£e
Causal Categorical Overall
Complementary
Contradictory
5.2 5.6 
-6.7 -20.9
5.4
-13.8
Overall -0.8 -7.6
Complementarity Effect Replication: Disjunctions
Previous research (Baltzer, 1993) found that disjunction errors are slightly 
larger when the component explanations are contradictory in nature than when they 
are complementary. This is consistent with the explanation-based decision making 
claim that people prefer single explanations (or explanations merged into a single 
representation) to non-unique or competing explanations.
To test this prediction, a mixed analysis of variance was performed on 
disjunction judgments in which relationship type (complementary versus 
contradictory) was the within-subjects variable, and protocol condition (talk aloud 
versus control) was the between-subjects variable. The difference between 
disjunction errors in the complementary and contradictory conditions was not found 
to be reliable, F(l,38) = 3.2, MSE = 212.65, PRE = .08, p=.08, although the means 
were in the predicted direction (Mco„m=3.1; Mcompl=-1.6). Similarly, subjective 
complementarity was not found to be a reliable predictor of disjunction error 
magnitude when used as a covariate in the above mixed analysis of variance. The
means for these conditions are shown in Table 3.
A second mixed analysis of variance was performed to examine the effects of 
material type on disjunction judgments. In this analysis, material type (causal versus 
categorical) was the within-subjects variable, and protocol condition (talk aloud 
versus control) was the between-subjects variable. Disjunction errors were smaller,
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on average, for causal materials (M=-2.0) than for categorical materials (M=-3.4), 
F(l,38)=4.87, MSE=208.94, PRE = .11, p<.05. However, when controlling for the 
difference in subjective complementarity between causal and categorical materials, 
these effects were not reliable, suggesting that the causal / categorical differences 
may have been due to differences in the way subjects perceived the complementarity 
of the causal and categorical materials.
Protocol condition did not significantly affect disjunction error magnitude, 
nor did it interact with any within-subjects variables. This again suggests that the talk 
aloud condition did not influence the way subjects performed the judgment tasks.
Table 3: Disjunction Error Magnitude by Relationship and Material Txpe
■ Causal Categorical Overall
Complementary
Contradictory
-3.7 0.4 
-0.2 6.4
-1.6
3.1
Overall -2.0 3.4
Extent-Merged Analyses
The specific predictions of explanation-based decision making depend on the 
extent to which component events are merged into a single representation. The verbal 
protocol statements provided us with a method of distinguishing those subjects who 
actually did merge the statements into a single plausible representation from those 
who thought that a merged representation was implausible. Each judgment problem 
was classified into one and only one of the following four categories: plausibly- 
merged, implausibly-merged, separate, and unclassifiable, based on the statements 
made during the conjunction judgment. Statements were considered plausibly 
merged if the statements described some scenario or representation that the subject 
considered plausible, in which both component events were a part. Statements were 
considered implausibly merged if the statements described some scenario or 
representation that they considered implausible, in which both component events 
were a part. Statements were classified as separate if the subject merely discussed 
one or both of the component events separately, but did not connect them into a 
single representation. Unclassifiable statements were those that did not contain
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enough detail to determine whether the component events were considered separately
or in a single representation. Examples of these classifications are shown in Table 4.
A complete list of statements by extent-merged classifications is presented in
Appendix E.
Table 4: Sample Verbal Protocol Extent-Merged Classifications
OMestion
How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard both because it was 
damaged by some deer that live in the woods behind Mr. King's property and 
because the real cause of the damage was another boy in town who looked similar 
to .Tohnnv?
Classification Verbal Protocol Statement
Plausibly merged Both of them could do it, the deer could have been making 
some noise, and then another boy could have been in there 
trying to look for the deer or something.
Implausibly
merged
I don't think it would be both. So that's 0. He saw him run 
away, and I don't think there happened to be a deer and a boy in 
there.
Separate Could have been another boy that looked like Johnny, could 
have been a deer because he does live next to woods , so both — 
hieh possibilitv, 65.
Unclassifiable High, like 100, because both make sense.
Extent-merged classification differences were found between protocols 
spoken during conjunction and disjunction questions. Subjects were more likely to 
verbalize a plausibly or implausibly merged representation containing both 
component events when they were answering questions about conjunctions of events 
(71%) than when answering questions about disjunctions of events (26%). Subjects 
spoke more frequently about the component events separately when answering 
questions about disjunctions (33%) than when answering questions about 
conjunctions (11%). These differences suggest that subjects focus on the relationship 
between events when thinking about conjunctions, but are less likely to do so when 
thinking about disjunctions. Table 5 shows the number of statements classified into 
each extent-merged category.
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'M e r S r
Plausible
Merged Separate
, —
Total
Conjunction
Statements
26 24 8 12 70
Disjunction
Statements
5 13 23 29 70
It was expected that the protocol derived extent-merged measure would be a 
more accurate measure of the extent to which subjects merged components into a 
single representation than relationship-type, the measure based on a materials 
manipulation. Consequently, the conjunction and disjunction effects were expected 
to be stronger in the extent-merged classification than in materials-based relationship-
type classification.
Conjunction Error Magnitude by Extent-Merged. Extent-merged proved to 
be a highly reliable predictor of conjunction error magnitude, and a stronger 
predictor than either relationship-type or subjective complementarity. In an analysis 
of variance using extent-merged as the between-subjects2 factor, explanations that 
were merged into a single representation had larger conjunction errors (M=7.2 ) than 
explanations that were considered implausible when merged (M=-24.0), 
F(l,56)=25.08, MSF=492.77, PRE= .31, pc.OOOl. In contrast, the effect size (i.e. 
PRE) was smaller both when relationship-type (complementary vs. contradictory) 
was used as the between-subjects factor in the analysis of variance, F(l,68)=6.18, 
MSE=622.86, PRE=.08, p<.05, and when subjective complementarity was used as the 
between-subjects factor, F (l, 67)=4.41, MSE=646.87, PRE=.06, p<.05. Condition 
means are shown in Tables 6 and 7, and the percentage of conjunction likelihoods 
falling above, equal to, between, or below the component likelihoods are shown in 
Table 8, broken out by extent-merged. The extent-merged factor did not interact with
material type.
2 Within-subjects differences were not computable, because many subjects had missing cells 
in this analysis, in which one or more of their four protocols were unclassifiable. Dropping 
those subjects would have resulted in extremely low power. Therefore, each judgment was 
analyzed independently as if all factors were between-subjects.
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Table 6: Magnitude o f Conjunctkm Errors by Extent-merged and Relationship-type
Implausible
Merged
Plausible
Merged Separate Unclassifiable Total
Complementary -10.0 5.9 -1.2 7.2 4.5
(n=2) (n=19) (n=4) (n=9) (n=34)
Contradictory -25.2 12 31.2 15.7 -10.4
(n=24) (n=5) (n=4) (n=3) (n=36)
Total -24.0 7.2 15.0 9.3
(n=26) (n=24) (n=8) (n=12)
Table 7: Magnitude o f Conjunction Errors by Extent-merged and Material-type
, ■ ■ ■ Implausible
Merged
Plausible
Merged Separate Unclassifiable Total
Causal -16.6 
(n=l 1)
4.2
(n=10)
25
(n=5)
10.2
(n=8)
1.9
(n=34)
Categorical -29.5
(n=15)
9.3
(n=14)
-1.7
(n=3)
7.5
(n=4)
-8.0
(n=36)
Total -24.0 
(n=26)
7.2
(n=24)
15.0
(n=8)
9.3
(n=12)
Table 8: Conjimction Likelihood with respect to Compor,tents by Extent merged
Implausible
Merged
•
Merged
■' . .• : ';
^parae Unclassifiable
■ * ■* ■ '
Total
Conj > Most 1% 9% 3% 0% 13%
Conj = Most 0% 6% 1% 3% 10%
Compl < Conj < 
Comp2
1% 9% 4% 10% 24%
Conj = Least 7% 3% 1% 1% 13%
Conj < Least 27% 9% 1% 3% 40%
Total 37% 34% 11% 17% 100%
Disjunction Error Magnitude by Extent-Merged. A second prediction of 
explanation-based decision making is that unique explanations are judged to be better 
explanations than non-unique explanations when the non-unique explanations can not 
be merged into a single, plausible causal chain. Thus, the disjunction of component 
explanations that can be merged into a single explanation should be thought of as 
more likely, and hence have smaller disjunction errors, than the disjunction of 
explanations that are implausible when merged.
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Neither extent-merged, relationship-type, nor subjective complementarity 
were reliable predictors of disjunction error magnitude in separate analyses of 
variance5., and material type did not significantly influence the error magnitude or 
interact with any of these three factors. However, as mentioned earlier, subjects were 
much less likely to comment on the relationship between component events when 
answering questions about disjunctions of events. As a consequence, there was a 
very small number of problems (i.e. 13 plausibly merged and 5 implausibly merged) 
that could be used to reliably determine the effects of extent-merged on disjunction 
error magnitude.
It can be argued that subjects may use the same representations when 
assessing both conjunctions and disjunctions events, but that due to the nature of the 
questions, subjects comment more on the relationship between the components for 
conjunctive questions. Because conjunction protocols provided more insight into the 
relationship between the component events than the disjunction protocols, a separate 
analysis of variance was performed on disjunction error magnitude using the extent- 
merged scores derived from the conjunction protocols as the between-subjects factor. 
This analysis contained 24 and 26 plausibly merged and implausibly merged 
observations, respectively. Again, extent-merged was not found to be a reliable
predictor of disjunction error magnitude.
One may take issue with the above assumption that subjects are using the 
same representation when answering both disjunctive and conjunctive questions. A 
safer assumption is that if a subject answered the conjunctive question before 
answering the disjunctive question, the representation used on the conjunction would 
be available for use on the disjunction. A third analysis of variance was performed 
on disjunction error magnitudes using extent merged scores derived from the 
conjunction protocols on problems in which the subject answered the conjunctive 
question before the disjunctive question Again, extent-merged was not a reliable
3 Within-subjects differences were not computable, because many subjects had missmg cells 
in this analysis in which one or more of their four protocols were unclassifiable. Droppi g 
would have resulted in extremely low power. Therefore, each judgment was 
analyzed independently as if all factors were between-subjects.
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predictor. The condition means from each of these analyses are shown in Table 9, 
and the percentage of disjunction likelihoods falling above, equal to, between, or 
below the component likelihoods are shown in Table 10, broken out by the extent- 
merged classification derived from the conjunction protocol.
Classified using:
Implausible
Merged
Plausible
Merged Separate Unclassifiable
Disjunction protocol -8.5 4.2 3.5 -3.4
(n=5) (n=13) (n=23) (n=29)
Conjunction protocol: - 4.7 3.6 -1.5 6.7
Q’s where conjunction 
answered before disjunction
(n=17) (n=14) (n=4) (n=3)
Conjunction protocol: 
All Questions
-3.8 2.5 0.1 4.2/  -f r% \
(n=26) (n=24) (n=8) (n=12)
lClDlC IV. U izjun
Implausible
Merged
Plausible
Merged
'
■
Separate
. ' ' ' "
Total
Conj > Most 21% 13% 4% i% ~ 40%
Conj = Most 3% 4% 1% 3% 11%
Compl < Conj < 
C,omD2
9% 13% 4% 10% 36%
ip*-
Conj = Least 1% 0% 1% 1% 4%
Conj < Least 3% 4% 0% 1% 9%
Total 37% 34% 11% 17%
100%
Reasoning Strategies
The statements subjects made as they were reasoning about the conjunctions 
and disjunctions of events were classified according to whether or not they provided 
evidence for the use of representational and calculation^ strategies. Evidence for 
representational strategy use involved the verbalization of event representations, 
while evidence for calculation^ strategy use involved the verbalization of some 
operation performed on the components of the complex event. Two types of 
representational strategies were found, and three types of calculation^ strategies were 
found. A list of the strategies identified and the number of statements matching each
is presented in Table 12. The strategies are described below.
One of the most commonly found representational strategies involved 
matching aspects of the complex event in question to aspects of the problem 
description. In this strategy, judgments reflect the degree to which subjects’ 
representations of the complex event in question match their representations of the 
person or case description. Consider the problem shown in Table 11 below: The 
subject matched the complex event in question, “Kristin being on a basketball team 
and wanting to be a coach for a girls team in the future”, with aspects of Kristin’s 
description, in particular that she was “athletic” and a “hard worker . In the matching 
strategy, specific details from the case or person description are explicitly referred to 
in the verbal protocol. The matching strategy is an example of the reasoning 
described by Tversky and Kahneman in the representativeness heuristic.
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Table 77: Sample «‘Matching” Strategy-------------------------- ---------------------------
Problem Description__________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Kristin is 17 years old. She is a Junior in high school, is athletic, loves sports, 
and doesn’t smoke. She comes from a poor family. She receives average 
grades in school. However, she is a /zarJ-worfcer and very conscientious.—
- ■  ' ............... ... ^  II>vtinn  - / ? V -  ^  7 s* '__________________ Question
How likely is it that Kristin both would like being a coach for a girls team in the 
future and is on a basketball team at school?
__________  Verbal Protocol Statement
‘If she’s really athletic, outgoing, intelligent, and hard working, she’d like to do 
both, I think.” _______ ______________ _ ______ ___________________________
Another commonly invoked representational strategy involved the use of 
deeper forms of reasoning to arrive at a likelihood estimate for the complex event. 
Protocols were classified under this strategy if they offered information about the 
events in question or the relationships between them that went beyond that presented 
in the case or person descriptions. Subjects frequently used causal reasoning, 
constructed stories or scenarios, or made inferences to explain the complex event in 
question. For example, when asked the likelihood that both Johnny and a deer
damaged Mr. King’s property, one subject created a scenario in which both could 
have happened, and matched the newly constructed scenario to the evidence 
presented to conclude the scenario was unlikely: “It is unlikely that a deer damaged 
the property, because it would be obvious that the deer did it too, because he would 
see hoof prints instead of shoe prints. So not very likely.” The subject reasoned 
about the problem and made the inference that evidence about hoof prints should 
have been available for the deer scenario to be plausible.
Evidence for calculational strategies was also found, although less frequently 
than for representational strategies. Three types of calculational strategies were 
found: the evaluation of the complex event likelihood to be equal to the most likely 
component, the least likely component, and the sum of the components. The most 
common of these was the largest component strategy. The following statement 
exemplifies this strategy: “If he can be two things, I was thinking of how someone 
can be both, and engineer and an accountant. Yeah, I don’t know if he can be two 
things. I’ll just say it’s likely that he can be an accountant.”
Subjects were also found to use strategies that did not fall into either the 
representational or the calculational camp, which shall be grouped into the category 
“other strategies”. There were four instances of protocols that matched a toolbox 
strategy, such as the adjust up or down strategy or the “50/50 I don’t know”. Another 
less commonly invoked strategy was identified in which subjects changed the 
meaning of the question to something presumably easier to answer. For example, 
instead of answering how likely it was that Jack was innocent “either because the 
wife did it for reason X or because the wife did it for reason Y”, some subjects gave 
the likelihood that Jack was innocent because the wife did it, regardless of the reason. 
In essence, these subjects widened the scope of the problem by answering a less 
specific question than what was asked. Other subjects simply misunderstood the 
question. A complete classification of the statements made by the subjects is
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presented in Appendices F-I.
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Table 12: Number ofStatements Matching Reasoning Strategies
Causal Categorical Total
. ■■ : : :
Complem’y 
Conj Disi
Contra
Con
idicfy
Disj
Comp
Con s
i Contra
Con
dict’y
Disj
Stater
Num
nents
%
Sul:
Num
)jects
%
Representational 11 7 14 8 11 11 16 9 87 62% 18 100%
Matching 4 6 6 5 5 7 6 4 43 31% 17 94%
Reasoning 10 4 13 7 9 8 16 7 74 53% 18 100%
Calculational 2 5 1 3 2 2 1 4 20 14% 11 61%
Largest
Component
1 4 1 3 1 2 1 4 17 12% 10 56%
Smallest
Component
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1% 2 11%
Added
Components
0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1% 1 6%
Other 2 3 3 5 1 1 2 5 22 16% 13 72%
Changed meaning 
of Question
1 1 3 3 0 0 2 1 11 8% 7 39%
Toolbox 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 3% 4 22%
Misinterpreted
Question
1 1 0 2 0 1 0 3 8 6% 5 28%
Not
interp retable
5 5 3 6 5 6 0 8 38 27% 0 0%
Note: There were a total of 140 statements. Single statements were coded into 
multiple reasoning categories whenever evidence for multiple strategy usage was 
found.
The data do not show that strategy use is linked to individual strategy 
preferences. Each and every subject used a representational strategy at least once 
while answering the set of four problems, and over half (61 percent) of the subjects 
used a calculational strategy. Instead, strategy use depended more on problem type 
than subject. Strategy differences between conditions appeared primarily in the 
number of times the reasoning representational strategy and the largest component 
calculational strategy were found to occur. The reasoning representational strategy 
dominated conjunction judgments, appearing on 48 of the 70 conjunction statements, 
while appearing just over half as often (26 times) on disjunction statements. This 
data suggests that subjects are more likely to reason about the relationship between 
component events when making a conjunction judgment than when making a 
disjunction judgment. Subjects also invoked the reasoning strategy more when
answering questions about contradictory components (43 occurrences) than 
complementary (31 occurrences). Calculational strategy use depended on whether 
the complex event was disjunctive or conjunctive. In particular, the largest 
component strategy was used more often for disjunctions (13 occurrences) than for 
conjunctions (4 occurrences), and the smallest component strategy was used more 
often for conjunctions (2 occurrences) than for disjunctions (0 occurrences). These 
differences are shown in Table 13.
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Table 13: Strategy Differences Between Conditions
Strategy : - v  . ■ - Experimental Condition
Complex Event Type Relationship Type Material Type
' Conj Disj Comple- Contra- Causal CategorT
Representational 521 35 40 47 40 47
Matching 21 22 22 21 21 22
Reasoning 48 26 31 43 34 40
Calculational 6 14 11 9 11 9
Largest Component 4 13 8 9 9 8
Smallest
Component
2 0 2 0 1 1
Added Components 0 1 1 0 1 0
Other 8 14 7 15 13 9
Misinterpreted
Question
1 7 3 5 4 4
Toolbox 1 3 3 1 2 2
Changed Meaning 
of Question
6 5 2 9 8 3
13 24 21 16 18 19
Analysis on post-judgment interview questions.
After subjects in the talk aloud group had completed the six causal and 
categorical reasoning tasks, they were asked to assess the extent to which they 
utilized six specific strategies for arriving at likelihood estimates in those tasks. 
Tables 14-16 summarize subjects’ assessments of the percentage of their answers 
based each of the following strategies: similarity to a typical instance 
(representational), story (representational), familiar experience (representational), 
calculate from a rule (calculational), adjust up or down (other), and 50/50 I don t 
know” (other).
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Subjects reported that their answers to questions involving a single 
component were primarily based on two representational strategies, similarity to a 
typical instance and familiar experience. Many subjects also reported adjusting their 
answers up or down depending on how well the components matched the typical 
instance or familiar experience. The familiar instance strategy was used more for 
categorical materials than for causal, and the story strategy more for causal materials 
than for categorical, as expected. Subjects also reported using representational 
strategies to a lesser degree when evaluating conjunctions and disjunctions of events. 
For conjunctions, the calculational strategy was reported most often, and for 
disjunctions, subjects frequently chose “other” because they felt none of the strategies 
presented were descriptive of how they assessed the disjunctions. Most of these 
subjects were unable to explain how they arrived at the disjunction likelihoods.
In comparing strategy self-assessment with protocol strategy classifications, 
two primary differences were apparent. First, evidence for representational strategy 
use was found to a higher degree in the protocols than were reported by subjects. 
Second, when subjects were assessing conjunctions, they reported using calculational 
strategies even when there was no evidence for calculational strategy use the 
protocols. These differences are shown in Table 17.
±  C IL /L Z s  1  T .  x v i / p i / #  iwf*#
...... ....................
-----
Similarity Familiar Adjust 50/50 Story Calculate Other
Causal Components 23% 16% 17% 15% 13% 9% 9%
Categorical Components 26% 28% 17% 10% 6% 6% 7%
Average Components 24% 22% 17% 12% 9% 8% 8%
Table 75: Regon edS tm ugy
• - ■ " v •- ■ Calculate Adjust Story9%
Other J 
11 %1Causal Conjunctions 37% 18% 13% 7%
Categorical Conjunctions 24% 17% 17% 16%
Average Conjunctions 31% 18% 16% 12% 10% 8%
Table 16: Reported Strategy Usage forDisjmction Questions
fQther [A djust "Calculate Similarity 50/51/50
18%
Familiar Story
|7%|Causal Disjunctions 27% 21% 12% 11
Categorical Disjunctions 37% 11% 17% 9% 7% 3%
Average Disjunctions 21% 19% 18% 15% 14% 9% 5%
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Conjui 
Self Report
' Disjun 
Self Report
ctiohs
Representational
(Familiar Exp, Story, Similarity)
36% 74% 29% 50%
Calculational 31% 9% 18% 20%
Other
(Adjust, 50/50, Other)
34% 11% 54% 20%
Discussion
This study explored the strategies that people use when making judgments 
about complex events in problems in which a semantic representation of events is 
possible. According to explanation-based decision making, when a single, plausible 
representation of a complex event exists or can be constructed, judgments will be 
derived from the representation. One indication that people base their judgments on 
event representations is the influence of event complementarity on conjunction and 
disjunction error magnitude. Although previous research (Baltzer, 1993) has shown 
that judgments are influenced by the complementarity of component events, data 
have not been provided to show what the event representations look like, or how 
differences in event representations may cause differences in judgments. The very 
specific claim of explanation-based decision making is that subjects represent events 
as stories, and that component explanations that are merged into single, more 
complete stories are preferred and associated with higher likelihood ratings, and 
consequently larger conjunction and smaller disjunction errors. This study provided 
talk aloud evidence that people are constructing representations of events, and that 
they are using a representational strategy that causes errors in judgments about
conjunctions of events.
Verbal protocol statements were analyzed to determine whether subjects were
merging component explanations into a single representation or whether they 
considered the component explanations separately. In the vast majority of 
conjunctive questions (71 percent), subjects referred and commented on the
Reasoning about Conjunctions and Disjunctions 43
plausibility of the components occurring together in a single representation. But less 
frequently, in only 26% of the statements, did subjects verbally reason about the 
relationship between the components when they were a part of a disjunction. 
Therefore, the verbal protocol data provide evidence that people attempt to merge 
separate explanations into a single representation in order to assess the likelihood of 
conjunctions of events, but are less likely to do so for disjunctions of events.
Evidence was found to support the claim that event representations mediate 
judgments about conjunctions of events. In particular, explanation-based decision 
making predicts that explanations that can be plausibly merged into a single 
representation are better explanations of evidence than those that can not. This 
prediction was supported: merged representations that subjects considered plausible. 
had larger conjunction errors (M=7.2) than those they considered implausible (M—- 
24.0 ). It was expected that this protocol derived extent-merged classification would 
provide a better measure of the extent to which subjects merged components into a 
single representation than relationship-type, the measure based on a materials 
manipulation. As predicted, the conjunction effect was stronger in the extent-merged 
analysis than in materials-based relationship-type analysis. Extent-merged was a 
highly reliable predictor of conjunction error magnitude, as were relationship-type 
(i.e. contradictory vs. complementary materials) and subjective complementarity.
Although this study replicates and extends previous research (Baltzer, 1993) 
in showing that event representations influence conjunction error rates beyond simple 
component event likelihoods, the results are less clear for disjunctions of events. 
Explanation-based decision making claims that people prefer unique explanations to 
non-unique explanations, and thus predicts larger disjunction errors for contradictory 
explanations than for complementary explanations. Baltzer (1993) found that 
disjunction errors are slightly larger when the component explanations are 
contradictory in nature than when they are complementary. This effect was not 
reliably replicated: no difference was found in the magnitude of disjunction errors 
between complementary and contradictory explanations, although the means were in 
the predicted direction. When protocol statements were used to provide a more
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accurate separation of those plausibly merging explanations from those using separate 
representations, the effect reversed, although again not reliably . The protocols 
suggest that people may not be concerned with the relationship between component 
events when asked about a disjunctive relationship.
The lack of a difference between complementary and contradictory 
disjunction error magnitudes is not completely unexpected. First of all, the 
disjunction error magnitude difference between these two groups was very small in 
previous research (Baltzer, 1993), and the difference between contradictory and 
complementary components was most pronounced when one component explanation 
was considered plausible, and the other implausible. In fact, the 1993 study did not 
detect a reliable difference between groups when both components were plausible (as
was the case in this study).
It is also very interesting that subjects appear to be using a representational 
strategy strongly affected by differences in complementarity when assessing 
conjunctions, whereas their strategy for assessing disjunctions does not seem to be 
likewise affected. In coding verbal protocol statements made during disjunction 
judgments, it was clear that people did not focus on the relationship between 
component events, although the relationship between components is normatively an 
important factor when determining the likelihood of disjunctive events According to 
probability theory, there should be large differences in disjunction errors between 
complementary and contradictory explanations: the disjunction for contradictory 
explanations equals the sum of the components, whereas the disjunction for 
complementary explanations equals the greatest component likelihood. So a 
disjunction equal to its greatest component is normative for complementary 
explanations, but represents a large error for contradictory explanations. It is difficult 
to determine whether subjects just “discount” disjunctions more when explanations 
are contradictory than when they are complementary, or if subjects just ignore 
complementarity all together when assessing disjunctions. Both yield the same
result.
The verbal protocols show that people use a variety of strategies, both
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representational and calculational, in assessing the likelihood of complex events, and 
that they often use a variety of strategies even within the same judgment problem. 
Two types of representational strategies (reasoning, matching), three types of 
calculational strategies (largest component, smallest component, and adding 
components), and three other types of strategies (toolbox,question misinterpretation, 
and changing the meaning of the problem) were identified from the protocols. The 
most commonly found strategies included reasoning about the representation 
(primarily on conjunctions), matching parts of the explanation to a representation of 
the events (used equally across judgment problems), and calculating the likelihood 
using the likelihood of the most likely component (primarily on disjunctions). In 
only one instance did we find evidence for a subject taking two component 
likelihoods and explicitly combining them according to a rule. This is not to suggest 
that subjects do not use a formula for combining the events. It merely suggests that 
subjects may not be able to verbalize their rules for combining event likelihoods.
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EXPERIMENT 2: STRATEGY STUDY
A central claim of this research is that representational strategies are invoked 
when rich, unifying representations of events are available or easily formed, and 
calculational strategies are likely to be invoked when they are not. Complex events 
whose elements are thought of as parts of a single story should invoke 
representational strategies. Materials of this sort include the disjunctive and 
conjunctive explanations from a common scenario with components that are 
connected into a single causal scenario. Complex events whose elements are clearly 
not thought of as part of a single story or representation are likely to invoke 
calculational strategies. Materials of this sort include complex events whose 
components are generated by unrelated processes, such as those used in the research 
of Carlson and Yates (Carlson & Yates, 1989; Yates & Carlson, 1986). In addition, 
presenting subjects with a rich, unifying representation that connects the complex 
events should even more strongly influence the likelihood that representational 
strategies are used. This method guarantees that a representation is available from
which subjects may make judgments.
Judgments about disjunctions and conjunctions of events are studied under 
conditions in which rich, unifying representations of the component events are either 
present or absent, under conditions in which the component events are either from the 
same or different scenarios, and under conditions in which the common scenario 
component events either plausibly or implausibly fit into a unifying representation. 
Representational strategies should be preferred over calculational strategies when the 
unifying representations are given, and when component events easily fit into a 
common representation (common scenario conditions). Calculational strategies 
should be preferred when common representations are not given, and when it is 
difficult to derive a common representation unifying the component events (different
scenario problems).
It is predicted that the complementarity of component events will influence
the pattern of errors for common scenario materials in a manner consistent with the
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predictions of explanation-based decision making, and that this pattern will be 
stronger when unifying representations are given than when they are not. A second 
prediction is that differences between errors arising from uncommon scenario 
problems and common scenario problems with independent components will be 
small when unifying representations are not given (as found in previous research).
Method
Subjects
Two hundred and forty University of Colorado undergraduates participated in 
the experiment as fulfillment of a requirement for their psychology classes. Data 
from two subjects were lost due to computer error. Of the remaining 238 subjects,
125 were female and 113 male. All but 15 subjects spoke English as their native
language.
Materials
Three legal cases and person descriptions (those used in the verbal protocol 
study) were used as stimuli. Based on the results from the verbal protocols, minor 
modifications were made to the case descriptions and questions to increase
plausibility and reduce question ambiguity.
A representational and nonrepresentational version of each conjunction was 
constructed. The nonrepresentational version of the conjunction was formed by 
connecting two simple events with the word “and”. For example, nonrepresentational 
conjunctions were of the following form: “How likely is it both that Bill is a 
computer scientist and that Bill enjoys working with computers? The 
representational version of the conjunction phrased the complex event in terms of a
unifying representation. For example, the two simple events “Bill enjoys working 
with computers” and “Bill is a computer scientist” were merged in the 
representational version of the conjunction “Bill is a computer scientist who enjoys 
working with computers.” Whenever possible, the unifying representations were 
those spontaneously constructed by subjects in the verbal protocol study. To reduce 
the likelihood that subjects in the representational condition used a calculational 
strategy, the representational conjunction was expressed in a form that joined the 
events without explicitly using the connective “and”.
A representational and nonrepresentational version of each disjunction was 
also formed. Nonrepresentational disjunctions were of the following form: “How 
likely is that either A or B, or both?” In the representational version of the 
disjunction, the word “both” was replaced with the representational version of the 
conjunction. For example, “How likely is it either that Bill is a computer scientist or 
that Bill enjoys working with computers, or that Bill is a computer scientist who 
enjoys working with computers?” The representational versions provide the subject 
with a unifying representation connecting the simple events, whereas the
nonrepresentational versions do not.
The extent to which the component events formed a plausible unifying 
representation when merged was also varied. This factor, complementarity, included 
four levels: complementary, independent, contradictory, and unrelated. 
Complementary complex events contained components from a common scenario that 
could be easily merged into a single scenario. Two events were complementary if 
they went well together, or were correlated with each other. The unifying 
representation for these events were designed to score high on a measure of 
plausibility. Independent complex events also contained components from a common 
scenario that could be easily merged into a single scenario. However, the 
components were designed to be independent of each other, rather than positively
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correlated with each other. Contradictory components were negatively correlated, 
and their unifying representations were expected to score low on a measure of 
plausibility. Unrelated complex events combined simple events from different, 
unrelated scenarios. For example, an unrelated conjunction read as follows: “How 
likely is it both that Bill is a computer scientist and that Kristin is on an athletic team 
at school?” Their unifying representations were expected to score very low on a 
measure of plausibility. The materials used are presented in Appendices J-O.
Design
All subjects were presented with each of the case descriptions (causal) and 
person descriptions (categorical). For each description, subjects were asked to 
answer questions about simple events (A, B), conjunctions of those events (A&B), 
and disjunctions of those events (AorB). The two within-subjects independent 
variables of interest are material type with two levels, causal and categorical, and 
complex-event type with two levels, disjunction and conjunction.
There were two between-subjects factors, complementarity with four levels,
' complementary, independent, contradictory, and unrelated; and representation-type 
with two levels, representational and non-representational. Thus, there were eight 
groups of subjects (complementarity x representation-type). Each group had 24 
subjects except the unrelated complementarity groups which had 48 subjects each4.
The block of causal material was always presented together, as was the block 
of categorical material. The practice case was always presented as the first case in a 
block, and was classified as an “independent common scenario” problem. Half of the
4 The unrelated condition produced a single conjunction and a single disjunction judgment 
regarding a combination of two unrelated cases. The other conditions produced a 
conjunction and disjunction judgment for each of two cases. To make the number of 
conjunction and disjunction judgments equal between the conditions, the number of 
subjects in the unrelated condition was doubled.
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subjects received the causal material first, and the other half received the categorical 
material first. Order of presentation of the two cases within each material type block 
(causal and categorical) was counterbalanced. For the unrelated scenario group, 
instead of showing a single case description followed by questions about that 
description, two descriptions were shown one after the other, before questions 
regarding the descriptions were presented.
For each case, subjects were asked to make six judgments (A, B, A&B, AorB, 
Filler 1, Filler2) about the likelihood of the defendant being innocent or guilty for 
particular reasons, or about the described person having a certain job or hobby. The 
order the questions were seen was counterbalanced, such that component questions 
(A, B) were seen first on half of the cases, and complex events (A&B, AorB) were 
seen first on the other half. One filler always appeared between the component event 
questions and the other between the complex event questions. Subjects were asked to 
rate how well the two explanations that were used in the disjunction and conjunction 
questions went together, on a scale of -10 (don't go together) to 10 (completely go 
together).
Procedure
The experiment was conducted on Macintosh computers running HyperCard. 
Subjects were given some practice questions to get them familiar with using the 
keyboard and mouse. They were then presented with three causal and three 
categorical cases (a practice and two targets). All subjects were run one-at-a-time in 
private rooms. The experimenter and subjects were in separate rooms. The 
experimenter was available for questions at all times. The sessions took on average
25 minutes to complete.
Reasoning about Conjunctions and Disjunctions 50
Results
A primary goal of this research is to compare the pattern of judgments 
resulting from representational strategies with those resulting from calculational 
strategies. In order to make this comparison, subjects must be induced to use 
representational strategies in some conditions, and calculational strategies in others. It 
was expected subjects would use a representational strategy when component events 
were from a common scenario, because the components could easily be merged into a 
unifying representation. Evidence of representational strategy use in common 
scenario problems would be apparent if the relationship among components (i.e. the 
complementarity of the components) influenced the error magnitude in the direction 
predicted by explanation-based decision making. It was also expected that 
representational strategies would be used to an even greater extent if subjects were 
presented with unifying representations from which to base their judgments.
Manipulation Check
In order to test whether the complementarity manipulation was successful,
subjects were asked to rate the extent to which component events went together on a
subjective complementarity scale of -10 (if X occurred, Y could not also occur) to 10
(if X occurred, Y would definitely occur). It was expected that component events in
the complementary condition would receive positive scores, that events in the
contradictory condition would receive negative scores, and events in the independent
condition would receive scores close to zero (the occurrence of X has nothing to do
with the occurrence of Y). As expected, events in the complementary condition
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received higher subjective complementarity scores (M=4.0) than events in the
contradictory condition (M=-2.6), F(l,137)=204.40, MSE= 20.08, pc.OOOl. 
Independent events had a mean score of 1.3, between the complementary and 
contradictory scores. Table 18 show the subjective complementarity scores broken 
out by case and condition. Upon inspection, it was apparent that subjects were 
interpreting the complementary components for the McMillan case as being 
contradictory in nature. The*mean scores for this group are negative (M„„=-2.0, 
Mnanrep=-4.0), whereas mean scores for the other complementary cases are all positive. 
Because responses from subjects in the complementary causal group actually 
represent a mixture of both complementary (e.g. the King case) and contradictory 
(e.g. the McMillan case) interpretations of the events, it would be misleading to 
analyze the data according to the groups in which subjects were placed (i.e. 
contradictory, complementary, independent). The subjective complementarity 
measure provides a more accurate measure of the extent to which subjects merge 
component explanations into a single representation. Thus, in subsequent analyses, 
the subjective complementarity measure will be used in place of the between-subjects 
relationship-type factor.
Problems
i  a u ie  i o. live.
Bill Kristin King McMillan Overall
Complementary Rep
Nonrep
7.8
7.7
5.0
5.7
(3.1
5.4
-2.0
-4.0
4.2
3.7
Contradictory Rep
Nonrep
-0.6
-2.2
-2.3
-7.4
-0.1
-3.1
-2.2
-3.0
-1.3
-3.9
Independent Rep
Nonrep
1.0
0.9
-0.4
1.0
2.7
2.4
1.7
1.1
1.2
1.4
As predicted, component events in the unrelated scenario problems had
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complementarity scores close to 0, as shown in Table 19.
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Table 19: Subjective Complementarity: Unrelated Scenario Problems
kS , T
M l/
■
<Cr ■ -'v
King/ 
McMillan 1
King/ 
McMillan 2
Overall
■ : '
Unrelated Rep
Nonrep
-1.2
-0.9
-0.2
-0.1
-1.0
-0.2
1.1
-0.8
-0.3
-0.5
Complementarity Effect Replication: Conjunctions
Explanation-based decision making predicts that the magnitude of 
conjunction errors will be larger for complementary explanations that can be merged 
into a single explanation than for contradictory explanations that can not. To test this 
prediction, a mixed analysis of variance was performed on conjunction judgments in 
which material type (causal versus categorical) was the within-subjects variable, and 
subjective complementarity was the between-subjects variable. In this analysis, only 
conditions comparable to the verbal protocol experiment were tested: causal and 
categorical common-scenario problems. Representational materials and uncommon- 
scenario problems were excluded from this analysis. Replicating results from the 
verbal protocol experiment, the magnitude of conjunction errors increased with 
subjective complementarity, F( 1,63)=5.16, MSE=828.51, PRE=.08, p<.05. As 
shown in Figure l 5, for each unit increase in subjective complementarity (scale of -10 
to 10), conjunction error magnitude increased by .57 units (scale of 0 to 100). This 
complementarity effect indicates that the relationships among component events does 
matter, and suggests the use of representational strategies.
5 The points aligned with the y-axis represent the problems in which subjects considered 
components to be perfectly independent of each other. The large number of these points
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Figure 7: Conjunction Error Magnitude by Subjective  ^Complementarity
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Subjective Complementarity
Categorical materials had smaller conjunction errors on average (M=-1.7), 
than causal materials (M=9.2), F(l,63)=l 1.57, MSE=669.37, PflF =.16, p<.005. This 
effect did not depend on subjective complementarity scores. Table 20 shows 
conjunction error magnitude as a function of subjective complementarity and material
type.
Table 20: Conjunction E r r o r  Magnitude by Subjective Complementarity and
Material Type
* A - ■—------:M! n ,
Subjective Complementarity 
Less than -1 -1 to 1 Greater than 1 Overall
Causal
Categorical
5.5 16.3 7.5 
-9.7 -3.3 3.6
9.2
-1.7
Overall -1.8 8.7 5.3 3.7
reflects the inclusion of the independent common scenario condition in the analysis.
Subjects were expected to use representational strategies to a higher extent 
when given a unifying representation from which to base their judgments. It was 
expected that judgments would be more uniform and that the complementarity effect 
would be stronger in the representational condition than in the nonrepresentational 
condition, because fewer subjects would be invoking calculational strategies when 
they were given representations on which to base their judgments. Calculational 
strategies should be unlikely on representational conjunctions because the 
conjunction was phrased without using the connective “and”, making it difficult to 
decompose the conjunction into its components. To determine how the 
representation manipulation influenced conjunction judgments, a mixed analysis of 
variance was performed on conjunction judgments in which material type (causal 
versus categorical) was the within-subjects variable, and subjective complementarity 
and representation were the between-subjects variables. In this analysis, only causal 
and categorical common-scenario problems were tested. Uncommon-scenario
problems were excluded from this analysis.
As expected, the magnitude of conjunction errors increased with subjective 
complementarity, F( 1,139)= 17.62, MS£=870.34, PRE=.U, p<.OOOl. For each unit 
increase in subjective complementarity (scale o f -10 to 10), conjunction error 
magnitude increased by .75 units (scale of 0 to 100), as shown in Figure 2. The 
means (see Table 21) show that the complementarity effect does appear to be larger 
in the representational condition, although the complementarity by representation 
interaction was not reliable.
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Effect of Representation on Conjunctions
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Table 21: Conjunction Error Magnitude by Subjective Complementarity,
Material Type Representation
Subjecuve Complementarity 
Less than-i -1 to 1 Greater
than 1
Overall
Causal Nonrep 5.5 16.3 7.5 9.2
Rep -16.8 0.4 3.6 -1.8
Causal Mean -3.4 8.2 5.3 3.7
Categorical Nonrep - 9.7 -3.3 3.6 -1.7
Rep -9.5 -6.4 0.8 -2.8
Categorical Mean -9.6 -5.2 2.1 -2.3 j
Nonrepresentational Mean -1.8 8.7 5.3 3.7
Representational Mean -13.5 -2.8 2.1 -2.3
Grand Mean -6.3 2.4 3.6 0.7
Figure 2: Conjunction Error Magnitude by Subjective Complementarity: 
Representational and Nonrepresentational Materials
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Subjective Complementarity
A main effect for representation revealed that the conjunction error magnitude 
slightly smaller overall for the representational materials (M=-2.31) than for the 
presentational materials (M=3.75), F(l,139)=7.91, MSE=870.34, PRE-.05, 
/?<.01. The conditions primarily affected by the representation manipulation were the 
contradictory and independent groups. Perhaps not all subjects had not attempted to
was
nonrer
problems in the nonrepresentational condition, and when such a representation was
provided, they realized that the contradictory components could not both plausibly
occur together, decreasing their conjunction likelihood ratings.
Categorical materials had smaller conjunction errors on average (M=-2.25),
than causal materials (M=3.65), F(l,139)=15.12, MSF=1628.13, PRE =.10, pc.001.
The effect of subjective complementarity was smaller for causal than for categorical
materials, F(l,139) = 8.42, MSF=1628.13, PRE =.06, /?<.005.
Unrelated Events: Conjunctions
Previous research (Gavanski et. al., 1991) found that similar errors occurred
for complex events with components from unrelated scenarios and with independent
components related to a common description. An analysis of variance was performed
on conjunction error magnitude scores from nonrepresentational materials using
relationship-type (i.e. independent / unrelated) as the between-subjects independent
variable. As expected, there were no differences in conjunction error magnitude
between the two conditions (Mindep = 9.6, MUnretated = 5.3). Subjects may have used
calculational strategies to evaluate conjunctions in both groups, or they could have
used representational strategies in the common scenario independent condition that
yielded errors of similar magnitude to those produced by a calculational strategy
assumed to be used in the uncommon scenario problems. It is not possible to
distinguish the two alternatives using error magnitudes alone.
However, it may be possible to infer what strategy was used by examining
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construct a unifying representation for the independent and contradictory components
using a representational strategy for nonrepresentational problems, then providing
them with a representation should only cause a small difference in error magnitude.
But if subjects were using a calculational strategy, providing subjects with a
representation should cause a strategy switch, and thus may substantially change error
magnitudes.
When representations were given, error magnitudes dropped dramatically for 
the uncommon scenario problems and slightly for the common scenario problems, as 
shown in Table 22. The large drop in error magnitudes for the uncommon scenario 
problems suggest that these subjects switched strategies from calculational to 
representational. The causal and/or temporal links connecting events from unrelated 
scenarios may have been perceived to be less plausible than those connecting events 
from common scenarios.
Table 22: Conjunction Error Magnitude: Uncommon Scenario and Independent
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judgment patterns that result from the representation manipulation. If subjects were
Problems:
■ Non­
representation Overall
Uncommon 5.3 -14.2 -4.5
Scenario
Independent 9.6 4.7 1 7.1
7.5 - 4.7
In sum, the differences between independent and uncommon scenario 
problems was small and not reliable in the nonrepresentational condition, replicating 
prior research. When a representation is provided, the judgments in the uncommon 
scenario problems change dramatically, and hence suggest that subjects switched 
from using calculational strategies in the nonrepresenational condition to using
to determine whether subjects in the independent nonrepresentational condition are
using calculational or representational strategies. The error magnitudes in this group
are similar to errors produced both by the calculational strategies used in the
uncommon scenario nonrepresentational problems, and to errors produced by
representational strategies used in the representational independent common scenario
problems.
Effect of Component Plausibility on Conjunctions
The data above show that subjective complementarity influences the
magnitude of conjunction errors, as predicted by representational accounts of
reasoning. However, it would be a mistake to ignore component plausibility as a
factor in the assessment of conjunctions. In exploring component plausibility as a
predictor of conjunction error magnitude, two algebraic combination models were
examined: Yates and Carlson’s signed summation rules (Carlson & Yates, 1989;
Yates & Carlson, 1986) and Abelson, Leddo, and Gross’ (1987) geometric mean
model.
Signed summation rules provide an account for how people make 
“qualitative” judgments about the relative likelihood of two or more events (e.g. 
ranking two or more alternatives.) In particular, for unrelated events A and B, the 
signed summation rules state that X(A & B) = X(A) + A,(B), where A.(X) is the 
qualitative likelihood of event X. This model predicts that when both components 
are seen as likely (++), the conjunction will be greater than both components, and
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representational strategies in the representational condition. It is difficult, however,
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when both are unlikely the conjunction will be less than both components.
When one component is likely and the other unlikely (+-), it predicts the conjunction
estimate will be between the components. Although the judgment processes invoked
in ranking are different from those involved in assessing the likelihood of alternatives
separately, this model still provides a useful framework for thinking about how
component likelihood may contribute to conjunction likelihood estimates.
Responses from each problem were placed in three groups based on
component likelihood ratings: “++” (both components 50 or above), -’’(both
components 50 or below), and (one component above 50 and one below 50).
The percentage of conjunction likelihood ratings falling below, between, and above
the components are shown below in Table 23. The cells corresponding to predictions
of the summation rules are highlighted. Less than one third of the data are predicted
by the signed summation rules: 35% of the data are predicted when both components
are unlikely (--) or when one component is likely and the other is unlikely (+-).
When both components are likely (++), only 9% of the data match signed summation
rule predictions.
Error Tvpe
Component Likelihood
++ +- — All
No error 38% 36% 35% 37%
Conj = Smallest 17% 17% 11% 16%
Smallest < Coni < Largest 16% 35% 8% 17%
Coni = Largest 21% 5% 22% 18%
Coni > Smallest, Largest 9% 7% 24% 12%
The conjunction error types were also examined with respect to both
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subjective complementarity and component likelihood ratings, and are shown in
Table 24. Subjects were least likely to make conjunction errors when they considered
the components to be contradictory (51 %-60% made no errors), and most likely when
they considered components to be complementary (23%-32% made no errors). These
patterns occurred regardless of component plausibility.
Table 24: Conjunction Error Type by Component Likelihood and Subjective
Complementarity’
Error Type
Component Likelihood
Contradictory 
(-10 to -1 S.C.)
Independent 
(-1 to 1 S.C.)
Complementary 
(1 to 10 S.C.)
++ +- — ++ +- — ++ +- —
No error 60% 51% 60% 43% 27% 32% 26% 32%' 23%
Conj = Smallest 13% 14% 10% 17% 22% 10% 19% 10% 14%
Smallest < Conj < Largst 11% 27% 0% 13% 39% 14% 19% 39% 7%
Conj = Largest 8% 2% 13% 18% 7% 21% 27% 6% 29%
Conj > Smallest, Largest 8% 6% 18% 9% 4% 23% 9% 13% 27%
Abelson, Leddo, and Gross (1987) attempted to express the rating of the
conjunction as a function of the ratings of its components. They experimented with 
several models including weighted averaging, and found that the best fitting model 
was one in which the conjunction was equal to the geometric mean of the 
components: C=k(AB)'/2. They speculated that subjects first judged the plausibility 
of each of the component explanations, then took a rough average of the components 
(approximated by the geometric mean), and adjusted the average upward or 
downward depending upon whether the components could fit together into a coherent 
story. The conjunction coefficient k represented the extent to which the components 
cooperated or competed with each other in the story.
My research suggests that people first attempt to construct a single
resulting representation. This approach does not require the subject to first assess
component event plausibilities, average, and then adjust, as claimed by Abelson,
Leddo, and Gross. The likelihood of component events is important to the extent that
they influence the likelihood of the representation containing them. For example, a
representation containing two non-competing likely events should be more plausible
than one containing two non-competing unlikely events. However, the likelihood of
the component events themselves may never be considered separately when assessing
the conjunction.
To determine how well the geometric mean model fit the data from the 
strategy study, separate regressions were run for the uncommon scenario problems, 
and common scenario problems containing subjective complementarity scores from - 
10 to -1 (contradictory), -1 to 1 (independent), and 1 to 10 (complementary). The 
results are shown in Table 25. All models reliably predicted conjunction scores with 
apc.OOOl. The model provided the best fit to complementary components (Multiple 
R=.96) and the worst fit to contradictory components (Multiple R=.76). The 
conjunction coefficient k was largest for positive subjective complementary scores 
(jfc=.95) and smallest for negative scores (k=.60).
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representation of the conjunctive events, and then assess the plausibility of the
Subjective Complementarity Score . Model Multiple R
Unrelated Scenario: C=.73(AB)I/Z R=. 86
Common Scenario: Contradictory C=.60(AB)1W R=76
Common Scenario: Independent C=.87(AB)1/Z II 0
0
Common Scenario: Complementary C=.95(AB)1/Z R=.96
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These results can be compared with the results obtained from Abelson, Leddo
and Gross (1987) who fitted stimulus averages from a large sample of stimuli
containing independent components. In their research, they obtained the following fit
to the data: C=1.15(AB)1/2, R=.89. It should be noted that in their models, they did
not include a constant term. They claimed that “the fit, incidentally, is not improved
by including a constant term on the right-hand side of [the equation], as in general
linear multiple regression. Such a term, when included, comes out not significantly
different from zero.” (p. 148). However, it is not standard practice to report multiple
R ’s for equations that do not contain a constant term, and hence I felt the multiple R’s
reported for these models were misleading. In these models, errors are calculated as
the deviation from a 0 likelihood score, making the total error in these models very
high (e.g. Unrelated Scenario Sum of Squared Total = 484093). Because the
geometric mean provides a far better prediction of the data than the value 0, the
multiple R is high. When a constant term is included in the model, the total error is
calculated from the mean of the dependent variable, rather than from 0, making the
total error much smaller (e .g .. Unrelated Scenario Sum of Squared Total = 159331).
The geometric mean provides a somewhat better prediction of the data than the mean
of the dependent variable, and thus, the multiple R is also much smaller. The data
were fitted to more standard models containing a constant term, and are shown in
Table 26. All models reliably predicted conjunction scores with apc.0001.
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Table 26: Geometric Mean Model Fit with Constant by Subjective Complementarity
Subjective Complementarity Score Model Multiple R
Unrelated Scenario: C=4.4 + .66(AB)!/2 R=.49
Common Scenario: Contradictory C=6.3 + ,49(AB)iyi R=.39
Common Scenario: Independent C=9.6 + ,73(AB)1/2 R=.57
Common Scenario: Complementary C=9.3 + ,82(AB)1/2 R=.71
Conjunctions: The Best Fitting Model
In an attempt to find the best fitting model of conjunctions, component 
plausibility, subjective complementarity, and representation were considered both as 
predictors of conjunction likelihood and conjunction error magnitude. Prior models in 
the literature (Abelson, Leddo, & Gross, 1987;. Carlson & Yates, 1989; Yates & 
Carlson, 1986) tried to predict conjunction likelihood alone. But the deviation from 
the prescriptions of probability theory is also of interest for normative reasons, which 
is not accounted for in a model of conjunction likelihood. For example, the 
geometric mean of the component pairs (10,90) and (30,30) yield the same 
conjunction estimate of 30. However, a conjunction of 30 yields an error of 20 in the 
first instance, and no error in the second. Therefore, separate models are needed to 
account for deviations from the prescriptions of probability theory.
The contribution of the component likelihood was modeled in three ways, as 
the geometric mean (A B )1/2 of the components, as a linear combination of the largest 
(L) and smallest (S) components, and as a weighted sum of the components (A+B). 
The three ways of modeling the component likelihood produced conjunction 
likelihood models with similar multiple R’s: .67, .66, and .66, respectively.
However, the linear combination of the largest and smallest components was better at
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predicting conjunction error magnitude than the geometric mean and weighted sum
models, R’s =.45, .39, and .36, respectively. The best fitting models included
component likelihood of the largest (L) and smallest (S) components (0-100),
subjective complementarity (0-100, where 0=contradictory, 50=neutral, and
100=complementary), and representation (where -1 = representation not given and
1 representation given):
Conjunction = -9.32 +.23 L + .52 S +.31 SC + -5.00 Rep, R=.67.
Conjunction Error = -9.32 +.23 L + -.48 S +.31 SC + -5.00 Rep, R=.45.
All factors were reliable with p<.0001. In these models, the smaller component is 
weighted more heavily than the larger component, and subjective complementarity 
has a weight between the weight of the components. Subjects given a representation 
are predicted to rate the likelihood of conjunctions 10.0 smaller and have errors 10.0 
smaller than those not given a representation. The inclusion of both subjective 
complementarity and representation increased the multiple R for conjunction 
likelihood by .06, and increased the multiple R by .14 for conjunction error 
magnitude over models merely containing component likelihood as predictors. Data 
from all conditions (common scenario, uncommon scenario, representational and 
nonrepresentational) were used to derive these models (see Tables 27 and 28).
Best Conjunction Likelihood Models Multiple R
✓ C =  -9.32+ .23 L +  .52 S + .31 SC +-5.00 Rep R=.67
C =  -7.79+ .70 (A*B) 111 + .31 SC +-5.07 Rep R=.66
C =-14.65 + .38 (A+B) + .33 SC + -4.91 Rep R=.66
C = -9.13 + .24 L +  .51 S + .29 SC R=.65
C -  3.21 + .22 L +  .61 S R=.61
C = 23.98 + .47 SC R=. 38
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Table 28: Models  ^of Conjunction Error Magnitude
Best Conjunction Error Magnitude Models Multiple R
✓ Error = -9.32 + .23 L + -.48 S + .31 SC +-5.00 Rep R=.45
Error = 3.45 + -.33 (A*B)1/2 + .28 SC +-5.18 Rep R=.39
Error = 3.97+ -.15 (A+B) + .26 SC + -5.23 Rep R=.36
Error = -9.13+ .24L + -.49S + .29 SC R=.41
Error = 3.21+ .22 L +-.39 S II
Error =-10.23 + .18 SC R=.18
Complementarity Effect Replication: Disjunctions
Previous research (Baltzer, 1993) found that disjunction errors are slightly 
larger when the component explanations are contradictory in nature than when they 
are complementary, consistent with the explanation-based decision making claim that 
people prefer single explanations (or explanations merged into a single 
representation) to non-unique or competing explanations. However, this 
complementarity effect was not found to be reliable in the verbal protocol 
experiment. To determine whether complementarity affected disjunction error 
magnitude in this study, a mixed analysis of variance was performed on disjunction 
judgments in which material type (causal versus categorical) was the within-subjects 
variable, and subjective complementarity was the between-subjects variable. In this 
analysis, only conditions comparable to the verbal protocol experiment were tested: 
causal and categorical common-scenario problems. Representational materials and 
uncommon-scenario problems were excluded from this analysis. As in the verbal 
protocol experiment, the magnitude of disjunction errors was not found to be related 
to subjective complementarity, F(l,63)=.30, MSE=428.94, p>.05, suggesting the use 
of calculational strategies . Categorical materials had larger disjunction errors on
=.17, pc.001. The material type effect did not depend on subjective
complementarity. Figure 3 shows the complementarity effect across causal and
categorical materials, and condition means are shown in Table 29.
Table 29: Disjunction Error Magnitude by Subjective Complementarity and
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average (M=5.1), than causal materials (M=-2.2), F( 1,63)= 12.95, MSE=2&2.7\, PRE
Material, Type
Subjective Complementarity
Material Type Less than -1 -1 to 1 Greater than 1 Overall
Causal -3 .4 -5.7 1.2 -2.2
Categorical 2.3 13.5 4.1 5.1
Overall -0 .7 1.7 2.8 1.5
Figure 3: Disjunction Error Magnitude by Subjective Complementarity
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Subjective Complementarity
Ejfect of Representation on Disjunctions
To determine how the representation manipulation influenced disjunction
judgments, a mixed analysis of variance was performed on disjunction judgments in
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which material type (causal versus categorical) was the within-subjects variable, and
subjective complementarity and representation were the between-subjects variables.
In this analysis, only conditions comparable to the verbal protocol experiment were
tested: causal and categorical common-scenario problems. Uncommon-scenario
problems were excluded from this analysis.
As in the verbal protocol study, the magnitude of disjunction errors did not
vary with subjective complementarity (see Figure 4). This lack of a complementarity
effect suggests that the relationships among component events are not important in
the assessment of disjunctions, and suggests the use of calculational strategies.
Figure 4: Disjunction Error Magnitude by Subjective Complementarity: 
Representational and Nonrepresentational Materials
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Subjective Complementarity
Representational disjunctions (M= 6.98) had larger disjunction errors overall 
than nonrepresentational disjunctions (M=1.45), F(l,139)=7.04, MS£=724.79,
PRE— o i, p<.01, as shown in Table 30. Categorical materials had larger disjunction 
errors on average (M= 8.85), than causal materials (M -0.39), F( 1,139) 29.01,
MSE= 1494.13, PRE =.17, pc.0001. Neither material type or representation depended
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on subjective complementarity.
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Table 30: Disjunction Error Magnitude by Subjective Complementarity, 
_______ Representation, and Mat£rial Txpe_____________________
Material Type Representation
Subjective Complementarity 
Error < -1 -1 to 1 Error > 1 Overall
Causal Nonrep -3.4 -5.7 1.2 -2.2
Rep 6.7 -1.8 0.8 1.4
Causal Mean 0.6 -3.8 1.0 -0.4
Categorical Nonrep 2.3 13.5 4.1 5.1
Rep 17.9 15.0 9.8 12.5
Categorical Mean 00 14.4 7.1 8.9
Nonrepresentational Mean - 0.7 1.7 2.8 1.5
Representational Mean 11.7 6.1 5.6 7.0
Grand Mean 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.2
Unrelated Events: Disjunctions
To test whether the disjunction error magnitude differed between the common 
scenario independent and uncommon scenario (i.e. unrelated) problems when no 
representation was given, an analysis of variance was performed using relationship- 
type (i.e. independent / unrelated) as the between-subjects independent variable. As 
expected, there were no differences in error magnitude between the two conditions
(Mjndep =5.4, MUnrelated 6.5).
Disjunction errors were larger for representational disjunctions than for
nonrepresentational disjunctions, as shown in Table 31. Representation, relationship-
type, and their interaction were all reliable predictors of disjunction error magnitude,
F's(l, 187) = 21.52, 14.49, 11.37, respectively, MS£=592.06,/?\s<.001. These results
can be accounted for by calculational models if subjects included the conjunction
likelihood rating in the representational disjunction calculation. This is likely
question, whereas in the nonrepresentational disjunction, the conjunction was merely
referred to with the words “or both”. If subjects were averaging the components, then
the disjunction likelihood should be lower for representational disjunctions because
of the inclusion of the conjunction likelihood (a relatively small number), and hence
have larger disjunction errors than nonrepresentational disjunctions.
Table 31: Disjunction Error Magnitude: Unrelated Scenario and Independent
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because the conjunction was explicitly stated in the representational form of the
Problems:
N on-representational
Representational Overall
Unrelated 6.5 26.4 16.5
Independent 5.4 8.6 7.0
5.9 19.7
Effect of Component Plausibility on Disjunctions
Carlson and Yates’ developed an algebraic combination model to account for
peoples’ estimates of disjunctions of events, called the signed combination rule: 
X,(AorB) = w lM A) + w2MB), where w j and w2 have values between zero and one, 
and together sum to one. In exploring component plausibility as a predictor of 
disjunction error magnitude, this model was examined. This model predicts that for 
events of equal qualitative likelihood, the disjunction will be equal in likelihood to 
the components. For events of differing qualitative likelihood, the disjunction should
fall between the components.
Responses from each problem were placed in two groups based on whether or
not the component likelihood ratings were the same or different. The percentage of
disjunction likelihood ratings falling below, between, and above the components are
ratings (n=61), 57% of the disjunction ratings were equal to the components, as
predicted. When the components were not rated the same (n=231), 26% of the
disjunctions were rated between the components, as predicted. In total, 34 % of the
judgments followed the predictions of the rules.
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shown below in Table 32. When the components were given the same likelihood
Table 32: Disjunction Error Ty£e by Com£onent Likelihood
Error Type
Components
Equal?
Yes No Total
No error 31% 24% 26%
Disj = Largest 57% 21% 28%
Smallest < Disj < Largest 0% 26% 20%
Disj = Smallest 0% 15% 12%
Disj < Smallest, Largest 12% 14% 14%
The disjunction error types were also examined with respect to both 
subjective complementarity and component likelihood ratings, and are shown in 
Table 33. Subjective complementarity had little effect on disjunction error rates.
Table 33: Disjunction Error Type by Component Likelihood and Subjective
Components Equal?
Contradictory Independent Contradictory
(-10 to - 1 S.C.) (-1 to 1 S.C.) (1 to 10 S.C.)
Error Type Yes No Yes No Yes No
No error 31% 38% 34% 23% 28% 19%
Disj = Largest 0% 9% 0% 14% 0% 19%
Smallest < Disi < Largest 0% 24% 0% 26% 0% 26%
Disi = Smallest 50% 17% 52% 20% 66% 25%
Disi < Smallest, Largest 19% 13% 15% 18% 7% 11%
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Disjunctions: The Best Fitting Model
In an attempt to find the best fitting model of disjunctions, component 
plausibility, conjunction plausibility, subjective complementarity, and representation 
were considered both as predictors of disjunction likelihood and disjunction error 
magnitude. The contribution of the component likelihood was modeled in three 
ways: as the geometric mean (A B )1/2 of the components, as a linear combination of 
the largest (L) and smallest (S) components, and as a weighted sum of the 
components (A+B). The three ways of modeling the component likelihood produced 
disjunction likelihood models with similar multiple R’s: .68, .68, and .65, 
respectively. However, the linear combination of the largest and smallest 
components was better at predicting disjunction error magnitude than the geometric 
mean and weighted sum models, R’s =.53, .41, and .35, respectively. The best fitting 
models included component likelihood of the largest (L) and smallest (S) components 
(0-100), conjunction likelihood (0-100), and representation (where -1 = 
representation not given and 1 representation given) as predictors: Subjective 
complementarity did not increase the multiple R for models of disjunction likelihood 
or disjunction error magnitude, and are thus not included. All factors were reliable
with pc.OOl.
Disjunction = 15.15 + .16S + .40L + .25Conj + -3.84Rep, R=.68
Disjunction Error =-15.15 + -.16S + .60L + -.25Conj + 3.84Rep, R=.53.
In these models, the larger component is weighted more heavily than the smaller 
component, and the conjunction has a weight between the weight of the components. 
Subjects given a representation are predicted to rate the likelihood of disjunctions
Although the inclusion of the conjunction likelihood as a predictor of disjunction
likelihood yielded a model with only slightly larger multiple R (increase of .02) than
a model without the conjunction likelihood predictor, it had a large effect on the
disjunction error magnitude, and increased the multiple R by .10. The models tested
are shown in Tables 34 and 35.
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7.68 smaller and have errors 7.68 larger than those not given a representation.
Table 34: Models of Dis junction Likelihood^
Best Disjunction Likelihood Models Multiple R
D = 1 7 .7 4 +  .17S + .39L + ,27Conj + -.06SC + -3.67Rep R=.68
D = 21.63 + .28(A+B) + .26Conj + -.07SC + -3.80Rep R=.68
D = 28.92 + ,44(A*B) 1/2 + .28Conj + -.08SC + -3.70Rep R=.65
✓ D = 15.15 + . 16S + .40L + ,25Conj + -3.84Rep R=.68
D = 1 4 .7 0 +  .14S + .40L + .28Conj R=.66
D = 1 5 .5 9 +  .31S + .46L R=.61
D = 40.38 +.48Conj R=.56
Table i!5: Models of Disjunction Error Magnitude
Best Disjunction Error Magnitude Models ■Multiple R
Error =-17 74 + -.17S + .61L + -,27Conj + .06SC + 3.67Rep R=.53
Error = -3.81 + .21(A+B) + -,31Conj + .02SC + 3.21Rep R=.41
Error = 3.62 + ,27(A*B)1/2 + -,26Conj + .02SC + 3.34Rep R=.35
✓ E r r o r  = -1 5 .1 5 + -.1 6 S +.60 L + -,25Conj + 3.84Rep R=.53
F.rror = -14.70 + -.14S + .60L + -,28Conj R=.50
Error =-15.59 + -.31S + .54L R=.40
E r r o r - 14.51 +-.15Conj R=.20
Reasoning about Conjunctions and Disjunctions 74
Discussion
The primary claim of representational accounts of reasoning is that the 
likelihood of the complex events emerges as a property of the event representation, 
rather than through a calculation performed on simple event probabilities. This study 
explored situations in which both calculational and representational strategies were 
likely to be invoked. Representational strategies were most likely to be used for 
judgments about conjunctions of events, when the elements of the conjunction were 
from the same scenario, and when subjects were provided with a representation that 
merged the component events into a single scenario. Calculational strategies were 
most likely to be used on conjunctions judgments when elements of the conjunction 
were from nonrepresentational unrelated scenarios, and on all disjunction judgments. 
The following section discusses what people are doing when they are assessing 
conjunctions and disjunctions of events, and explains the contribution of each 
independent variable to this process.
Conjunctions
Complementarity: The relationships among component events are an 
important aspect of event representations, and therefore should influence the 
perceived likelihood of complex events. This study examined the complementarity 
of the components of conjunctions of events in a variety of ways, through the 
materials manipulation Relationship Type (complementary, independent, 
contradictory), the ratings provided by the subjects themselves called Subjective
(merged, implausibly merged, and separate). Regardless of the measures used,
complementarity was always found to influence the magnitude of conjunction errors
such that complementary explanations receive higher likelihood ratings, and thus
result in larger conjunction errors, than contradictory explanations. This finding is
predicted by the completeness principle of explanation-based decision making, in
which more complete stories, or stories that contain elements that are causally linked
together to explain the final outcome, are viewed as more likely than incomplete
stories. The complementarity effect provides the strongest evidence that subjects are
using representational strategies when assessing common scenario conjunctions.
Protocol Strategies: The verbal protocol study provided additional evidence 
that subjects were constructing representations of events and reasoning about the 
relationships among component events when assessing conjunction likelihood. In 
seventy-one percent of the protocols, subjects commented on the plausibility of a 
merged representation containing the component events. The protocols also showed 
that people may use a variety of other strategies, in addition to or in place of 
representational strategies. The identified strategies included two types of 
representational strategies (reasoning and matching), three types of calculational 
strategies (largest component, smallest component, and adding components), and 
three other types of strategies (toolbox, question misinterpretation, and changing the 
meaning of the problem). Nevertheless, it was apparent that representational 
strategies played an important role in the assessment of conjunctions.
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Complementarity (-10 to 10), and a verbal protocol classification Extent-Merged
a higher extent when given a unifying representation from which to base their
judgments. It was expected that the complementarity effect would be stronger in the
representational condition than in the nonrepresentational condition, because fewer
subjects would be invoking calculational strategies when they were given
representations on which to base their judgments. In addition, calculational strategies
should be unlikely in the representational condition because the conjunction was
phrased without using the connective “and”, making it difficult to decompose the
conjunction into its components.
The complementarity effect was larger in the representational condition than 
in the nonrepresentational condition, although the complementarity by representation 
interaction was not reliable. The lack of an interaction may indicate that the 
representation manipulation did not cause a significant number of subjects to switch 
from calculational to representational strategies, possibly because most subjects were 
already using representational strategies throughout.
Providing subjects with a representation on which to base their judgments 
reduced the magnitude of conjunction errors, especially for contradictory and 
independent materials. One interpretation for this effect is that subjects in the 
contradictory and independent groups may have been using calculational strategies in 
the nonrepresentational conditions, and when given representations on which to base 
their judgments, they switched to a representational strategy, reducing the magmtud 
of the conjunction errors in the direction predicted by explanation-based decision 
making. A second interpretation of this effect is that the smaller likelihood given to
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Representation: Subjects were expected to use representational strategies to
provided to the subject. The representational conjunction presents one specific
interpretation of how component events may be combined, while the
nonrepresentational conjunction leaves the interpretation up to the subject. Subjects
may feel their own interpretation may be more likely than the one given, or that a
specific interpretation is unjustified given the amount of detail provided in the case
description. This would account for representational conjunctions receiving lower
conjunction ratings, and hence smaller conjunction errors, than nonrepresentational
conjunctions.
Unrelated Scenario Problems: It was predicted that subjects would use a 
representational when the components are from the same scenario, because they can 
easily form unifying representations connecting the component events. Calculational 
strategies may be used in uncommon scenario problems because it may be difficult to 
form unifying representations of the component events. However, previous research 
(Gavanski et. al„ 1991) found that similar errors occurred for complex events with 
components from uncommon scenarios and with independent components related to a 
common description. My replicated their result, finding no reliable difference 
between the error magnitudes from the two conditions. The challenge was to 
determine whether subjects in the uncommon scenario and independent conditions 
were both using calculational strategies, as suggested by Gavanski et. al„ or if 
subjects were using representational strategies for the independent problems that 
yielded errors of similar magnitude to those produced by a calculational strategy in 
the uncommon scenario problems.
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representational conjunctions may be caused by the specificity of the representations
uncommon scenario problems switched from using a calculational strategy to a
representational strategy when representations were provided, due to the large
difference in error magnitude between the two conditions. If subjects were using a
representational strategy in the nonrepresentational condition, then providing them
with a representation should only cause a small difference in error magnitude. But
the error difference was large, indicative of a strategy switch.
It is difficult, however, to determine whether subjects in the independent 
nonrepresentational condition were using calculational or representational strategies. 
The error magnitudes in this group are similar to errors produced both by the 
calculational strategies used in the uncommon scenario nonrepresentational problems, 
and to errors produced by representational strategies used in the representational
independent common scenario problems.
Material Type: Conjunction errors have been found to occur for a variety of 
material types, including categorical materials in which the judgment involves 
assessing the likelihood that a person is a member of a particular category given a 
description, causal materials in which the judgment involves assessing the likelihood 
that a person is a innocent of a crime for particular reasons, reasoning about event 
scenarios, and medical diagnosis. This experiment tested the predictions of 
explanation-based decision making, a causal theory of reasoning. Research suggests 
that subjects may invoke causal reasoning when making judgments about categorical 
material. In particular, several studies (Hastie, et al., 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1980) have found that people naturally develop causal accounts to explain why a
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The representation manipulation provided evidence that subjects assessing
that causal reasoning occurs on categorical materials, explanation-based decision
making explains conjunction errors for categorical material in exactly the same way
as for causal material — on the basis of completeness and plausibility. Both
categorical and causal materials were included in this study to determine the extent to
which representation plays a role in the assessment of these differing types of
materials.
Overall, it was found that conjunction errors are slightly smaller for 
categorical materials than for causal, and that the complementarity effect is slightly 
stronger for categorical materials than for causal. The differences between the 
material types may have to do with the familiarity and experience people have with 
making judgments in the two domains, and the rules governing their judgments. For 
example, in legal trials in the U.S., a prosecutor must prove “beyond reasonable 
doubt” that a defendant is guilty of a crime. The likelihood of innocence judgments 
about causal materials may have been influenced by this and other rules governing 
courtroom behaviour, whereas the judgments about categorical materials may have 
been influenced by different types of rules governing categorical judgments. 
Nevertheless, the important thing to note is that complementarity affected both causal 
and categorical materials in the direction predicted by the completeness principle of 
explanation-based decision making, and representation had the effect of reducing
conjunction errors on both material types.
Strategy Use by Condition: This research provided the evidence needed to
classify strategy use by problem type, as shown in Table 36. There were three
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described person chose a vocation inconsistent with their personality. To the extent
contradictory and complementary common scenario problems (columns 1 and 3,
Table 36). First, Experiments 1 and 2 showed evidence that common scenario
conjunction error magnitude depended on subjective complementarity. Second,
Experiment 1 showed that 76% of conjunction protocols contained evidence for
merged representations. And third, the extent-merged classifications predicted error
magnitude in the direction predicted by explanation-based decision making.
Subjects are thought to use calculational strategies to assess 
nonrepresentational uncommon scenario (column 4, row 2, Table 36) by default. It is 
believed that when a common representation of events is difficult to form, 
calculational strategies will be used. The large difference in error magnitudes 
between the representational and nonrepresentational uncommon scenario problems 
suggest that subjects are using different strategies for the two conditions, in 
particular, the calculational strategy for nonrepresentational problems, and a 
representational strategy for the representational problems (column 4, row l, Table
36).
The common scenario independent condition is the most difficult to classify. 
One could argue that subjects would be likely to use a representational strategy 
because the component events could easily be made part of a common representation. 
One could also argue that because the component events are independent, no 
immediate relationship between the components comes to mind and the events are 
assessed in a manner similar to the uncommon scenario problems. Factors other than 
error magnitude may need to be used to discriminate between strategies for these
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sources of evidence that subjects were using representational strategies to assess
representational strategies, or verbal protocol differences between the conditions.
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types of problems, such as differences in variability produced by calculational and
Table 36: Strategy Use by Condition
' Common Scenario Uncommon
Contradictory Independent Complementary Scenario
Representational Representational Representational Representational Representational
Nonrepresentational Representational 9 Representational Calculational
Component Plausibility: The plausibility of the events making up a 
conjunction were expected to be important in the assessment of conjunction 
likelihood. Calculational models, such as Carlson and Yates Signed Summation 
Rules and Abelson, Leddo, and Gross’ geometric mean model, place maximum 
weight on component plausibility in the assessment of conjunctions. In 
representational models, many factors may influence conjunction likelihood, 
including component plausibility and the extent to which the components can be 
merged into a single representation. To determine the contribution of component 
plausibility to conjunction likelihood, data were fitted to several calculational models, 
including the Signed Summation Rules, a geometric mean model, a linear 
combination of the largest and smallest components (i.e.. C= Po + PiL + P2S) and a 
weighted sum model (i.e., C= Po + P.(A + B)). The geometric mean, linear 
combination, and weighted sum models performed similarly in predicting 
conjunction likelihood, but the linear combination of the largest and smallest 
components was best at predicting conjunction error magnitude. In all cases, 
component likelihood was a reliable predictor of conjunction likelihood.
Best Fitting Models: Because people may invoke different strategies for
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common and uncommon scenario problems, separate models of conjunction
likelihood were created, one for each. For common scenario problems, the best
fitting model included the likelihood of the largest (L) and smallest (S) components
(0-100), subjective complementarity (0-100, where 0=contradictory, 50=neutral, and
100=complementary), and representation (where -1 = representation not given and
1 represen tation  given), as shown in Table 37.
Table 37^ Best Fining Modelfor Common Scenario Coivnnciions
M °de! . , Multiple
R
Conj = -9.98 + .26L + .50S + .33SC - 3.29Rep .69
Conj Error = -9.98 + .26L - .50S + .33SC - 3.29Rep .46
In this model, conjunction likelihood appears to be most heavily influenced by 
the likelihood of the smallest component. Subjective complementarity is the next 
most influential term, with weight between the weight of the components. 
Representational conjunctions are predicted to have errors with magnitude of 6.6 
smaller than nonrepresentational conjunctions. This decrease m conjunction 
likelihood when representations are provided is thought to be a reflection of the 
specificity of the representation: the representational conjunction presents one 
specific interpretation of how component events may be combined, which may be too 
specific given the amount of detail provided in the case. It may also indicate a 
strategy switch from calculational to representational for some subjects. These results 
are consistent with a representational model of reasoning, in which the plausibility of 
the component events as well as the relationship between them is important.
For uncommon scenario problems, the best fitting models include all of the
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param eters listed above, with the exception of subjective complementarity, as shown
in Table 38. Subjects typically rated the subjective complementarity of uncommon
scenario problems with or close to a single value, 0 , and consequently, this parameter
does not improve the model’s predictions.
Table 38: Best Fitting Modelfor Uncommon Scenario Conjunctiom
Model ; : Multiple
R
Coni = 2.45 + .23L + .48S -10.03Rep .59
Coni Error = 2.45 + .23L - .52S -10.03Rep .53
As with common scenario problems, the conjunction likelihood appears to be 
most heavily influenced by the likelihood of the smallest component, as evidenced by 
the relative weights of the terms in the equation. The meaning of the representational 
term is thought to differ from that in the common scenario problems. In common 
scenario problems, the representation effect may reflect differences in specificity 
between representational and nonrepresentational problems. For uncommon scenario 
conjunctions, the representational condition may actually determine what type of 
strategy is used to assess the conjunction: a calculational strategy for 
nonrepresentational conjunctions, and a representational strategy for representational 
conjunctions. The weight of representation is much larger in the uncommon scenario 
model because it reflects a strategy shift rather than the specificity effect alone.
Disjunctions
Complementarity. Relationships among component events are an important 
aspect of event representations, and therefore should influence the perceived 
likelihood of disjunctions of events if representational strategies are used. According
explanations than non-unique explanations when the non-unique explanations can not
be merged into a single, plausible causal chain. The disjunction of component
explanations that can be merged into a single explanation should be thought of as
more likely, and hence have smaller disjunction errors, than the disjunction of
explanations that are implausible when merged. Those predictions were tested by
looking at several variables, including relationship-type, subjective complementarity,
and extent-merged. All of these variables were slightly different measures of the
complementarity effect. None of the complementarity variables was found to
influence the magnitude of disjunction errors. This finding suggests that subjects
may be using calculational strategies that do not depend on the relationship among
component events in the assessment of disjunctions.
Protocol Strategies: There was little protocol evidence that people attempt to 
merge separate explanations into a single representation to assess the likelihood of 
disjunctions of events. In only 26 percent of the statements did subjects verbally 
reason about the relationship between the components when they were a part of a 
disjunction, compared to 71 percent of statements made during conjunction 
judgments. The protocol data, together with the lack of a complementarity effect, 
suggest that people may not be concerned with the relationship between component
events when asked about a disjunctive relationship.
If calculational strategies dominate for disjunctive judgments, one would 
expect to find evidence for rule usage. Protocol evidence for the largest component 
strategy was found on 13 of the 70 disjunction problems (18% of the problems).
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to explanation-based decision making, unique explanations are judged to be better
Reasoning about Conjunctions and Disjunctions 85
However, in only one instance was evidence found for a subject taking two 
component likelihoods and explicitly combining them according to a rule. This is not 
to suggest that subjects do not use a formula for combining the events. It merely 
suggests that subjects may not have access to or be able to verbalize their rules for 
combining event likelihoods.
Representation: In order to increase the likelihood that subjects were using a 
representational strategy to assess disjunctions, representational disjunctive 
explanations were constructed that contained component events already merged into a 
single representation. For example, in the representational version of the disjunction
“How likely is that either A or B, or both?”, the word “both” was replaced with the 
representational version of the conjunction, so that the merged representation was 
explicitly stated in the disjunctive question. Ideally, the representational disjunction 
would have been expressed in a form that did not contain the connective “or” to 
discourage calculational strategy use, but it was difficult to keep the disjunctive 
meaning the same without using the connective. It was expected that if subjects used 
a representational strategy for representational disjunctions and a calculational 
strategy for nonrepresentational disjunctions, a complementarity effect would be 
apparent in the representational version, and a representation interaction wonld result. 
Complementarity did not reliably inflnenee disjunction error magnitude in either 
representation group, and there was no evidence for a representation by
complementarity interaction 
calculational strategy to coir
tion. Instead, the data suggest subjects continued to use a 
combine terms in the representational disjunction.
larger disjunction errors (M=6.98) than nonrepresentational disjunctions (1.45).
Given a calculational strategy, this increase in disjunction error magnitude may be
caused by the inclusion of the likelihood of the representational conjunction in the
disjunction calculation. We know from studying conjunctions that the
representational conjunction likelihood is smaller than the nonrepresentational
conjunction likelihood. And if subjects were averaging the components along with
the conjunction, for example, the inclusion of the representational conjunction would
cause the disjunction estimate to be lower than the inclusion of the
nonrepresentational disjunction.
Unrelated Scenario Problems: As in research on conjunctions, there was no 
reliable difference between the disjunction error magnitudes of the unrelated scenario 
(Error mean = 6.5) and independent common scenario (Error mean = 5.4) 
nonrepresentational problems. Indeed, it appears subjects may be using similar 
strategies for both types of problems. Although the representational unrelated 
scenario problems had much larger disjunction errors (M = 26.4) than the 
representational independent common scenario problems(M = 8.6), the difference can 
be accounted for by calculational models in the same manner as the representation 
effect. We know that uncommon scenario conjunctions are much smaller than 
common scenario conjunctions in the representational group. If subjects are 
averaging the components along with the conjunction, the uncommon scenario 
disjunction would be smaller than that of the common scenario disjunction. In effect, 
the large difference between common and uncommon scenario conjunctions causes
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Representational disjunctions had smaller disjunctions, and consequently
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large differences between common and uncommon scenario disjunctions.
Material Type: Disjunction errors are slightly larger for categorical materials 
than for causal. This difference may have to do with the familiarity and experience 
people have with making judgments in the causal and categorical domains, and the 
rules governing their judgments. The important thing to note is that complementarity 
was not found to be a factor in assessing disjunctions for either domains, and that 
representation had the effect of increasing disjunction errors for both material types.
Component Plausibility: To determine the contribution of component 
plausibility to disjunction likelihood ratings, data were fitted to several calculational 
models, including the signed combination rule (i.e., A,(AorB) = w]X(A) + w2A,(B)), 
the geometric mean of the components, (i.e., D=k(AB)1/2), a linear combination of the 
largest and smallest components (i.e., D= (30+ PiL + p2S), and a weighted sum model 
(i.e., D= p0+ pi(A + B)). These models performed similarly in predicting disjunction 
likelihood, but the linear combination of the largest and smallest components was 
best at predicting disjunction error magnitude. In all cases, component likelihood
was a reliable predictor of disjunction likelihood.
Best Fitting Models: In constructing models of disjunction judgments, the 
type of scenario (i.e. common or uncommon) did not interact with model parameters. 
People made judgments about disjunctions in the same manner for both scenario 
types. However, it was hypothesized that people may make judgments about 
representational disjunctions differently than nonrepresentational disjunctions. It was 
expected that the conjunction may be weighted more heavily in the representational 
problems because the conjunction is explicitly presented to subjects, whereas in
prediction was confirmed. The best fitting models are shown in Tables 39 and 40.
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nonrepresentational disjunctions, it is merely referred to by the words “or both”. This
Table 39: Best Fitting Model for Representational Disjunctions
Model
-: V : i l l
Multiple
R
Disj = 12.19 + .25L+ .28S + .33Conj .68
Disj Error = -12.19 + .75L - .28S - .33Conj .57
Table 40: Best Fitting M odelJorJ^or^ Disjunctions
M o d e l . ^ :; :; 1 ;; MultipleR
Disj = 18.65 + .56L+ ,19Conj .68
Disj Error =-18.65 + .44L -  .19Conj .44
It appears that subjects are averaging the conjunction and component 
likelihoods on representational problems, whereas they may be anchoring on the 
largest component likelihood and adjusting based on the conjunction estimate for 
nonrepresentational problems. Subjective complementarity did not increase the 
multiple R for either of the models. Aside from the differential weighting of the 
conjunction, it is not clear why the two models differ, especially with respect to the
contribution of the smallest component.
It is likely that these models do not reflect the actual calculations made by 
subjects on all of the disjunction problems. Instead, the models probably reflect an 
aggregation of multiple calculational strategies used by subjects, including averaging, 
the largest component strategy, anchor and adjust, and others. Data collected in the 
verbal protocol experiment shed some light on what subjects were doing when 
assessing nonrepresentational disjunctions. Evidence for the largest component 
strategy was found on 18 of the 70 disjunction problems, and there was one instance
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of a subject explicitly adding the likelihoods of the component events. There was
also evidence from 18 of the 70 problems that some subjects tried to merge the
component events into a single representation when assessing the disjunction. These
subjects may have been forming a representation of the conjunction to use in the
assessment of the disjunction. On another 23 problems, subjects appeared to consider
only component events separately. In all cases, the largest component seems to be an
element of the calculation, accounting for its weight in the best fitting regression
models above. The conjunction may have been considered by only a subset of the
subjects, making its weight smaller by comparison. On representational problems,
the explicitly stated conjunction may have drawn attention to the conjunction and
away from the largest component, or it may have led subjects to consider all parts of
the disjunction, consistent with an averaging strategy.
Reasoning about Conjunctions and Disjunctions 90
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research suggests that people assess conjunctions using representational 
strategies when common representations of events can be easily formed, and that 
people use calculational strategies to assess disjunctions of events. When evaluating 
the likelihood of a conjunction of explanations, people first attempt to construct a 
single representation of the conjunctive events, and then assess the plausibility of the 
resulting representation. The likelihood of the conjunction emerges as a property of 
the representation itself, which is influenced by such factors as the internal 
consistency of the representation (e.g. Is it possible to combine components in a 
sensible way?), the match between the case and the representation (e.g. Does the case 
support the details in the representation?), and the amount of detail in the explanation 
(e.g. Are there enough details in the representation to make it a real possibility? Are 
there too many details so that the representation appears unlikely?). The 
complementarity of the component events contributes to the internal consistency of 
the representation. The plausibility of component events is largely a reflection of the 
match between the events and the case description and world knowledge. And the 
representation manipulation was thought to have influenced the amount of detail in 
the representation, possibly providing too many details for the representation to 
appear likely given what was known about the case.
When people assess conjunctions with components from uncommon 
scenarios, they are likely to use a calculational strategy in which individual 
component plausibilities are derived and combined according to some rule which
greatest weight given to the smallest component. This model appears to yield
judgments similar to those made by people assessing conjunctions with independent
components from a common scenario.
The likelihood of disjunctions of events believed to be assessed using one or 
many calculational strategies that involve a calculation on the likelihood of the 
component events and the likelihood of the conjunction of the components. The 
relationship between component events was not found to influence disjunction error 
magnitude, and there was only a small amount of protocol evidence to support 
representational strategy use. The representational reasoning that is done during 
disjunction judgments appears to be limited to assessing the likelihood of the 
conjunction of component events, the result of which may then be used in some type 
of formula to arrive at a disjunction likelihood.
Partial support for explanation-based decision making 
According to explanation-based decision making, in the course of making 
assessments of uncertainty and making decisions based on those assessments, 
decision makers construct an explanation that ties evidence into a causal structure and 
thereby provides an interpretation of it. Assessments of uncertainty are determined 
by attributes of the explanation, including the completeness, plausibility, and 
uniqueness of the explanation. From a normative perspective, the act of merging 
explanations into a single representation may help decision makers to discover 
contradictions or consistencies not apparent through an abstract problem formulation.
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resembles a linear combination of the largest and smallest components, with the
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For example, a story that connects component events provides the decision maker
with a concrete instance of an abstract problem that can be easily assessed. The ease
with which stories can be formed also provides the decision maker with information
about the plausibility of the abstract conjunction. If it is impossible to construct a
plausible story, then the conjunction must be unlikely. Likewise, if a story
connecting the component events is easily formed, then the conjunction may be
likely. Attempting to construct a merged representation may also enable subjects to
reconcile events that appear contradictory on the surface.
Uniqueness refers to the extent to which only one plausible alternative 
explanation exists for decision-relevant evidence. This study found evidence that the 
completeness of explanations constructed by decision makers influences their 
assessments of conjunctions, but found no evidence that the uniqueness of those same 
explanations played a part in the assessment of disjunctions. There are several 
reasons why uniqueness might not have been playing a role in the assessment of
disjunctions.
One possibility is that uniqueness may apply differently in real versus 
hypothetical situations. For example, in legal trials, if a prosecutor presents the jury 
with multiple competing stories that could explain the evidence they gathered in a 
case, jurors may think the prosecutor is uncertain about what exactly happened. Such 
a situation may have a dramatic effect on jurors confidence in the prosecution’s 
stories, and hence, in their likelihood assessment of the stories. However, when 
subjects in a psychology experiment are presented with multiple competing stories 
that could explain a fictitious case, there is no expectation that only a single
may be exceptionally strong and relevant and in the context of real situations such as
legal trials, and less strong in fictitious situations.
Another possibility may have to do with “naturalness” of the disjunctions. 
Bar-Hillel and Neter (1993) suggest that the mechanical joining of events by the 
words “or” and “or both” may cause subjects to invoke a calculational strategy. They 
claim that disjunctive categories formed in this manner tend to sound a bit odd, and 
do not evoke a natural representation of the union. In their research, they set out to 
examine the disjunction effect with categories that are naturally represented as unions 
of events, and in doing so capitalized on Rosch’s work in categorization (Rosch, 
1978). Rosch observed that basic level categories are neither thought of as 
conjunctive or disjunctive categories, whereas higher level categories are often 
thought of as disjunctive. For example, “furniture” is the union of “chairs,” “tables,” 
“beds,” “cupboards”, etc. In their studies, subjects were given the description of a 
person and were asked to rank the likelihood that the person was a member of 
different categories, including naturally disjunctive categories (e.g. Danielle is 
majoring in the humanities”) and a few component categories (e.g. “Danielle is a 
literature major”). Their subjects committed a high rate of disjunction errors 
averaging 64 percent, that were consistent with the predictions of Tversky’s (1977) 
representativeness theory, but could not be explained by calculational rules. Their 
work suggests people may indeed assess disjunctions using representational strategies 
when disjunctive representations are naturally formed. People may resort to using 
calculational strategies when complex events cannot be naturally represented, such as
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explanation is the true explanation of evidence. Therefore, the uniqueness principle
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when disjunctions are mechanically formed using the connective “or”, or when
conjunctions are composed of events from unrelated scenarios.
Task diligence
W henever I discuss the “Linda” problem with friends or colleagues, they find 
it hard to believe people would make such large and consistent errors in reasoning if 
they were really trying diligently to perform the task. Most think that if subjects bet 
money on their answers, then they would not make errors. Bar-Hillel and Neter 
(1993) ran a series of studies that addressed the betting issue with regard to the 
disjunction fallacy. They presented subjects with different versions of two problems, 
one in which subjects were asked to provide probabilities that a described case was a 
member of the category, and one in which subjects ranked categories by their 
willingness to bet that a described case was a member of the category. The options 
included a disjunctive category and subordinate categories making up the disjunctive 
category. The most likely answer was always the disjunctive category. The error 
rates for the willingness-to-bet group were no different than the probabilities group, 
with 72 to 77 percent of subjects making errors. But willingness to bet is less 
compelling than actual betting, and subjects may not be as diligent in a hypothetical 
betting situation. They repeated the study and offered subjects in one group the 
equivalent of $4.50 and subjects in another group a 5 percent chance to win $45.00 
for providing correct answers to their 10 minute experiment. They found a slight 
decrease in error rates for the real betting situation, although the difference between 
groups was not significant and error rates were still above 70 percent.
researchers (Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Locksley
& Stangor, 1984; Reeves & Lockhart, 1993). In these studies, the performance of
statistically naive subjects was compared to statistically sophisticated subjects.
Statistical knowledge slightly decreased the incidence of conjunction errors. Thus,
although statistical training and betting paradigms have been found to reduce the
conjunction and disjunction effects, the reduction is slight and these manipulations by
no means eliminate the effect. Hertwig and Chase (1997, p. 3) found a fitting quote
for the strength of the conjunction effect: “I know that the third statement [Bank
teller & Feminist] is least probable, yet a little homunculus in my head continues to
jump up and down, shouting at me -  ‘but she can’t just be a bank teller; read the
description.’” (Gould, 1992, p.469).
Representation Cues Assessment Strategy 
The incidence of conjunction errors has been found to be dramatically 
reduced when subjects are required to make frequency judgments rather than 
probability judgments (Beyth-Marom, 1981; Fiedler, 1988; Hertwig, 1994; Reeves
& Lockhart, 1993). A frequency version of the Linda problem may resemble the
following:
“Linda is 30 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright... Imagine 200 
women who fit the description of Linda. How many of the 200 women are 
bank tellers? ( _  of 200). How many of the 200 women are bank tellers and 
are active in the feminist movement?”
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The concern about statistical naivete has also been addressed by several
Whereas the incidence of conjunction errors in the probability format has been
format is much lower, typically between 10 and 30 percent. I claim that the reason
for these large differences is due to differences in the way events are represented in
the two problem types. Frequency problems evoke a distributional representation of
events, whereas probability problems evoke a singular representation. Depending on
the form of the representation, different features of the problem may be highlighted,
and different strategies may be cued. Although it is unclear what a distributional
representation may look like, one possibility is that events are represented in a way
that resembles Venn diagrams, in which sets of events, their unions and intersections
are highlighted. Given such a representation, judgments would naturally map more
closely to those prescribed by probability theory. Singular representations may take
the form of a story, in which judgments are determined by the completeness,
plausibility, and uniqueness of the story, rather than by extensional rules.
The present research suggests that event representation is the key determining 
factor in the assessment of complex events. Subjects were found to construct 
representations of events that resembled stories when asked to assess common 
scenario conjunctions. Given story-like representations, features of the story such as 
plausibility, completeness, and uniqueness, were important in determining the 
likelihood of conjunctions of events. These features were affected by the 
complementarity and plausibility of the events composing the conjunction. When a 
natural representation was difficult or impossible to construct, subjects appeared to 
decompose the problem into its components A and B, and apply some formula to 
combine the numbers. This occurred when events were from uncommon scenarios,
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reported to be typically around 60 to 80 percent, the incidence in the frequency
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and when subjects are asked to assess disjunctions that were mechanically
constructed using the connective “or”. It appears that people will attempt to construct
a representation of the problem when the problem lends itself to a natural
representation. They only resort to decomposition strategies when natural
representations are not available. Researchers need to characterize what makes a
representation “natural”, and develop theories to account for judgments given
particular types of representations. In sum, representation is a key element in the
assessment of complex events.
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APPENDIX A: VERBAL PROTOCOL CAUSAL REASONING MATERIALS
King vs Ryder
Mr. King is 77 years old, lives in a family neighborhood nuzzled up 
against the mountains. He owns one acre of land and has a flowerbed in his 
backyard. Mr. King is suing Johnny Ryder, who is 13 years old, and his 
parents for property damages. Mr. King claims Johnny Ryder, who lives in 
the same neighborhood, was trespassing in his yard, knocked down some rails 
in his fence, and trampled his flowerbed. Mr. King has lived in the area for 
many years, and knows a few of the kids in the area, including Johnny.
Johnny is the son of one of his hunting buddies. Mr. King claims he heard 
some noise outside, and when he looked out the window, he saw Johnny in 
the distance. When he yelled at him, Johnny ran away.
The defense points out that Mr. King's eyesight is poor. They point 
out that the noise Mr. King heard could have been caused by large animals 
that live in the woods behind Mr. King's property. In addition, Johnny 
claims he did not do it, because he was not in the area when the incident 
occurred.
You are probably unsure about whether Johnny is innocent or guilty of 
damaging Mr. King's property. You are also probably unsure about what 
exactly happened. Johnny may or may not be innocent. Please assume the 
role o f a juror, and answer the following questions about the likelihood that 
Johnny is innocent or guilty for a variety of possible reasons.
(Subjects are asked to provide likelihood estimates for either all complementary or 
all contradictory questions —not both, and all filler questions.)
Complementary
F.yplanation A: How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by some deer that live in the woods behind Mr. 
King’s property?
F.xnl a nation B: How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by an animal running through the yard spooked by a 
hunter's gunfire?
Conjunction: How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
both because it was damaged by some deer that live in the woods behind Mr.
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King’s property and because it was damaged by an animal running through 
the yard spooked by a hunter's gunfire?
Disiunction: How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
either because it was damaged by some deer that live in the woods behind Mr. 
King’s property or because it was damaged by an animal running through the 
yard spooked by a hunter's gunfire, or both?
P(AIBV. Assuming that the yard was damaged by an animal running through 
the yard spooked by a hunter's gunfire, what is the chance it was damaged by 
some deer that live in the woods behind Mr. King's property?
Contradictory
Explanation A: How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by some deer that live in the woods behind Mr.
King's property?
Explanation B: How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
because the real cause of the damage was another boy in town who looked 
similar to Johnny?
Conjunction: How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
both because it was damaged by some deer that live in the woods behind Mr. 
King's property and because the real cause of the damage was another boy in 
town who looked similar to Johnny?
Disiunction: How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
either because it was damaged by some deer that live in the woods behind Mr. 
King’s property or because the real cause of the damage was another boy in 
town who looked similar to Johnny, or both?
P(AIB): Assuming that the real cause of the damage was another boy in town 
who looked similar to Johnny, what is the chance that Mr. King's property was 
damaged by some deer that live in the woods behind Mr. King's property?
Filler Questions
Filler 1: How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
because the real cause of the damage was a large dog that ran through Mr. 
King's yard?
Filler 2: How likely is it that 
because the damage was due
Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard 
to a lack of upkeep of the yard and garden?
APPENDIX B: VERBAL PROTOCOL CAUSAL REASONING MATERIALS
State vs McMillan
On Thursday, January 17, 1991, at 9:15 PM, Randy Allen Jr. was shot 
to death in his private, secluded backyard. The shooting occurred in a quiet, 
middle-class neighborhood in Dayton, Ohio. The state is charging Jack 
McMillan with murder.
The state brought forth two witnesses who testified that they saw 
Randy arguing with Jack two hours earlier that evening in a bar. They 
testified that the argument broke out into a fist fight, and ended with Jack 
holding Randy by the collar, threatening him "to pay, or else", and throwing 
him out of the bar. It was discovered that Randy owed Jack $20,000.
The defense reports testimony that Jack and Randy had been friends 
for over ten years. Randy had overdrawn all his bank accounts, and was in 
danger of getting his house repossessed. In addition, Randy was having some 
problems at home with his wife. Randy drank too much, and had been 
accused of beating and cheating on his wife. Randy's wife has been suffering 
from depression, and had told him that someday he would feel all the pain that 
he had made her endure. Jack had always been there for Randy whenever he 
was in trouble. Jack claims that the money was a loan to help out his friend. 
Jack believed that Randy had been having problems with drugs, and had 
encouraged him to get help. But Jack knew that Randy had once been 
involved with loan sharks, and didn't want him to get mixed up with that 
again. Jack was never repaid. However, the money meant little to him
because he is a successful businessman.
Randy's widow was able to pay off the house mortgage with money
from his life insurance policy.
You are probably unsure about whether Jack McMillan is innocent or guilty 
o f  murder. You are also probably unsure about what exactly happened. Jack 
may or may not be innocent. Please assume the role of a juror, and answer 
the follow ing questions about the likelihood that Jack is innocent or guilty for  
a variety o f possible reasons.
(,Subjects are asked to provide likelihood estimates for either all complementary or
all contradictory qu estions-not both, and all filler questions.)
Complementary
F.vnlanation A: How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder
because Randy's wife shot him after a fight they had when she found out their
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Explanation B: How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder 
because Randy's wife killed him because she believed her husband had used 
their house payment money to entertain a woman with which he was having 
an affair?
Conjunction: How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder both because 
Randy's wife shot him after a fight they had when she found out their house 
would be repossessed and because Randy's wife killed him because she 
believed her husband had used their house payment money to entertain a 
woman with which he was having an affair?
Disjunction: How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder either because 
Randy's wife shot him after a fight they had when she found out their house 
would be repossessed or because Randy's wife killed him because she 
believed her husband had used their house payment money to entertain a 
woman with which he was having an affair, or bothP.
P(A1B): Assuming that Randy's wife killed him because she believed her 
husband had used their house payment money to entertain a woman with 
which he was having an affair, what is the chance that Randy s wife shot him 
after a fight they had when she found out their house would be repossessed?
Contradictory
F.xplanation A: How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder because 
Randy's wife shot him after a fight they had when she found out their house
would be repossessed?
F.xnlanation B' How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder because the 
person w h o  murdered Randy was really a loan shark Randy got mvolved with
and couldn't pay back?
Coniunction: How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder both because 
Randy's wife shot him after a fight they had when she found out their house 
would be repossessed and because the person who murdered Randy was really 
a loan shark Randy got involved with and couldn't pay back?
Disiunction- How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder either because 
Randy's wife shot him after a fight they had when she found out their house 
would be repossessed or because the person who murdered Randy was really a 
loan shark Randy got involved with and couldn't pay back, or both.
P(AIB): Assuming that the person who murdered Randy was really a loan
shark Randy got involved with and couldn't pay back, what is the chance that 
Randy's wife shot her husband after a fight they had when she found out their 
house would be repossessed?
Filler Questions
Filler 1: How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder
because he was with his wife at a movie when the shooting occurred?
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Filler 2: How likely is it that Jack is innocent of murder 
because he does not own a gun?
APPENDIX C: VERBAL PROTOCOL CATEGORICAL REASONING
MATERIALS
Bill
Bill is 34 years old. He is intelligent, but unimaginative, meticulous, and 
generally lifeless. In school, he was strong in mathematics but weak in social 
studies and humanities.
Complementary
Question A: How likely is it that Bill is a computer scientist?
Question B: How likely is it that Bill likes to spend a lot of time working on 
computers?
Conjunction: How likely is it that Bill both is a computer scientist and likes 
to spend a lot of time working on computers?
Disiunction: How likely is it that Bill either is a computer scientist or likes to 
spend a lot of time working on computers, or both?
P(AIB): Assuming that Bill is a computer scientist, what is the chance that 
Bill likes to spend a lot of time working on computers?
Contradictory
Question A: How likely is it that Bill is an accountant?
Question B: How likely is it that Bill is an engineer?
Conjunction: How likely is it that Bill both is an engineer and is an 
accountant?
Disiunction: How likely is it that Bill either is an engineer or is an 
accountant, or both?
P(AIB): Assuming that Bill is an engineer, what is the chance that Bill is an 
accountant?
Filler Questions
Filler 1: How likely is it that Bill is an architect?
Filler 2: How likely is it that Bill is a reporter?
APPENDIX D: VERBAL PROTOCOL CATEGORICAL REASONING
MATERIALS
Kristin
Kristin is 17 years old. She is a Junior in high school, is athletic, loves sports, 
and doesn't smoke. She comes from a poor family. She receives average 
grades in school. However, she is a hard-worker and very conscientious.
Complementary
Question A: How likely is it that Kristin is on a basketball team at school?
Question B: How likely is it that Kristin would like being a coach for a girls 
team in the future?
Conjunction: How likely is it that Kristin both would like being a coach for a 
girls team in the future and is on a basketball team at school?
Disjunction: How likely is it that Kristin either would like being a coach for a 
girls team in the future or is on a basketball team at school, or both?
P(A1B): Assuming that Kristin would like being a coach for a girls team in the 
future, what is the chance that Kristin is on a basketball team at school?
Contradictory
Question A: How likely is it that Kristin is on a basketball team at school?
Question B: How likely is it that Kristin can't participate in school sports 
because she holds a part-time job after school?
Conjunction: How likely is it both that Kristin can't participate in school 
sports because she holds a part-time job after school and that Kristin is on a 
basketball team at school?
Disjunction: How likely is it either that Kristin can't participate in school 
sports because she holds a part-time job after school or that Kristin is on a 
basketball team at school, or both?
P(AIB): Assuming that Kristin can't participate in school sports because she 
holds a part-time job after school, what is the chance that Kristin is on a 
basketball team at school?
Filler Questions
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Filler 1: How likely is it that Kristin has taken a shop class in school?
Filler 2 : How likely is it that Kristin is planning to go on to college?
APPENDIX E: CONJUNCTION STATEMENTS BY EXTENT MERGED
Conjunction Protocol Statements by Extent Merged 1
Implausibly Merged Components
Subj Protocol
1 not very likely, the top one says she can't do sports because of job, the 
second one says she's on the team. 10
3 he could be both engineer and accountant, but most likely not. At his 
age, he could have gotten both degrees, but I would say not. 20.
4 I don't think they are related, because one says she can't and one says she 
is. 0.
4 I am confused because it is new evidence. It seems likely that his wife 
could have shot him, but then why was J charged with it. I m questioning 
that J was a loan shark because if he were friends for 10 years it doesn t 
seem very likely. I'm confused. It seems somewhat likely that that could 
have happened. But if J lent him the $, then I don’t know where the loan 
shark would come into the picture, unless it was an old that he was still 
dealing with. And if they had been fighting earlier about the $, it
5 not very likely, if can't be on school sports because of job, wouldn’t be 
on BB team.__________________ _ _____ _________ ________________
5 Unlikely both would happen. Seems like only 1 animal would do 
damage instead of 2. 30________________ ________________________
6 Doesn't sound very likely to me that he would do both because why 
would he need to, both of them is considered a complete job. Work a 
lot with numbers in engineering I’m sure, but not tied in together, but I 
don't think its very likely that he'd do both.__________________________
6 I don’t think it would be both. So that's 0. he saw him run away, and I 
don't think there happened to be a deer and a boy in there.
7 If deer, probably have damage to property more frequently. Could have 
been boy looked similar, because eyesight bad. Unlikely deer, because 
would be obviously deer did it "too", because would see hoof prints 
instead of shoe prints, so not very likely__________________ __________
7 if he can be two things, its, I was thinking ot how someone can be buih,
a n d  engineer and an accountant. Yeah, I don’t know if he can be two
things. I’ll just say its likely that he can be an accountant (versus an 
engineer?)_____________ __________________ _______ :— ; -----------
8 That just sort of contradicts itself, I don't know why. 111 give it 2U.---------
9
___9_
That is saying 2 people murdered him. Have An AND with 2 dillerent
people killing him, the likeliness is pretty low.---------------------------- _------
Well she’s probably not on a basketball team it she has ajoD and cant----- 1
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participate. Doesn't fit together.
10 Being both would be difficult I think. Being strong in numbers he could 
probably be both, but as a profession its pretty difficult I think. I don't 
think its likely. I think its either 1 or the other. So I will say 30.
11 sounds boring enough to be both, but most people do either or.
12 I would think this is a good possibility, I guess can't say both, cause 2 
people, I mean could have shot him, but don't really know w/ the facts 
that are stated. I would say if they have 2 different possibilities, then J 
probably more likely to be innocent.72.
13 I don't think the likelihood is too great here because I don't think Randy's 
wife was a loan shark. So, I think it was one or the other, not both.
13 I don't think its too likely that both would occur. Maybe either one could 
occur, either deer or animal, so, I don't think because of both, I'd say like 
30.
14 I guess you could do that, it would be kind of time consuming, though, of 
course he doesn't really have a life, so, I’d say about 70
15 I don't know, it seems like it would take a lot of work to me to be an 
engineer and an accountant. But he doesn't really have anything else 
going for him. 8
15 Well it can't be both. Right. It had to be one or the other. So I'd say 
there was really no chance of that.
16 It's not likely at all. I mean, you can't do both things.
16 I don't think it was both of those, because both couldn't happen. But it 
Drobablv was one of them. 0.
17 well, can't be both.
18 I guess I don't think the deer probably would have been the cause but its 
possible, and the first one is pretty likely, I would think, so the chances 
of both of them aren’t really that high, but it could have been both, 70
18 could be likely that he’s one or the other, but I don't think its realistic that 
someone would have both of those jobs. That is pretty likely that he 
could have done either one and then changed jobs, so somewhere in the 
middle._____________ ____________ _ _____ __________________ _ _
Piaus»ibly Merged Components
1 since he's a computer scientist, he spends a lot of time on computers
2 That’s very likely if he has 2 jobs. 70
3 Well she could be doing both. I guess I never thought about this, 1 like 
sports and don't play BB at all, so could like sports and not play BB. 
Probably is both, would like being a coach for a girls team and on the BB 
team. I would probably have to give _______ _ _______ _— -------------
4 It probably very likely because of his background, and it he s a computer 
scientist, he definitely likes computers. 100. ---------------------------------
4 If the deer is the animal going through the yard (don t know it it was 
caused by a hunters gunfire), both are the same situation, so they are the
same thing. 60__________ ____________ _ ___ _____________________
Reasoning about Conjunctions and Disjunctions 113
6 I think its pretty likely, if I was athletic, I'd definitely like to do both. 
Usually pretty athletic people like to coach because they know what 
needs to be done to win the game. 90.
6 See those kind of go together. Man, she'd be really pissed. But to have 
both, I mean, we haven’t even heard from this other girl, this other 
woman about them having an affair and that's a pretty big jump to say 
that he was having an affair and it was being repossessed and that they 
were fighting and she shot him. That narrows it down when you start 
putting in so many details.
8 Both of these are likely, because with all the animals in there if he lives 
in woods, there are hunters back there, there is a high chance.
8 That is high, CS works with math, working on computers a lot. I would 
say 85.
9 Well, pretty high, because they could go together.
10 she didn’t want her life to turn out that way & she thought that the thing 
she needed to get rid of was Randy. There is a lot going against R's wife. 
I think that J is looking more innocent. Jack was just kind of a 
convenient bystander in a way & that’s why they targeted him as being 
the murderer. I'm going to say 60.
11 That's pretty possible, maybe the deer was scared out of the woods by 
someone, and while running away, ran through his property.
11 Didn't say anything about him having an affair. Considering he's so 
screwed up with everything else, its probably pretty likely.
12 I would say that it’s not likely,... That both are done. I would say she 
does both. I would say an 83.
12 I think its a good possibility, Mr. King should, I don't know, he's too 
quick to judge somebody when he lives so close to the mountains, a lot 
of animals could come in yard & do same type of damage.
13 I'm just like confused. It says that she can't participate in sports, but yet 
s h e 's  o n  the BB team at school? So is that like? I'm confused on that. I 
think she's more the type of person that would be on BB team, she 
probably play on school sport and have a part time job after school. So, 
how likely is it that, No, I think about 50 percent because I think she 
could have a part time job and be on a school team
14 I would like to say 90, usually, if she’s really athletic, outgoing, and 
intelligent, hard working, she'd like to do both I think.
14 I'd say that's about, right in between 45 and 50, 47. Both of them could 
do it, the deer could have been making some noise, and then another boy 
could have been in there trying to look for the deer or something---- --------
15 Well I guess they both could be reasons why it happened. I m sure it 
seems like its either one or the other that is the reason why she killed
him. ___________________ __________ .— -—------------------- —----------
15 Again, I don't know, I'd say 50 percent. 1 don’t Know what she d like iu 
do in the future, but it just seems to fit her interests.__________________
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16 I think that that is probably a pretty good possibility of why Johnny 
would be innocent. It could have possibly been deer that were spooked 
by hunters gunfire. 75
16 If he is a CS, he probably does spend a lot of time on computers, but it 
just depends on if that's what he is. 20.
17 if a CS, I imagine that you spend a lot of time working on computers, 
and if you didn't enjoy doing it, you wouldn't be a CS. So
18 I think both of those are likely, so its possible that they are pretty much 
correlated too, so.
Components Considered Separately
1 There are 2 possibilities besides jack. Wife that shot him or a loan shark. 
What about possibility of suicide. Didn't really come into play. Could 
have been known that there was someone else in yard, suicide doesn't 
come up, so must have been someone else. Jack on one side, two other 
people on the other side. Good possibility.
2 For the first one I'll say 50, it was likely that it was another boy. (took 
likelihood of the boy) 50.
3 Could have been another boy that looked like Johnny, could have been a 
deer because he does live next to woods , so both — high possibility..65.
5 kind of likely, but CS I don't know
9 0 because its an AND, and there are still nobody hunting in the woods.
10 Johnny looks pretty innocent right now. He shouldn't have much 
motivation to damage the property. 13 years old, if K really friend of 
fathers, J would be more respectful of K's property than someone else's , 
because of consequences. Could be another boy, because of King's 
eyesight. Deer could do it after all, deer like flowers. 70.
12 I would say that this is a isn't likely because I don't think he's a CS, I do 
think he likes to work on computers, so also a 24.
13 nrettv likelv. seems like bill is a CS.
Unclassifiable Statements
1 OK so that would be both of them. And the deer. Not too likely, 30,
2 80
2 It could be these things.
3 I'd probably have to give this a 35.___________ ___________________—
5 Sounds good, don't know anything about either of those though.
7 High, like 100, because both make sense.
7 Likely, 100__________ ______________.—-------------------------------------
8 I think both of those have high potential. 8 0 ._______________________
10 I think its likelv still, I'm going to say both at 70.--------------------------------
11 I'd say that's really likely too. ___________ ____ ______ .___________
17 Oh, 50 a g a i n . _____________________________________________-
17 [silent]_________ ________ _____________ _______ _ _________ _______ 1
APPENDIX F: CONJUNCTION STATEMENTS BY STRATEGY TYPE
Note: the portion o f the statement that is underlined is the portion that matched the 
strategy.
Conjunction Protocol Statements by Strategy
Representational: Matching________________________________________
See those kind of go together. Man, she'd be really pissed. But to have both, I 
mean, we haven’t even heard from this other girl, this other woman about them 
having an affair and that's a pretty big jump to say that he was having an affair 
and it was being repossessed and that they were fighting and she shot him. That
narrows it down when you start putting in so many details.___________________
I guess you could do that, it would be kind of time consuming, though, of course
he doesnJjgallv_haye_ahfe, so, I’d say about70___________________________
I would like to say 90, usually, if she’s really athletic, outgoing, and intelligent-
hard working, she'd like to do both I think.__________ _____________________
That is high. CS works with math, working on computers a lot. I would say 85.
If deer, probably have damage to property more frequently. Could have been boy 
looked similar, because evesight bad. Unlikely deer, because would be 
obviously deer did it "too", because would see hoof prints instead of shoe prints,
so not very likely_________ ______________________ _____________________
Both of these are likely, because with all the animals in there if he lives in woods,
there are hunters back there, there is a high chance. ___________________
Being both would be difficult I think. Being strong in numbers he could probably 
be both, but as a profession its pretty difficult I think. I don't think its likely. I
think its either 1 or the other. So I will say 30.____ _ ______________________
I don't think it would be both. So that's 0. he saw him run away, and I don't think
there happened to be a deer and a boy in there. ________________________
There are 2 possibilities besides jack. Wife that shot him or a loan shark. What 
about possibility of suicide. Didn't really come into play. Could have bee.n 
known that there was someone else in yard, suicide doesn t come up, so must 
have been someone else. Jack on one side, two other people on the other side.
Good possibility._____________ _ ____________ _—.----------------------------------
Didn't sav anything about him having an affair. Considering he’s so screwed up
with everything else, its probably pretty likely._____ _______________________.
he could be both engineer and accountant, but most likely not. At his age, he
could have gotten both degrees, but I would say not. 20.--------------------- _--------
Again, I don't know, I'd say 50 percent. I don’t know what she'd like to do in the
future, but it lust seems to fit her interests.__________________ —-----------------
I think its a good possibility, Mr. King should, I don’t know, he’s too quick to 
judge somebody when he lives so close to the mountains, a lot of animals could 
come in yard & do same type of damage.__________ _______________________
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I don't know, it seems like it would take a lot of work to me to be an engineer and
an accountant. But he doesn't really have anything else going for him. 8________
Doesn't sound very likely to me that he would do both because why would he 
need to, both of them is considered a complete job. Work a lot with numbers in 
engineering I’m sure, but not tied in together, but I don't think its very likely that
le'd do both._________________________________________________________
I think its pretty likely, if I was athletic, I'd definitely like to do both. Usually 
pretty athletic people like to coach because they know what needs to be done to
win the game. 90.____________________________________________________
It probably very likely because of his background, and if he's a computer scientist,
he definitely likes computers. 100.______________________________________
sounds boring enough to be both, but most people do either or.________________
Johnny looks pretty innocent right now. He shouldn't have much motivation to 
damage the property. 13 years old, if K really friend of fathers. J would be more 
respectful of K's property than someone else's , because of consequences. Could 
be another boy, because of King's eyesight. Deer could do it after all, deer like
flowers._____________________ __________________________________ _
Could have been another boy that looked like Johnny, could have been a deer
because he does liye_nexrto_wpods , so both -- high possibility..65.____________
I am confused because it is new evidence. It seems likely that his wife could have 
shot him, but then why was J charged with it. I'm questioning that J was a loan 
shark because if he were friends for 10 years it doesn’t seem very likely. I'm 
confused. It seems somewhat likely that that could have happened. But if J lent 
him the $, then I don't know where the loan shark would come into the picture, 
unless it was an old that he was still dealing with. And if they had been fighting
earlier about the $, it________ _________________________________________
Representational: Reasoning ________ ___
Sec those kind of go together. Man. she'd be really pissed. But to have both, 1 
mean, we haven’t even heard from this other girl, this other woman about them 
having an affair and that's a pretty big jump to say that he was having an affair 
and it was being repossessed and that they were fighting and she shot him. That
narrows it down when you start putting in so many details.___________________
I guess you could do that, it would be kind of time consuming, though, of course
he doesn't really have.ajjfe, so, I’d say about 70___________________________
Tf Heer. probably have damage to property more frequently. Could have been boy 
looked similar, because eyesight bad. Unlikely deer, because would be 
obviously deer did it "too", because would see hoof prints instead of shoe prints,
so not very likely _____________ _ ________ __________ _ ___ — —
There are 2 possibilities besides jack. Wife that shot him or a loan shark. What 
about possibility of suicide. Didn't really come into play. Could have been 
known that there was someone else in yard, suicide doesn t come up. so must 
hav,. hpen someone else. Jack on one side, two other people on the other side.
Good possibility.______________ ___________ ___ _— :---------- ---------—------
Didn't sav anything about him having an affair. Considering he's so screwed up
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with everything else, its probably pretty likelv._____________________________
he could be both engineer and accountant, but most likely not. At his age, he
could have gotten both degrees, but I would sav not. 20._____________________
I think its a good possibility, Mr. King should, I don't know, he's too quick to 
judge somebody when he lives so close to the mountains, a lot of animals could
come in yard & do same type of damage.__________________________________
I don't know, it seems like it would take a lot of work to me to be an engineer and
an accountant. But he doesn't really have anything else going for him. 8________
Doesn't sound very likely to me that he would do both because why would he 
need to. both of them is considered a complete job. Work a lot with numbers in 
engineering I’m sure, but not tied in together, but I don't think its very likely that
he'd do both.__________________________________________________
I think its pretty likely, if I was athletic. I'd definitely like to do both. Usually 
pretty athletic people like to coach because they know what needs to be done to
win the game. 90. _____________ _________________________________
It probably very likely because of his background, and if he's a computer scientist,
he definitely likes computers. 100._________ ____________________________
sounds boring enough to be both, but most people do either or.________________
Johnny looks pretty innocent right now. He shouldn't have much motivation to 
damage the property. 13 years old, if K really friend of fathers, J would be more 
respectful of K's property than someone else's . because of consequences. Could 
be another bov. because of King's eyesight. Deer could do it after all, deer like
flowers. _____________ _ _______ ________________________________
I am confused because it is new evidence. It seems likelv that his wife could haye 
shot him, but then whv was J charged with it. I'm questioning that J was a loan 
shark because if he were friends for 10 years it doesn't seem very likely. I'm 
confused. It seems somewhat likely that that could have happened. But if J lent 
him the $. then I don't know where the loan shark would come into the picture,, 
unless it was an old that he was still dealing with. And if they had been fighting
_e^Herabout=t ^ J ij t ____ ___________________ _ ______________________ —
That's pretty possible, mavbe the deer was scared out of the woods by someone^  
and while running away, ran through his p r o p e r t y . ----------------------------------
0 because its an AND, and there are still nobody hunting in the woods (Note: 
causal reasoning in explanation for why no one is hunting in the woods from
disjunction statement). __________ _______ _ _______ .---------—---- —------
1 don’t think the likelihood is too great here because I don't think Randy s wde
was a. loan shark. So, I think it was one or the other, not both. ------ ----------------
Well she could be doing both. I guess I never thought about this, I like sports and 
don't plav BB at all, so could like sports and not play BB. Probably is both,
would lilff being a coach for a girls team and on the BB team. — ------- -----------
she didn’t want her life to turn out that way & she thought that the thing she 
needed tn ret rid of was Randv. There is a lot going against R's wife. I think that J
i: looking m~r~ -------^  kind of a convenient bystander in a,way
& that’s whv they tarpetedjiim as b e in g _the_murderer.______ _ _____________ _—
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since he's a computer scientist, he spends a lot of time on computers___________
could be likely that he's one or the other, but I don't think its realistic that 
someone would have both of those jobs. That is pretty likely that he could have
done either one and then changed jobs, so somewhere in the middle.___________
If he is a CS. he probably does spend a lot of time on computers, but it just
depends on if that's what he is. 20._______________________________________
if a CS. I imagine that you spend a lot of time working on computers, and if you
didn't enjoy doing it. you wouldn't be a CS. So____________________________
I'd say that's about, right in between 45 and 50, 47. Both of them could do it. the 
deer could have been making some noise, and then another bov could have been
in there trying to look for the deer or something____________________________
If the deer is the animal going through the yard (don't know if it was caused by a
hunters gunfire), both are the same situation, so they are the same thing. 60_____
I guess I don't think the deer probably would have been the cause but its possible, 
and the first one is pretty likely. I would think, so the chances of both of them
aren't really that high, but it could have been both. 70 ________________
That is saving 2 people murdered him. Have An AND with 2 different people
killing him, the likeliness is pretty low. _____________________________
Well it can t be both. Right. It had to be one or the other. So I'd say there was
really no chance of that.___________ _________________ __________________
Unlikely both would happen. Seems like only 1 animal would do damage instead
of 2. 30 ____________ ____________________________ _ __________________
I don't think its too likely that both would occur. Maybe either one could occur^
either deer or animal, so. I don't think because of both. I'd say like 30.__________
Well, I guess they both could be reasons why it happened. I'm sure it seems like
its either one or the other that is the reason why she killed him._______________
I don't think it was both of those, because both couldn't happen. But it probably
was one of them. 0._______________________ _ __________________ _ _____
I don’t think they are related, because one says she can't and one says she is. 0.__
t w  sort of contradicts itself, I don’t know why. I'll give it 20.____________
I would say that it’s not likely... That both are done. I would say she does both.
I would say an 83._____ __________________ ______ ._________ _ ______ ____
not very Hi^lv if can't he on school sports because of job, wouldn’t be on BB
team .______________ _______________ ________ _ _________ _ __ ;------ —— —
w»n probably not on a basketball team if she has a job and can t participate.
Doesn't fit together. ----------- ----------- -------------------------------- ----------- :------
if he can be two things. I was thinking of how someone can be both and enginee_r 
anH an accountant. Yeah. I don't know if he can be two things. I'll just say its
likely that he can be an accountant (versus an engineer?)-------------------------------
It's not likely at all. I mean, you can't do both things.-----------------------------------
not very likely, the top one says she can't do sports because of iob, the second one
says she's on the team. 10----- --------------------- -------- ---------------------------------
well, can't be both.______ _ _______________ -—--------------- ---------— , ,
I think both of those are likely, so its possible that they are pretty much correlate.
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too,so.
Well, pretty high, because they could go together.
I think that that is probably a pretty good possibility of why Johnny would be 
innocent. It could have possibly been deer that were spooked by hunters gunfire. 
75
I don't think it would be both. So that's 0. he saw him run away, and I don't think 
there happened to be a deer and a boy in there._____________________________
Being both would be difficult I think. Being strong in numbers he could probably
be both, but as a profession its pretty difficult I think. I don’t think its likely. I
think its either 1 or the other. So I will say 30.
I would like to say 90, usually, if she’s really athletic, outgoing, and intelligent, 
hard working, she’d like to do both I think._____________________________
I would think this is a good possibility, I guess can't sav both, cause 2 people. I 
mean could have shot him, but don't really know w/ the facts that are stated. I
would say if they have 2 different possibilities, then J probably more likely to be 
innocent.72. ________________________
Calculational: Largest Component
if he can be two things, I was thinking of how someone can be both, and engineer 
and an accountant. Yeah, I don’t know if he can be two things. I'll just say its 
likelv that he can be an accountant (versus an engineer?)
For the first one I'll sav 50. it was likelv that it was another boy, (took likelihood
of the boy) 50.
Oh. 50 again, (answered conj after the disj Q where took largest component)
pretty likelv. seems like bill is a CS-
Calculational: Smallest Component
0 because its an AND, and there are still nobody hunting in the woods.
T would sav that this is a isn't likelv because I don't think he's a CS, I do think he
likes to work on computers, so also a 24 (likelihood of CS).
Other: Changed the Question _________________ _______
There are 2 possibilities besides Jack. Wife that shot him or a loan shark, What
about possibility of suicide. Didn't really come into play. Could have been 
known that there was someone else in yard, suicide doesn t come up, so must 
have been someone else. Jack on one side, two other people on the other side.
Good possibility.______ _____ _ _______ _______ _ _______________—--------
I think its a good possibility, Mr. King should, I don't know, he's too quick to 
judge somebody when he lives so close to the mountains, a lot of animals could
come in yard & do same type of damage.---------------------------- ----------- .------
inhnnv look, nrettv innocent right now. He shouldn'thave much motivation to 
damage the property. 13 years old, if K really friend of fathers, J would be more 
respectful of K's property than someone else's , because of consequences. 02LL- 
he. another boy, because of King's eyesight. Deer could d o n after all, deer like
flowers.______________ _______ _ ______________ —— ---------- ------- 7 ~ r
T w ould think this is a good possibility, I guess can't say both, cause 2 peop ,
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mean could have shot him, but don't really know w/ the facts that are stated. I 
would say if they have 2 different possibilities, then J probably more likelv to be 
innocent.72.
That’s very likelv if he has 2 jobs. 70
I'm just like confused. It says that she can't participate in sports, but yet she's on 
the BB team at school? So is that like? I'm confused on that. I think she's more 
the type of person that would be on BB team, she probably play on school sport 
and have a part time job after school. So, how likely is it that, No, I think about 
50 percent because I think she could have a part time job and be on a school 
team.
...  ; . ......  - - ---..-. - - - ..........-.... - —-
Again. I don't know. I'd sav 50 percent. I don't know what she'd like to do in the 
future, but it just seems to fit her interests._______________
APPENDIX G: DISJUNCTION STATEMENTS BY STRATEGY TYPE
Note: the portion o f the statement that is underlined is the portion that matched the 
stra teg y .____________  ____
Disjunction Protocol Statements by Strategy
Representational: Matching / ; " ! . .
sounds pretty likely for both, using the math and that kind of stuff.
highly likely since leader and athletic. Especially being either or, probably 
has done one or will do one. ____
well, it’s definitely not both, I'd say that's pretty high that its either, or. Says 
she's athletic. So I think that if she could, she'd play on some kind of team.
Pretty likely as long as doesn't have to deal with anybody else. A computer 
scientist is pretty individual I would say. Pretty likely________________
I'd say its pretty likely, just because she loves sports, and she’s real athletic. I 
don’t know, I’d give it a 60.
that's pretty much about the same question as before. I'd say about 90, 
because both engineering and accounting pretty much pump and crank 
numbers
I think that’s probably highly likely, since those are the jobs I think he'd be 
involved in. Pretty high up.
I really don’t see his wife shooting him, they didn't present that much 
evidence about her, she could do it, & there is a possibility that he could have 
been involved with loan sharks. Don't know for sure, not positive.
I think the likelihood of both of those is high. Really high, especially since he 
didn't see him do it.
Doesn't sav anything about hunting or guns being shot, but it is possible that it
was ripped by the deer, so 50.
I would also give this a high number, because he lives so close that its a
possibility.__________________________ ______ ____________________
I think it is probably both. Said she likes sports. If she knows grades aren't 
exactly strong point, its normal for anybody to focus on their strong point. 
She likes plaving sports and I think that she would probably like being a
coach for a girls team _______ _ _____ _______ ______________ _____
I bet he likes to spend a lot of time on computers because good at math, 
doesn't involve a lot of time talking to people. I will give it a high 80.
Jt jo ,»»ry lively if identified herself as athletic and good sportswoman. Can 
see her going on to be a coach, especially if her grades really don’t show her 
t r y in g  toward another job field. I think a coach would be great for her. On
BB, already________ ______ _ ______________________________ ——:-----
Maybe if Bill is in an office all time, that could be why he is reserved, It is
hard work being an engineer and accountant, could keep him busy enough to
not want to be social at night or on the weekend. I still don't think he's really
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both because of
Could be either. If has bad eyesight, you'd be able to distinguish between an 
animal & a person, unless he lost his mind & all he can see is blurs, but then 
he wouldn't be able to recognize, if he can't tell the difference between 
animals & people, no way__________________________________________
One or the other. Either one or the other. Couldn't pay back. Because 
Randy's wife shot him after a fight they had gotten in because of the house or 
because owed money to loan shark. Oh, because the person who murdered 
Randy really______________________________________________________
Jack could be innocent. There is a lot going against R's wife right now. 
When it comes to an affair, women get really jealous, could cause her to lose 
it one day and kill her husband. I guess she could have set it up, she was 
under her own stress by______________________________________ _
I think its more like a deer & not a hunters gunfire, why would one be hunting
that close to a neighborhood w/ people? More like deer or something._______
I guess that's pretty likely. I think its more likely that he used the money to 
buy drugs, than to have an affair with another woman. Or maybe both. I
guess that's pretty likely.____________________________________________
Pretty likely if he was innocent, because King does live in woods, Said he did 
like to go hunting, so probably hunting up in mountains, & animal could have 
been scared & destroyed his property, or some deer could have come down, or
animals been spooked. __________________________________ _ _____
It could be likely doesn't seem like Jack would kill him if they were friends
for 10 years.
I think it is probably both. Said she likes sports. If she knows grades aren^ 
exactly strong point, its normal for anybody to focus on their strong point. 
She likes playing sports and I think that she would probably like being a 
coach for a girls team
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Could be either. If has bad eyesight, you'd be able to distinguish between an 
animal & a person, unless he lost his mind & all he can see is blurs, but then
te wouldn’t be able to recognize, if he can't tell the difference between
animals & people, no way
One or the other. Either one or the other. Couldn’t pay back. Because 
Tandy's wife shot him after a fight they had gotten in because of the house or 
Decause owed money to loan shark. Oh, because the person who murdered 
^.andy really______________________________________________________
Jack could be innocent. There is a lot going against R's wife right now. 
When it comes to an affair, women get really jealous, could cause her to lose
it one day and kill her husband. I guess she could have set it up. she was
under her own stress by
I think its more like a deer & not a hunters gunfire, why would one be hunting 
that close to a neighborhood w/ people? More like deer or something.
I guess that's pretty likely. I think its more likely that he used the money to 
buy drugs, than to have an affair with another woman. Or maybe both. I
guess that's pretty likely.
Pretty likely if he was innocent, because King does live in woods. Said he did 
like to go hunting, so probably hunting up in mountains, & animal could have
been scared & destroyed his property, or some deer could have come down, or
animals been spooked.
It could be likely doesn't seem like Jack would kill him if they were friends 
for 10 years.
if he's a computer scientist, he probably likes to spend a lot of time working 
on computers. I ’ll go, that’s pretty high. Most likely, if he's not a computer 
■scientist, he still probably likes to use computers.
probably if he is a computer scientist, he likes working on computers, 
probably if you put them both together its more likely than if, together more
likely.X1IVVAJ » ------- -
Seems like it contradicts itself, because it savs that she can't participate in 
school sports because she has a part time iob, either/or. I bet she can t 
participate in sports because of her iob, so 70.
I ; it’s possible that he's both, or its also possible that he hates computers, so 
20zu._____ _____ _________ ____________ ___ _____ _ ______ —--------
very likely, or both. 100 She might want to be a coach on a BB team ---------
Don't relate at all, why are they, don't seem to relate to me. 50. I don't know.
"■■== = = = = = = = = = = = ^ ~ ^  ■ ,  .  „  » i * i  i ___ __ ____ ^  t i M t n  n n t nI think the chances of both are high. JoundsQjke he was in trouble with both
his wife and neople who he owed money. So I would say 80.-----------—_ _
he. another boy, or could be a deer. I'm not really sure. Could
one or tnose.------------- --------- ---- ------------------------------------- —- ,
w ,n  m y  h n y fr ie n d  is an e n g in e e r. I've worked for enpineers and I know how
th ey  generally are, and T'm a business major, and taking accounting thjs
Qpmp.ster for mv first time so I like accounting better than I thought I would.
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would say he probably is
Could be another boy that looked like Johnny, or animals, either wav probably 
damaged by something. Can't blame deer or nature.70 still._______________
I would say probably both, No. It would have to be either/ or because they 
don't work, because if she has a part time job, and the first one says if she has
one she can't participate in sports, and the second one says she can or she is. I
would think that she could have a part time job and be on the BB team 
Decause of her hard work. 75.
I really don’t see his wife shooting him, they didn't present that much
evidence about her, she could do it, & there is a possibility that he could have 
been involved with loan sharks. Don't know for sure, not positive._________
Pretty likelv as long as doesn't have to deal with anybody else. A computer
scientist is pretty individual I would say. Pretty likely 
Calculational: Largest Componentv. i m u u m ; v.m ujjuucii  ____________ __________
I bet he likes to spend a lot of time on computers because good at math, 
doesn't involve a lot of time talking to people. I will give it a high 80.
T'H cq\/ tVint’c nrpttv hicrh that its either.well, it’s definitely not both, I’d say that's pretty high that its either, or. Says 
she's athletic. So I think that if she could, she'd play on some kind of team.
Doesn't say anything about hunting or guns being shot, but it is possible that it 
bv the deer, so 50.^ ^ •______________________________________ _________ ________________________________—-------------------------------
I would say this would have to be an either or, and I would say the likes a lot, 
lik es to snend a lot of time working on computers , so I would give this a 76.
This one again. I'd sav he'd be more likelv to be an engineer._____________
Seems like it contradicts itself, because it says that she can't participate in 
school sports because she has a part time job, either/or. I bet she can't 
participate in sports because of her job, so 70.
pped
a n i c u ^ ^ a ^ i  ^ ---------------- ------------------------
I think its likely that she's on the BB team, but the first one wouldn’t be very 
likely because if she's involved in sports, and that one says she isn't so, I'll say 
its likelv that she’s on the BB team still. 99US 11KC1Y m a t  ------------ ----------------------------:------ :------- -—  ■—
I'm going to say the same. Going with the first one, (took likelihood of the 
boy) 50
Thnf. fo<riy nvplv T think its more likely that it was another bov that looked 
like Johnny than the deer.
t .UnV itThecausp another bov in town, so I’ll sav 90 for that. Not becauseof 
the deer.
Because its still an OR. still think deer might have run through there,. 
High, probably could have been the animal.
-------- L  *  not a hunters gunfire, why would one be hunting
---------:-------: - • ui___1___ A M ore like deer or something.
It could be likely doesn't seem like Jack would kill him if they were friends 
for 10 years. __________________
Pretty likely that, doesn't seem that Jack is murderer, seems innocent, it 
probably was someone else that did kill Randv. so the likelihood is about 70
percent.___________________________________________________________
Both very likely. Idonlt think J was really involved in the murder. 85._______
Same as before (conj). I still think its very likelv she's the cause, whether she
_di^t_one_wa^=orjnother;____________________________________________
I would say probably both, No. It would have to be either/ or because they 
don't work, because if she has a part time job, and the first one says if she has 
one she can't participate in sports, and the second one says she can or she is. I 
would think that she could have a part time job and be on the BB team
because_ofheLharf_worlc 75. ______________
Other: M isinterpreted the Question _______________
This one again. I'd say he'd be more likely to be an engineer._______________
I'm going to sav the same. Going with the first one. (took likelihood of the
boy) 50.___________________ ___________________ __________________
Same as before (coni). I still think its very likely she's the cause, whether she
did it one way or another. ___________________________ ______________
that's pretty much about the same question as before. I'd say about 90, 
because both engineering and accounting pretty much pump and crank
numbers________ _________________________ __________________ ____
I would say 90 also, its pretty much about the same question, (right after the
conj Q)_________ _________ _____________ .____________—-----------------
70 again. Same question._____ _________________________ ____________
T would sav that these 2 arguments would help prove his innocence, so
probably a 71. ---------------
O ther: Toolbox Strategy __ ___________________________
I put 25 for the last one, which was the affair, and I don't remember what I put 
for other one about the fight, but I would put that at probably a 20, so 20 + 25 
is 45. That just seems too high because evidence was not presented. So
35.(adiust down) ________ _____________ _________ ———--------------
Don't relate at all, why are they, don't seem to relate to me. 50. I don t know.
Well I think those would be the best reasons if she felt like killing him.
Those are pretty big things, and to have either or, pives it even more chance,
70 (Adjust up)________ _____________________.______________ _ ________1
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APPENDIX H: CONJUNCTION STRATEGY CLASSIFICATION BY
STATEMENT
(Note: Numbers under the columns refer to the strategy number. Representational 
Strategy 1 = Matching, 2 = Reasoning. Calculational Strategy 1 = Largest 
Component, 2 -  Smallest Component, 3 = Added components. Other Strategy 1 = 
M isinterpreted the Question, 2 = Toolbox, 3=Changed the Question )
Subj# Rep Calc Other Conj Protocol
1 12 3 There are 2 possibilities besides jack. Wife that shot 
him or a loan shark. What about possibility of 
suicide. Didn't really come into play. Could have 
been known that there was someone else in yard, 
suicide doesn't come up, so must have been someone 
else. Jack on one side, two other people on the other 
side. Good possibility.
1 2 since he's a computer scientist, he spends a lot of 
time on computers
1 2 not very likely, the top one says she can't do sports 
because of job, the second one says she's on the team. 
10
1 OK, so that would be both of them. And the deer. 
Not too likelv, 30,
2 1 For the first one I'll say 50, it was likely that it was 
another boy. (took likelihood of the boy) 50.
2 It could be these things.
2 3 That’s very likely if he has 2 jobs. 70
2 80
3 12 he could be both engineer and accountant, but most 
likely not. At his age, he could have gotten both 
degrees, but I would say not. 20.
3 2 Well she could be doing both. I guess I never thought about this, I like sports and don't play BB at 
all, so could like sports and not play BB. Probably is 
both, would like being a coach for a girls team and on 
the BB team. I would probably have to give
3 1 Could have been another boy that looked like Johnny, could have been a deer because he does live next to 
woods , so both -- high possibility..65.
tm to criVP this 3
3
4 12
1 a propapiy ndvc m uiia a _______ ._________
It probably very likely because of his background, 
and if he's a computer scientist, he definitely likes 
computers. 100. _____  -
Reasoning about Conjunctions and Disjunctions 127
4 12 I am confused because it is new evidence. It seems 
likely that his wife could have shot him, but then why 
was J charged with it. I'm questioning that J was a 
loan shark because if he were friends for 10 years it 
doesn't seem very likely. I'm confused. It seems 
somewhat likely that that could have happened. But if 
J lent him the $, then I don't know where the loan 
shark would come into the picture, unless it was an 
old that he was still dealing with. And if they had 
been fighting earlier about the $, it
4 2 If the deer is the animal going through the yard (don't 
know if it was caused by a hunters gunfire), both are 
the same situation, so they are the same thing. 60
4 2 I don’t think they are related, because one says she 
can’t and one says she is. 0.
5 2 not very likely, if can't be on school sports because of 
job, wouldn’t be on BB team.
5 2 Unlikely both would happen. Seems like only 1 
animal would do damage instead of 2. 30
5 Sounds good, don't know anything about either of 
those though.
5 kind of likely, but CS I don't know
6 12 See those kind of go together. Man, she'd be really 
pissed. But to have both, I mean, we haven’t even 
heard from this other girl, this other woman about 
them having an affair and that's a pretty big jump to 
say that he was having an affair and it was being 
repossessed and that they were fighting and she shot 
him. That narrows it down when you start putting in 
so many details.
6 12 Doesn't sound very likely to me that he would do 
both because why would he need to, both of them is 
considered a complete job. Work a lot with numbers 
in engineering I’m sure, but not tied in together, but I 
don’t think its very likely that he'd do both.
6 12 I think its pretty likely, if I was athletic, I'd definitely like to do both. Usually pretty athletic people like to 
coach because they know what needs to be done to 
win the game. 90.
6 12 I don't think it would be both. So that's 0. he saw him run away, and I don't think there happened to be 
a deer and a boy in there.
7 12 If deer, probably have damage to property more frequently. Could have been boy looked similar, 
because eyesight bad. Unlikely deer, because would
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be obviously deer did it "too”, because would see 
hoof prints instead of shoe prints, so not very likely
7 2 1 if he can be two things, I was thinking of how 
someone can be both and engineer and an accountant. 
Yeah, I don't know if he can be two things. I'll just 
say its likely that he can be an accountant (versus an 
engineer?)
7 Likely, 100
7 High, like 100, because both make sense.
8 1 That is high, CS works with math, working on 
computers a lot. I would say 85.
8 1 Both of these are likely, because with all the animals 
in there if he lives in woods, there are hunters back 
there, there is a high chance.
8 2 That just sort of contradicts itself, I don’t know why. 
I'll give it 20.
8 I think both of those have high potential. 80.
9 2 2 0 because its an AND, and there are still nobody 
hunting in the woods.
9 2 Well she’s probably not on a basketball team if she 
has a job and can't participate. Doesn't fit together.
9 2 Well, pretty high, because they could go together.
9 2 That is saying 2 people murdered him. Have An 
AND with 2 different people killing him, the 
likeliness is pretty low.
10 12 3 Johnny looks pretty innocent right now. He shouldn't 
have much motivation to damage the property. 13 
years old, if K really friend of fathers, J would be 
more respectful of K's property than someone else's , 
because of consequences. Could be another boy, 
because of King’s eyesight. Deer could do it after all, 
deer like flowers. 70.
10 2 she didn’t want her life to turn out that way & she 
thought that the thing she needed to get rid of was 
Randy. There is a lot going against R's wife. I think 
that J is looking more innocent. Jack was just kind of 
a convenient bystander in a way & that s why they 
targeted him as being the murderer. I'm going to say 
60
10 12 Being both would be difficult I think. Being strong in numbers he could probably be both, but as a 
profession its pretty difficult I think. I don't think its 
likely. I think its either 1 or the other. So I will say 
30._______ ___________________________________
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1 10 1 I think its likely still, I'm going to sav both at 70.
11 1 12 Didn't say anything about him having an affair. 
Considering he's so screwed up with everything else, 
its probably pretty likely.
1 1 12 sounds boring enough to be both, but most people do 
either or.
11 12 Conj: That's pretty possible, maybe the deer was 
scared out of the woods by someone, and while 
running away, ran through his property.
1 1 I'd say that's really likely too.
12 | 2 I would say that this is a isn't likely because I don't 
think he's a CS, I do think he likes to work on 
computers, so also a 24.
12 I 12 3
I think its a good possibility, Mr. King should, I don't 
know, he's too quick to judge somebody when he 
lives so close to the mountains, a lot of animals 
could come in vard & do same tvpe of damage.
12 12 3
I would think this is a good possibility, I guess can’t 
say both, cause 2 people, I mean could have shot him, 
but don’t really know w/ the facts that are stated. I 
would say if they have 2 different possibilities, then J 
probably more likely to be innocent.72.
12 I 2
I would say that it’s not likely... that both are done. I 
would say she does both. I would say an 83.
13 | 1 pretty likely, seems like bill is a CS.
1 3 2
I don't think the likelihood is too great here because I 
don't think Randy's wife was a loan shark. So, I think 
it was one or the other, not both.
13 2
I don't think its too likely that both would occur. 
Maybe either one could occur, either deer or animal, 
so I don't think because of both, I'd say like 30.
13 
J l4  
1 14
t l 2
|2
3 I'm just like confused. It says that she can t 
participate in sports, but yet she's on the BB team at 
school? So is that like? I'm confused on that. I think 
she's more the type of person that would be on BB 
team, she probably play on school sport and have a 
part time job after school. So, how likely is it that,
No, I think about 50 percent because I think she
could have a part time job and be on a school team.----
" I guess you could do that, it would be kind of time 
consuming, though, of course he doesn't really have a
life, so, I’d sav about 7 0 ____________________
I'd say that's about, right in between 45 and 50, 47. 
Both of them could do it, the deer could have been-----
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making some noise, and then another boy could have 
been in there trying to look for the deer or something
14 12 I would like to say 90, usually, if she’s really athletic, 
outgoing, and intelligent, hard working, she'd like to 
do both I think.
15 1 2 Again, I don't know, I'd say 50 percent. I don't know 
what she'd like to do in the future, but it just seems to 
fit her interests.
15 12 I don't know, it seems like it would take a lot of work 
to me to be an engineer and an accountant. But he 
doesn't really have anything else going for him. 8
15 2 Well it can't be both. Right. It had to be one or the 
other. So I'd say there was really no chance of that.
15 2 Well, I guess they both could be reasons why it 
happened. I'm sure it seems like its either one or the 
other that is the reason why she killed him.
16 2 If he is a CS, he probably does spend a lot of time on 
computers, but it just depends on if that's what he is. 
20.
16 2 I think that that is probably a pretty good possibility 
of why Johnny would be innocent. It could have 
possibly been deer that were spooked by hunters 
gunfire. 75
16 2 I don’t think it was both of those, because both 
couldn’t happen. But it probably was one of them. 0.
16 2 It’s not likely at all. I mean, you can’t do both things.
17 1 1 Oh, 50 again, (answered conj after the disj Q)
17 2 if a CS, I imagine that you spend a lot of time 
working on computers, and if you didn't enjoy doing 
it, you wouldn't be a CS. So
17 [silent]rrv 1 j V \ n
17
18
2
2 could be likely that he's one or the other, but I don t 
think its realistic that someone would have both of 
those jobs. That is pretty likely that he could have 
done either one and then changed jobs, so somewhere 
in the middle._______________________ _ ________ _
1 8 '~2 I think both of those are likely, so its possible that they are pretty much correlated too, so.____________
7 8 "~2 ' I guess I don't think the deer probably would have been the cause but its possible, and the first one is 
pretty likely, I would think, so the chances of both of 
them aren't really that high, but it could have been 
both, 70--------------------- ---------- ,-------------------------
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APPENDIX I: DISJUNCTION STRATEGY CLASSIFICATION BY STATEMENT
(Note: Numbers under the columns refer to the strategy number. Representational 
Strategy 1 = Matching, 2 -  Reasoning. Calculational Strategy 1 = Largest 
Component, 2 = Smallest Component, 3 = Added components. Other Strategy 1 =
Subj
#
Rep
#
Calc
#
Other
#
Disj Protocol
■ . . .
1 12 Pretty likely as long as doesn't have to deal with 
anybody else. A computer scientist is pretty individual 
I would say. Pretty likely
1 12 One or the other. Either one or the other. Couldn't pay 
back. Because Randy's wife shot him after a fight they 
had gotten in because of the house or because owed 
money to loan shark. Oh, because the person who 
murdered Randy really was a loan shark. Jack 
wouldn’t have been a loan shark would he? They were 
good friends and he bailed him out pretty often. Pretty 
good but not too high, 60.
1 I think its one, I think its one or the other, how likely is 
it, pretty likely. How likelv is it one or the other.
1 One or the other, pretty good possibility. Not too high, 
75.
2 13 Same as before (conj). I still think its very likely she’s 
the cause, whether she did it one way or another.
2 1 1 I’m going to say the same. Going with the first one. 
(took likelihood of the boy) 50.
2 1 70 again. Same question.
2 80 very likely as well, (answered just after conj)
3 2 Well, my boyfriend is an engineer, I've worked for 
engineers and I know how they generally are, and I m a 
business major, and taking accounting this semester for 
my first time so I like accounting better than I thought I 
would. I would say he probably is
3
1
3
12
3 _2___
I think it is probably both. Said she likes sports. If she 
knows grades aren't exactly strong point, its normal for 
anybody to focus on their strong point. She likes 
playing sports and I think that she would probably like 
being a coach for a girls team and she is involved in 
sports and she is on the BB team, so I would have to
give that a 75.____  . ______ _ ________________
Both are possible, so 75.---------------------- ------------- -—
I put 25 for the last one, which was the affair, and 1 |
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don't remember what I put for other one about the 
fight, but I would put that at probably a 20, so 20 + 25 
is 45. That just seems too high because evidence was 
not presented. So 35.
4 That is high again.
4 About half. 50.
4 I still think it could have something to do with it. 50.
4 2 1 I think its likely that she's on the BB team, but the first one wouldn’t be very likely because if she's involved in 
sports, and that one says she isn't so, I'll say its likely 
that she's on the BB team still. 99
5 1 sounds pretty likely for both, using the math and that 
kind of stuff.
5 12 1 I think its more like a deer & not a hunters gunfire, 
why would one be hunting that close to a neighborhood 
w/ people? More like deer or something.
5 12 3
It could be likely doesn't seem like Jack would kill 
him if they were friends for 10 years.
5 2 2
Don't relate at all, why are they, don't seem to relate to 
me. 50. I don't know.
6
12 Could be either. If has bad eyesight, you'd be able to 
distinguish between an animal & a person, unless he 
lost his mind & all he can see is blurs, but then he 
wouldn't be able to recognize, if he can't tell the 
difference between animals & people, no way
6
2 Well, I think those would be the best reasons if she felt 
like killing him. Those are pretty big things, and to 
have either or, gives it even more chance. 70
6 9 5 ,1 think one or the other, I'm sure, so.
6 99 percent I think. _
7
1 I think its because another boy in town, so I'll say 90 
for that. Not because of the deer.
7
1 1 This one again. I'd say he d be more likely to be an 
engineer.________ __________ ___________________
7
2 very likely, or both. 100 She might want to be a coach 
on a BB team
\Ta-r\r fnt* Hnth rp i^sons So 1 00.
b ___
[8 "1 2
verv lively iui uum icuwm. ^^  ^^ » __________
" I bet he likes to spend a lot of time on computers 
because good at math, doesn't involve a lot of time
talking to people. I will give it a high 80.____________
' High, probably could have been the animal.__________
' Seems like it contradicts itself, because it says that she 
can't participate in school sports because she has a part 
time iob, either/or. I bet she can't participate in sports _
8
|8 "~2
1
1
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because of her job, so 70.
8 2 I think the chances of both are high. Sounds like he 
was in trouble with both his wife and people who he 
owed money. So I would say 80.
9 12 1 well, it’s definitely not both, I'd say that's pretty high 
that its either, or. Says she's athletic. So I think that if 
she could, she'd play on some kind of team.
9 2 if he's a computer scientist, he probably likes to spend 
a lot of time working on computers. I’ll go, that’s 
pretty high. Most likely, if he's not a computer 
scientist, he still probably likes to use computers.
9 1 Because its still an OR, still think deer might have run 
through there..
9 Give it about a 40, cause those two are possibilities.
10 12 Jack could be innocent. There is a lot going against R's 
wife right now. When it comes to an affair, women get 
really jealous, could cause her to lose it one day and 
kill her husband. I guess she could have set it up, she 
was under her own stress by being beat by R, Plus 
having their house potentially repossessed and not 
having any money and to find out that money was 
going to an affair, wouldn’t seem fair to R's wife.
After fight broke out about house being repossessed 
she just couldn't take it anymore.
10 12 Maybe if Bill is in an office all time, that could be why 
he is reserved, It is hard work being an engineer and 
accountant, could keep him busy enough to not want to 
be social at night or on the weekend. I still don’t think 
he's really both because of time takes to be successful 
in both. I think its one or the other, so pretty likely, 70.
10 12 It is very likely if identified herself as athletic and good 
sportswoman. Can see her going on to be a coach, 
especially if her grades really don’t show her tracking 
toward another job field. I think a coach would be 
great for her. On BB, already familiar with sports. 
Maybe she is close to her coach and she might need a 
little of extra support since she is not getting some at 
home. I think it is very likely that she is both. I will 
say 70.___________ ________ _____________________
10 2 Could be another boy that looked like Johnny, or animals, either way probably damaged by something. 
Can't blame deer or nature.70 s t i l l . ______________
11 ~”72 I guess that's pretty likely. I think its more likely that he used the money to buy drugs, than to have an affair 
with another woman. Or maybe both. I guess that's___
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pretty likely.
11 pretty likely he's both.
1 1 1 That's fairly likely. I think its more likely that it was 
another boy that looked like Johnny than the deer.
11 I think both are pretty likely.
1 2 1 I would also give this a high number, because he lives 
so close that its a possibility.
1 2 2 3 I would say probably both, No. It would have to be either/ or because they don't work, because if she has a 
part time job, and the first one says if she has one she 
can't participate in sports, and the second one says she 
can or she is. I would think that she could both have a 
part time job and be on the BB team because of her 
hard work, 75.
1 2
1 I would say this would have to be an either or, and I 
would say the likes a lot, likes to spend a lot of time 
working on computers , so I would give this a 76.
1 2
1 I would say that these 2 arguments would help prove 
his innocence, so probably a 71.
1 3
2 probably if he is a computer scientist, he likes working 
on computers, probably if you put them both together 
its more likelv than if, together more likely.
1 3
3 Pretty likely that, doesn't seem that Jack is murderer, 
seems innocent, it probably was someone else that did 
kill Randy, so the likelihood is about 70 percent.
13 12
Pretty likely if he was innocent, because King does 
live in woods, Said he did like to go hunting, so 
probably hunting up in mountains, & animal could 
have been scared & destroyed his property, or some 
deer could have come down, or animals been spooked.
1 3
I think its likely that she is on BB team at school, once 
again, I think she could hold a part time job after 
school, so, 60 there. __________ ________________ .
I 14 ~~ that's pretty much about the same question as before.I'd say about 90, because both engineering and 
accounting pretty much pump and crank numbers_____
14 " 1
" Cause it could be another boy, or could be a deer, I'm 
not really sure. Could be both actually, the deer and 
the kid. I'd say 50, I'm not too sure about either one of
14 ' 1
t h o s e . _____________ ______________ ____________
" I would say 90 also, its pretty much about the same
question, (right after the conj Q)___________________.
15 ” 1
I'd say its pretty likely, just because she loves spons, 
and she's real athletic. I don’t know. I’d give it a 60,-----1
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15 pretty strong probability that he could be one of the 
two. I don't know, maybe like, 68.
15 There is a pretty good chance of that. 60.
15 Those seem like two pretty good reasons to me, so its 
probably high.
16 3 Both very likely. I don't think J was really involved in 
the murder. 85.
16 2 I , it’s possible that he's both, or its also possible that 
he hates computers, so 20.
16 It's likely that both of those things could have 
happened. 85.
16 That's very likely that she could do either one of the 
two choices.
17 1 1 Doesn't say anything about hunting or guns being shot, 
but it is possible that it was ripped by the deer, so 50.
17 12 I really don’t see his wife shooting him, they didn't 
present that much evidence about her, she could do it, 
& there is a possibility that he could have been 
involved with loan sharks. Don't know for sure, not 
positive.
17 80
17 well, I'd say 100.
18 1 I think that's probably highly likely, since those are the 
jobs I think he'd be involved in. Pretty high up.
18 1 highly likely since leader and athletic. Especially 
being either or, probably has done one or will do one.
18 1 I think the likelihood of both of those is high. Really 
hi eh, especially since he didn't see him do it.
APPENDIX J: STRATEGY STUDY CAUSAL REASONING MATERIALS
King vs. Ryder
Case Description
Mr. King is 77 years old, lives in a family neighborhood nuzzled up against the 
mountains. He owns one acre of land and has a flower bed in his backyard. Mr. 
King is suing the Ryder family's insurance company for property damages. Mr.
King claims Johnny Ryder, who is 13 years old and lives in his neighborhood, was 
trespassing in his yard, knocked down some rails in his fence, and trampled his 
flower bed. Mr. King has lived in the area for many years, and knows a few of the 
kids in the area, including Johnny. Mr. King claims he heard some noise outside, 
and when he looked out the window, he saw Johnny in the distance. When he 
yelled at him, Johnny ran away.
The defense points out that Mr. King’s eyesight is poor. They suggest that the noise 
Mr. King heard could have been caused by large animals that live in the woods 
behind Mr. King's property. The land bordering Mr. King’s property marks the 
edge of a popular hunting spot, and animals have wondered into his yard before. In 
addition, Johnny claims he did not do it, because he was not in the area when the 
incident occurred.___________________________________ ____________________
Case Instructions
You are probably unsure about whether Johnny is innocent or guilty o f damaging 
Mr. King's property. You are also probably unsure about what exactly happened. 
Johnny may or may not be innocent. Please assume the role of a juror, and answer 
the following questions about the likelihood that Johnny is innocent or guilty for a 
variety o f possible reasons.
King vs. Ryder Fdler Questions
1: How l ik e ly  is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard .
because the real cause of the damage was a large dog that ran through Mr. King s van ?
2- How likely is it that Johnny is innocent of damaging the yard
because the damage was due to a lack of upkeep of the yard and garden?---------------
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King vs. Ryder Questions: Complementary Materials
Representational Non-Representational
Explanation
A
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by a 
deer living in the woods behind 
Mr. King’s property?
(Same)
Explanation
B
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by an 
animal running through the yard 
spooked by a hunter's gunfire?
(Same)
Conjunction How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by a 
deer living in the woods behind 
Mr. King’s property that was 
spooked by a hunter’s gunfire?
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
BOTH because it was damaged 
by a deer living in the woods 
behind Mr. King’s property 
AND  because it was damaged 
by an animal running through 
the yard spooked by a hunter's 
gunfire?
Disjunction How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
EITHER because it was 
damaged by a deer living in the 
woods behind Mr. King’s 
property OR because it was 
damaged by an animal running 
through the yard spooked by a 
hunter's gunfire, OR because it 
was damaged by a deer living 
in the woods behind Mr. King’s 
property that was spooked by a 
hunter's gunfire?
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
EITHER because it was 
damaged by a deer living in the 
woods behind Mr. King’s 
property OR because it was 
damaged by an animal running 
through the yard spooked by a 
hunter's gunfire, OR BOTH
P(AIB) Assuming that the yard was 
damaged by an animal running 
through the yard spooked by a 
hunter's gunfire, how likely is it 
that the animal was a deer that 
lives in the woods behind Mr. 
King's property? ________
Assuming that the yard was 
damaged by an animal running 
through the yard spooked by a 
hunter's gunfire, how likely is it 
that it was damaged by a deer 
living in the woods behind Mr. 
King’s property?_________
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King vs. Ryder Questions: Independent Materials
Representational Non-Representational
Explanation
A
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because he was out of town 
with his family when the 
incident occurred?
(Same)
Explanation
B
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by an 
animal running through the 
yard spooked by a hunter's 
gunfire?
(Same)
Conjunction How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because Johnny was out of 
town with his family when an 
animal running through the 
yard spooked by a hunter's 
gunfire caused the damage?
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
BOTH because he was out of 
town with his family when the 
incident occurred AND 
because it was damaged by an 
animal running through the 
yard spooked by a hunter's 
gunfire?
Disjunction How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
EITHER because he was out of 
town with his family when the 
incident occurred OR because 
it was damaged by an animal 
running through the yard 
spooked by a hunter's gunfire, 
OR because Johnny was out of 
town with his family when an 
animal running through the 
yard spooked by a hunter's 
gunfire caused the damage?
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
EITHER because he was out of 
town with his family when the 
incident occurred OR because 
it was damaged by an animal 
running through the yard 
spooked by a hunter's gunfire, 
OR BOTH1
P(AIB) Assuming that Johnny was out 
of town with his family when 
the incident occurred, how 
likely is it that the yard was 
damaged while Johnny was 
gone by an animal running 
through the yard spooked by a 
hunter's gunfire?
Assuming that Johnny was out 
of town with his family when 
the incident occurred, how 
likely is it that the yard was 
damaged by an animal running 
through the yard spooked by a 
hunter's gunfire?
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King vs. Ryder Questions: Contradictory Materials
Representational Non-Representational
Explanation
A
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by a 
deer living in the woods 
behind Mr. King's property?
(Same)
Explanation
B
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by 
another boy in town who 
looked similar to Johnnv?
(Same)
Conjunction How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because a deer that lived in the 
woods behind Mr. King's 
property knocked over some 
rails in the fence after another 
boy in town who looked 
similar to Johnny trampled the 
flower bed?
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
BOTH because it was damaged 
by a deer living in the woods 
behind Mr. King's property 
AND  because it was damaged 
by another boy in town who 
looked similar to Johnny?
Disjunction How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
EITHER because it was 
damaged by a deer living in the 
woods behind Mr. King's 
property OR because it was 
damaged by another boy in 
town who looked similar to 
Johnny, OR because a deer that 
lived in the woods behind Mr. 
King's property knocked over 
some rails in the fence after 
another boy in town who 
looked similar to Johnny 
trampled the flower bed?
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
EITHER because it was 
damaged by a deer living in the 
woods behind Mr. King's 
property OR because it was 
damaged by another boy in 
town who looked similar to 
Johnny, OR BOTH1
P(AIB) Assuming that another boy in 
town who looked similar to 
Johnny trampled Mr. King's 
flower bed, how likely is it 
that a deer living in the woods 
behind Mr. King's property 
later knocked over some rails 
in his fence?_______________
Assuming that Mr. King s 
property was damaged by 
another boy in town who 
looked similar to Johnny, how 
likely is it that the yard was 
damaged by a deer living in the 
woods behind Mr. King's 
property?___________ _______
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APPENDIX K: STRATEGY STUDY CAUSAL REASONING MATERIALS
State vs. McMillan
Case Description
On Thursday, January 17, 1991, at 9:35 PM, Randy Allen was shot to death in his 
backyard. The state is charging Mike McMillan with murder. The state brought 
forth two witnesses who testified that they saw Randy arguing with Mike two 
hours earlier that evening in a bar. They testified that the argument broke out into 
a fight, and ended with Mike holding Randy by the collar, warning him "to pay, 
or you will get hurt". It was discovered that Randy owed Mike $10,000.
Mike’s wife testified that Mike could not have done it because she was with him 
at a movie the evening of the murder. The defense reports testimony that Mike 
and Randy had been friends for over ten years. Mike claims that he had always 
been there for Randy whenever he was in trouble. Randy could not make the 
payments on his house, and the bank had threatened to repossess it. Mike testified 
that he loaned Randy $10,000 so that he would not turn to loan sharks for the 
money. But he was afraid it was not enough, because he had seen a loan shark 
drive by Randy’s house several times, and two weeks before the murder he saw 
Randy meet face-to-face with the loan shark.
The defense also presented evidence implicating Randy’s wife. A bartender 
testified that Randy had a drinking problem, and that he took out his problems on 
his wife by physically and verbally abusing her. Police reports show that Randy’s 
wife had filed charges against him on one occasion after he physically hurt her in 
a fight Randy had accused her of having an affair, and then became physically 
abusive toward her. Randy's wife has been suffering from depression, and had 
told him that someday he would feel all the pain that he had made her endure. 
Randy's wife was able to pay off the house mortgage with money from his life
______Case In stru c tio n s^ _____ _ ______________
"You are probably unsure about whether Mike McMlUan is innocentorguilty of 
murder. You are also probably unsure about what exactly happened. Mike may 
| or may not be innocent. Please assume the role o f a  juror, and answer t e 
following questions about the likelihood that Mike is mnocent or gudty for a
variety o f  possible reasons----- ---------------------__----- ■
------- State vs. McMillan Filler  ^Questions_
1 • How likely is it that Mike is innocent of murder 
| ivnVe had nothing to gain by harming his friend?.
2: How likely is it that Mike is innocent of murder 
he. does not own a gun?^
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State vs. McMillan Questions: Complementary Materials
Representational N on -Representation al
Explanation
A
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because 
Randy's wife shot Randy to get 
him out of her life for good?
(Same)
Explanation
B
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because a 
loan shark killed Randy?
(Same)
Conjunction How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because 
Randy’s wife and the loan 
shark had been secretly seeing 
each other and together killed 
Randy to get him out of their 
lives?
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder BOTH 
because Randy's wife shot 
Randy to get him out of her life 
for good AND because a loan 
shark killed Randy?
Disjunction How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder EITHER 
because Randy's wife shot 
Randy to get him out of her life 
for good OR because a loan 
shark killed Randy, OR 
because Randy’s wife and the 
loan shark had been secretly 
seeing each other and together 
killed Randy to get him out of 
their lives?
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder EITHER 
because Randy's wife shot 
Randy to get him out of her life 
for good OR because a loan 
shark killed Randy, OR 
BOTH?
P(AIB) Assuming that Randy's wife 
shot Randy to get him out of 
her life for good, how likely is 
it that she had been secretly 
seeing the loan shark who 
assisted her in the murder?
Assuming that Randy's wife 
shot Randy to get him out of 
her life for good, how likely is 
it that a loan shark killed 
Randy?
Reasoning about Conjunctions and Disjunctions 144
State vs. McMillan Questions: Independent Materials
Representational Non-Representational
Explanation
A
3ow likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because 
'Randy's wife shot and killed 
ler husband Randy?
(Same)
Explanation
B
Tow likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because 
Mike was at a movie when the 
incident occurred?
(Same)
Conjunction How likely is it that Mik< 
innocent of murder 
because Randy’s wife shot and 
killed Randy while Mike was 
at a movie?
; is How likely is it that Mil e 
innocent of murder B O l I 
because Randy's wife shot and 
killed Randy AND because 
Mike was at a movie when the 
incident occurred?
Disjunction How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder EITHER 
because Randy's wife shot and 
killed Randy, OR because 
Mike was at a movie when the 
incident occurred, OR because 
Randy’s wife shot and killed 
Randy while Mike was at a 
movie?
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder EITHER 
because Randy's wife shot and 
killed Randy, OR because 
Mike was at a movie when the 
incident occurred, OR BOTH?
P(AIB) Assuming that Mike was at a 
movie when the incident 
occurred, how likely is it that 
Randy's wife shot and killed 
Randy while Mike was at the 
movies?_______ ___________
Assuming that Mike was at a 
movie when the incident 
occurred, how likely is it that 
Randy's wife shot and killed 
Randy?
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State vs. McMillan Questions: Contradictory Materials
Representational Non-Representational
j Explanation 1 
A.
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because 
Randy's wife shot Randy when 
she found out their house 
would be repossessed?
(Same)
1 Explanation 1 
B
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because a 
loan shark shot Randy when 
the loan shark found out he 
wouldn't be repaid?
(Same)
1 Conjunction 1How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because 
Randy was shot by two other 
people, first by Randy’s wife 
when she found out their house 
would be repossessed and a 
second time by a loan shark 
who found out he wouldn't be 
repaid?
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder BOTH 
because Randy's wife shot 
Randy when she found out 
their house would be 
repossessed AND because a 
loan shark shot Randy when 
the loan shark found out he 
wouldn't be repaid?
[ Disjunction 1How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder EITHER 
because Randy's wife shot 
Randy when she found out 
j their house would be 
1 repossessed OR because a loan 
I shark shot Randy when the 
loan shark found out he 
I wouldn't be repaid, OR 
J because Randy was shot by 
I two people, first by Randy s 
wife when she found out their 
j house would be repossessed 
and a second time by a loan 
shark who found out he 
I wouldn't be repaid?__________
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder EITHER 
because Randy's wife shot 
Randy when she found out 
their house would be 
repossessed OR because a 
loan shark shot Randy when 
the loan shark found out he 
wouldn't be repaid, OR 
BOTH!
Assuming that Randy's wife 
shot Randy when she found 
out their house would be 
repossessed, how likely is it 
that a loan shark shot Randy 
when the loan shark found out 
he wouldn't be repaid?_______
P(AIB) I Assuming that Randy s wife 
I shot Randy when she found out 
their house would be 
J repossessed, how likely is it 
that Randy was shot again by a 
loan shark who found out he
1 wouldnVbere£ald?

APPENDIX L: STRATEGY STUDY CAUSAL UNRELATED MATERIALS
Unrelated Causal Questions (King vs R yder/S ta te  vs McMillanJ: Set 7
Explanation
A
Explanation
B
Conjunction
Disjunction
P(AIB)
Representational 
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by 
another boy in town?
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because a 
loan shark shot Randy?
How likely is it both that Mike 
is innocent of murder and 
Johnny is innocent of 
damaging Mr. King’s yard 
because a loan shark shot 
Randy causing Randy's son, 
who just found out his father 
was killed, to run through Mr.
;'s yard damaging it?
How likely is it EITHER that 
Mike is innocent of murder 
because a loan shark shot 
Randy OR that Johnny is 
j innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by 
another boy in town, OR that 
Mike and Johnny are both 
innocent because a loan shark 
shot Randy causing Randy's 
son, who just found out his 
father was killed, to run 
through Mr. King's yard 
damaging it?
Assuming that Mike is 
innocent of murder because a 
loan shark shot Randy, how 
likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because Randy's son, who just 
found out his father was killed, 
ran through Mr. King's yard
Non-Representational 
(Same)
(Same)
How likely is it BOTH that 
Mike is innocent of murder 
because a loan shark shot 
Randy AND that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by 
another boy in town?
How likely is it EITHER that 
Johnny is innocent of 
damaging the yard because it 
was damaged by another boy 
in town OR that Mike is 
innocent of murder because a 
loan shark shot Randy, OR 
BOTH?
Assuming that Mike is 
innocent of murder because a 
loan shark shot Randy, how 
likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yarc 
because it was damaged by 
another boy in town?
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causing the damage?
Filler O’s Filler 1 from King; Filler 1 
from McMillan
(Same)
Unrelated Causal Questions (King vs Ryder /  State vs McMillan): Set 2 |
Representational Non-Representational
I Explanation 1 
A
How likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by an 
animal running through the 
yard spooked by gunfire?
(Same)
1 Explanation 1 
B
How likely is it that Mike is 
innocent of murder because 
Randy's wife shot Randy?
(Same)
I Conjunction 1How likely is it both that Mike 
is innocent of murder and 
Johnny is innocent of 
damaging Mr. King’s yard 
because Randy was shot by 
Randy’s wife in his own 
backyard that neighbors Mr. 
King’s yard, spooking an 
animal, causing it to run 
through and damage Mr. 
King’s yard?
How likely is it BOTH that 
Mike is innocent of murder 
because Randy's wife shot 
Randy AND that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by an 
animal running through the 
yard spooked by gunfire?
1 Disjunction 1How likely is it EITHER that 
Mike is innocent of murder 
I because Randy's wife shot 
Randy OR that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by an 
1 animal running through the 
yard spooked by gunfire, OR 
that Mike and Johnny are both 
I innocent because Randy was 
shot by Randy’s wife in his 
own backyard that neighbors 
Mr. King’s yard, spooking an 
1 animal, causing it to run 
through and damage Mr.
King’s yard? --------------
How likely is it EITHER that 
Mike is innocent of murder 
because Randy's wife shot 
Randy OR that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by an 
animal running through the 
yard spooked by gunfire, OR 
BOTH!
Assuming that Mike is 
innocent of murder because 
Randy's wife shot Randy, how
PfAlB) 1 Assuming that Mike is 
I innocent of murder because 
1 Randy's wife shot Randy, how
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likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by an 
animal running through the 
yard spooked by the gunfire of 
Randy being killed by Randy’s 
wife next door?
likely is it that Johnny is 
innocent of damaging the yard 
because it was damaged by an 
animal running through the 
yard spooked by gunfire?
Filler O’s Filler 2 from King; Filler 2 
from McMillan
(Same)
APPENDIX M: STRATEGY STUDY CATEGORICAL REASONING
MATERIALS
________________________________ Bill_____________________________
_____________________________Description__________________________
Bill is 34 years old. He is intelligent, but unimaginative, meticulous, and 
generally lifeless. In school, he was strong in mathematics but weak in social
studies and humanities. ____________________________ _________
_______________ BiU Filler  ^Questions•____________________
1: How likely is it that Bill is an architect?________________ ____________
2: How likely is it that Bill is a reporter?_____________________________
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Bill Questions: Complementary Materials
Representational N on-Representational
Explanation
A
How likely is it that Bill is a 
computer scientist?
(Same)
Explanation
B
How likely is it that Bill enjoys 
working with computers?
(Same)
Conjunction How likely is it that Bill is a 
computer scientist who enjoys 
working with computers?
How likely is it that Bill 
BOTH  is a computer scientist 
AND  enjoys working with 
computers?
Disjunction How likely is it that Bill 
EITHER is a computer 
scientist OR enjoys working 
with computers, OR is a 
computer scientist who enjoys 
working with computers?
How likely is it that Bill 
EITHER is a computer 
scientist OR enjoys working 
with computers, OR BOTH1
P(AIB) Assuming that Bill is a 
computer scientist, how likely 
is it that Bill also enjoys 
working with computers?
Assuming that Bill is a 
computer scientist, how likely 
is it that Bill enjoys working 
with computers?
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Bill Questions: Independent Materials
Representational Non-Representational
Explanation
A
How likely is it that Bill is an 
engineer?
(Same)
Explanation
B
How likely is it that Bill plays 
chess for a hobby?
(Same)
Conjunction How likely is it that Bill is an 
engineer who plays chess for a 
hobby?
How likely is it that Bill is 
BOTH an engineer AND plays 
chess for a hobby?
Disjunction How likely is it that Bill is 
EITHER an engineer OR plays 
chess for a hobby, OR is an 
engineer who plays chess for a 
hobbv?
How likely is it that Bill is 
EITHER an engineer OR 
plays chess for a hobby, OR 
BOTH!
P(AIB) Assuming that Bill is an 
engineer, how likely is it that 
Bill also plays chess for a 
hobby?
Assuming that Bill is an 
engineer, how likely is it that 
Bill plays chess for a hobby?
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| Bill Questions: Contradictory Materials
Representational ' M on-Representational
1 Explanation 1 
A.
How likely is it that Bill is an 
accountant?
(Same)
1 Explanation 1 
B
How likely is it that Bill is an 
engineer?
(Same)
1 Conjunction 1How likely is it that Bill is an 
engineer who moonlights 
evenings and weekends as an 
accountant?
How likely is it that Bill is 
BOTH an engineer AND an 
accountant?
1 Disjunction 1How likely is it that Bill is 
EITHER an engineer OR an 
1 accountant, OR that Bill is an 
I engineer who moonlights 
1 evenings and weekends as an 
1 accountant?
How likely is it that Bill is 
EITHER an engineer OR an 
accountant, OR BOTH1
P(AIB) I Assuming that Bill works days 
I as an engineer, how likely is it 
I that he moonlights evenings 
1 and weekends as an 
1 accountant? ________ _____
Assuming that Bill is an 
engineer, how likely is it that 
Bill is an accountant?
APPENDIX N: STRATEGY STUDY CATEGORICAL REASONING
MATERIALS
________ ___________ ____________ Kristin _______ _________________
________________ Case Description________________________ _
Kristin is 17 years old. She is a Junior in high school, is athletic, loves sports, and 
doesn't smoke. Kristin has an older sister who is a coach for another school nearby. 
Kristin comes from a poor family and she receives average grades in school.
However, she is a hard-worker and very conscientious._________ _____________
___________Kristin Filler Questions ______ _ ____________
1: How likely is it that Kristin has taken a shop class in school?------------------------
2: How likelv is it that Kristin is planning to go on to college?-------------------------
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Kristin Questions: Complementary Materials |
| | Representational ' ^ Ion-Representational
1 Explanation 
A
How likely is it that Kristin 
plays on an athletic team at 
school?
(Same)
1 Explanation 
B
How likely is it that Kristin 
would like being a coach for a 
I girls team in the future?
(Same)
1 Conjunction How likely is it that Kristin 
1 plays on an athletic team at 
1 school with hopes of being the 
1 coach for a girls team in the 
1 future?
How likely is it that Kristin 
BOTH plays on an athletic 
team at school AND would 
like being a coach for a girls 
team in the future?
1 Disjunction How likely is it that Kristin 
EITHER plays on an athletic 
I team at school OR would like 
I being a coach for a girls team 
1 in the future, OR that Kristin 
1 plays on an athletic team at 
1 school with hopes of being the 
I coach for a girls team in the
How likely is it that Kristin 
EITHER plays on an athletic 
team at school OR would like 
being a coach for a girls team 
in the future, OR BOTH?
1 f u t u r e ? _________________
A  r o n m i n a  thut T^ ristifl f)la.VS On
I P(AIB) j Assuming that Kristin plays on 
an athletic team at school, how 
I likely is it that she plays with 
1 hopes of being a coach for a 
1 girls team in the future?______
ssu ing indi iyiimui 
an athletic team at school, how 
likely is it that Kristin would 
like being a coach for a girls 
team in the future?__________ _
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Kristin Questions: Independent Materials
| | Representational ''Ion-Representational I
Explanation How likely is it that Kristin 
1 a  I plays on an athletic team at 
| | school?
(Same)
Explanation How likely is it that Kristin 
B 1 holds a part-time job to help 
I with the family finances?
(Same) I
1 Conjunction 11low  likely is it that Kristin 
plays on an athletic team at 
school during the day before 
going to a part-time job 
evenings after team practice to 
help with the family finances?
'rlow likely is it that Kristin J 
BOTH plays on an athletic 
team at school AND holds a I 
part-time job to help with the 1 
family finances?
1 Disjunction 1How likely is it that Kristin 
EITHER plays on an athletic 
team at school OR holds a part- 
time job to help with the 
family finances, OR plays on 
an athletic team at school 
during the day before going to 
a part-time job evenings after 
j team practice to help with the
family finances?____________ _
Assuming that Kristin plays on 
an athletic team at school 
during the day, how likely is it 
I that Kristin goes to a part-time 
1 job evenings after team 
1 practice to help with the family 
1 f i n a n c e s ? ______________
How likely is it that Kristin 
EITHER plays on an athletic 
team at school OR holds a 
part-time job to help with the 1 
family finances, OR BOTH ? 1
Assuming that Kristin plays I 
on an athletic team at school 
during the day, how likely is it 1 
that Kristin holds a part-time 1 
job to help with the family 
finances?
P(AIB)
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\  Kristin Questions: Contradictory Materials \
Representational 1Non-Representational
1 Explanation 1 
A 1
How likely is it that Kristin I 
plays on the girls basketball j 
team at her school?
(Same) 1
1 Explanation 1 
B
How likely is it that Kristin is a 
cheerleader for the girls 
basketball team at her school?
j (Same) 1
1 Conjunction How likely is it that Kristin 
1 cheers on the cheerleading 
1 squad for the varsity girls 
basketball team at her school 
1 each game night after playing 
1 basketball on the junior varsity 
1 team?____________________
: How likely is it that Kristin 
BOTH  plays on the girls 
basketball team at her school 
AND is a cheerleader for the 
girls basketball team at her 
school?
1 lii-plv k it thnt Kristin
Disjunction
P(AIB)
EITHER plays on the girls 
basketball team at her school 
OR is a cheerleader for the 
girls basketball team, OR that 
Kristin cheers on the 
cheerleading squad for the 
varsity girls basketball team at 
her school each game night 
after playing basketball on the
junior varsity team?________
Assuming that Kristin plays on 
the girls junior varsity 
basketball team at her school, 
how likely is it that Kristin 
then goes on to cheer on the 
cheerleading squad for the 
varsity girls basketball team 
each game night?
EITHER plays on the girls 
basketball team at her school 
OR is a cheerleader for the 
girls basketball team at her 
school, OR BOTH?
Assuming that Kristin plays on 
the girls basketball team at her 
school, how likely is it that 
Kristin is a cheerleader for the 
girls basketball team?
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and that Bill keeps statistics on 
her team?
teams for a hobby and that 
Kristin is on an athletic team 
at school?
Disjunction How likely is it that EITHER 
keeps statistics on sports teams 
for a hobby OR that Kristin is 
on an athletic team at school, 
OR that Kristin is on an 
athletic team at school and that 
Bill keeps statistics on her 
team?
How likely is it that EITHER 
keeps statistics on sports 
teams for a hobby OR that 
Kristin is on an athletic team 
at school, OR BOTH?
P(AIB) Assuming that Kristin is on an 
athletic team at school, how 
likely is it that Bill keeps 
statistics on her team?
Assuming that Kristin is on an 
athletic team at school, how 
likely is it that Bill keeps 
statistics on sports teams for a 
hobby?
Filler 0  #1 How likely is it that Kristin is 
planning to go on to college?
(Same)
Filler O #2 How likely is it that Bill is a 
reporter?
(Same)
Filler O #2
APPENDIX O: STRATEGY STUDY CATEGORICAL UNRELATED
MATERIALS
Unrelated Categorical Questions^ (Bill /  Kristin): Set 7
Representational Non-Representational
Explanation j How likely is it that Bill is an 
A I accountant?
(Same)
Explanation I How likely is it that Kristin 
B j holds a part-time job to help
with her family's finances?
(Same)
Conjunction j How likely is it that Bill is an 
accountant and that Kristin 
works at Bill’s office part-time 
to help with her family’s 
finances?
How likely is it that BOTH Bill 
is an accountant and that 
Kristin holds a part-time job to 
help with her family's 
finances?
Disjunction
P(AIB)
How likely is it that EITHER 
Bill is an accountant OR that 
Kristin holds a part-time job to 
help with her family’s finances, 
OR that Bill is an accountant 
and Kristin works at Bill’s 
office part-time to help with 
her family's finances? 
Assuming that Bill is an 
accountant, how likely is it that 
Kristin works part-time at his 
office to help with her family's
finances?____________ ______
How likely is it that Kristin has 
taken a shop class in school?. 
How likely is it that Bill is an 
architect?
How likely is it that EITHER 
Bill is an accountant OR that 
Kristin holds a part-time job to 
help with her family's finances, 
O R  BOTH?
Assuming that Bill is an 
accountant, how likely is it that 
Kristin works part-time to help 
with her family's finances?
(Same)
(Same)
Representational
(Same)How likely is it that Bill keepsExplanation
A
statistics on sports teams for a
hobb (Same)How likely is it that Kristin is
— A. /-« I )Explanation on an a t h l e ^ .  team at schooj?U l i  c t i i  --------- ------------------------------ ------ 7 .
How likely is it that Kristm isConjunction
nn an athletif. team at school
How likely is it that BOTH 
Rill keeps statistics on sports_
